I am sending you herewith a note on French Recognition of the C.P.R. and its Consequences for the United Nations, prepared at your request by the Political Department.

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FROM: V. Suslov
FRENCH RECOGNITION OF THE C.P.R. AND
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1. The announcement by the Quai d'Orsay that France proposes to recognize unconditionally the Government of the People's Republic of China, though generally foreseen, has caused serious diplomatic commotion, because of its timing and the fact that the French Government did not hold prior consultations with its Western allies.

2. The French position regarding this last point is that much has taken place over the past three years that has demonstrated the ability of the Western allies to act without giving detailed consideration to the French position. The United States' abrogation of diplomatic relations with Cuba, the MacMillan-Kennedy Nassau agreement, the Erhard-Johnson meeting in Texas are some of the instances cited by France.

3. The French Government does not regard the present move as one that might cause embarrassment to its Allies but, on the contrary, one that will pave the way towards a proper adjustment in line with existing realities of power. It is argued that such recognition does not constitute an endorsement of the political philosophy of Peking, but the acceptance of the fact that the C.P.R. is the Government in power on the mainland of China. As to the reason why France chose to act now, one notes Mr. Edgar Faure's statement of 19 January that France as a world power cannot remain inactive and refrain from "trying to bring China towards the West" and to help in finding a solution to the three great problems that beset the world: (a) peaceful co-existence; (b) disarmament; (c) the elevation of the under-developed countries.

4. Although a six-man mission of French parliamentarians is departing for Peking to explore the ways and means for the development of trade and cultural relations between the two countries, the French Government's new policy, it is said, is not motivated by commercial reasons. It is claimed that France, which has foreworn colonialism, is placed in a favourable position to assist in the solution of a number of problems in South East Asia, which are becoming increasingly dangerous. Solutions cannot be achieved, it is contended, without the co-operation of the C.P.R. - a power that represents one-quarter of the world's population.
5. This attitude might be regarded as a reversal of General de Gaulle's original conception regarding the means for achieving international security - an alliance of European peoples "from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains" so as to be able to face up to the "Chinese menace". However, the US-Soviet rapprochement during 1963, the US policy in South-East Asia and particularly in Vietnam, which France considers unwise, and the fact that the GFR has been able to overcome the economic difficulties of 1959-1962 seem to have contributed to the present reappraisal.

6. The consequences of the French diplomatic move for the United Nations are important. The fact that the United States is faced with a Presidential election in November raises a number of questions. To what extent will the contending parties within the United States be able to avoid adopting a stand with regard to the China issue so as not to be faced with a rigid position after the elections?

7. During the 18th Session of the General Assembly, the question of the "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" was again discussed in Plenary session, and the outcome of the vote represented a small gain over previous years for the Western group of nations who opposed the admission of the GFR. The vote was 41 in favour, 57 against, with 12 abstentions. Now following the reversal of French policy, it is generally agreed that the consequences will be far reaching. In the first place, during the last Assembly, France and 11 African states closely associated with France voted against admission. Other things being equal, there might be a reversal of their negative vote. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of Niger stated today that France's example will no doubt be followed by his country. Thus, one may expect that the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta and Togo will vote in favour of admission. To the above may be added the new Members, Kenya and Zanzibar, which have already recognized the GFR. Cameroon and Ivory Coast may, for reasons of internal policy, abstain. With regard to other African States, it is estimated that Ethiopia, which was absent during the vote at the last session, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Mauritania which abstained, will vote in favour.

8. Moreover, some countries which abstained during the last session, such as Austria, Kuwait and the Netherlands, may vote in favour, while Belgium, Jamaica, Japan and Mexico may well change from "No" to abstention.
9. Therefore, on the direct issue for the recognition of the CPR, divorced from any complicating formula regarding the maintenance of the Republic of China as a Member, one might expect the vote to be 61 in favour of admission, 40 against with 12 abstentions. This is five short of a two-thirds majority. It may be ventured that the outcome would be considerably different if the item were to be examined prior to the Presidential elections rather than after. It is conceivable that a two-thirds majority could be obtained if the item was taken up after the elections. However, Western European commentators appear to be agreed that no settlement of the issue in the United Nations can be expected before 1965.

10. It is likely that the question of the "Two Chinas" will arise. This question will also contribute towards the delay in the seating of the CPR as it is unlikely that the Soviet Union and the other Socialist and neutralist supporters of the cause will change their view that the CPR is representative of all China, including Taiwan. On the other hand, the Government of the Republic of China declared on 22 January 1964 that "the so-called two-China concept is fundamentally wrong and impractical". But Taipei's position in this question will undoubtedly depend on the attitude that would be taken by the United States.

11. On any objective appraisal, the conclusion would seem warranted that President de Gaulle's initiative is generally within the line of United Nations' interests, namely in view of the need for the Organization to be truly representative of the existing distribution of world power so that positive developments may be obtained in the areas that are essential for the maintenance of world peace. As has been repeatedly stated, efforts towards disarmament, the prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons, and measures for the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes cannot come to fruition if a major Power that seeks to be heard is not included in the deliberation.

12. The United States Government might, under certain conditions, accept in part the above view, but maintains that the CPR allegedly has not demonstrated a willingness to conform to the Principles and Purposes of the Charter. However, anticipating a change of policy among many non-aligned states over the issue of admission, it has indicated its preparedness in reappraising its China policy to meet the reality of the new situation. Mr. Hillsman, a spokesman of the State Department, on 9 December 1963 showed that the
issue is under consideration. It would seem, however, that the commitment to preserve the integrity of Taiwan will not be revised in the prevailing circumstances. Whether this will entail the promotion of the two-China policy in the United Nations or not will depend on the attitude of the non-aligned States, but whatever the outcome, the United States will be obliged to readjust its position not only with regard to the CPR, but also in the light of the new roles that will be assumed as a result of the redistribution of power.