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DATE: 07/16/2013

ACTION
TO NWC

INFO

EXHIBIT
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL; OADR
TAGS: NUC, PREL, PK
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR: SOLARZ CONVERSATIONS WITH GOP

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING HIS MAY 24-25 VISIT TO ISLAMABAD, CONG. STEPHEN SOLARZ RAISED THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH ALL THE SENIOR OFFICIALS HE MET. SOLARZ WENT STRAIGHT AT THE POINT SAYING U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAD HIGHLY OR MORDON, CONCLUDED THAT PAKISTAN WAS PRODUCING FISSILE MATERIAL THAT COULD BE USED TO MAKE AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WERE THERE POLITICAL WIL. HE SAID THIS ISSUE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DELAY CONGRESSIONAL AGREEMENT NEXT YEAR FOR A FOLLOW-UP PROGRAM, HE URGED THE GOP TO TAKE STEPS TO ALLOW INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION, AND RETROSPECTIVE GOP INSISTENCE ON A REGIONAL SOLUTION THAT IT SEEMED FOLLY TO ALLOW THE INDIANS A VETO ON U.S.-PAK RELATIONS.

2. THE PRESIDENT, FM, ZAINA, NOCZALE AND BURIN, WHAM,B, DENIED THAT PAKISTAN HAD ENRICHED OR WOULD ENRICH URANIUM OVER FIVE PERCENT. THEY SAID THE WORD OF SECRET.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Sharon Ahmad, Senior Reviewer
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GOVERNMENT LEADERS MUST BE ACCEPTED IF THERE IS TO BE ANY BASIS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP. THE PARTICIPANT ONE STEP FURTHER, SAYING IF THE WORD OF A MASTERS LAW ADMINISTRATOR WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH, AN ELECTED HEAD OF GOVERNMENT'S WORD SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT NO.

ZIA AND NOGRAH RAN OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION, EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF SIMILAR TREATMENT FOR INDIA. END SUMMARY

4. MR. SOLARI DISCUSSED THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF STATE NOGRAH, AND CHIEF KURRA KHAN AND, INFORMALLY WITH THE CHARGES OF THE UK AND AUSTRALIA. HIS PRESENTATION, WHICH WAS GENERALLY ALONG THE SAME LINES, IS SUMMARIZED BELOW, FOLLOWED BY SUMMARIES OF THE POINTS MADE BY EACH OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S INTERLOCUTORS.

5. THE CONGRESSMAN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT ALTHOUGH THE DIPLOMATS CONTINUALLY MAINTAINED THAT THE PAK NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS PEACEFUL, THE USG BELIEVED THAT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE PROGRAM WAS DEVOTED TO DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. THE USG'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FELT THAT THE KAMUTA FACILITY HAD BEGIN PRODUCING WEAPONS-GRAD EPURIFIED URANIUM, WHICH WOULD GIVE PAKISTAN THE ABILITY TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A FAIRLY SHORT TIME. IF THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO PRODUCE SOLAR CONCEDED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DID NOT KNOW, BUT CONGRESS WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO GO WITH THEIR ASSESSMENT.

6. SOLARI NOTED THAT THE NUCLEAR ISSUE COULD DERAIL THE PROPOSED FOLLOW-ON AID PROGRAM, IN LIGHT OF US SECRET
V. Non-proliferation Concerns. His committee would have to
closely examine whether the US could provide assistance
to a nation which appeared to be procuring fissile
material for nuclear weapons. "I have the impression
Pakistan has crossed the Rubicon," Solarz took note of
the GOP insistence that any solution must be a regional
one. By noting that the Indians did not appear prepared
to cooperate on PAK proposals -- thus the GOP was in
essence giving the GOI a veto over PAK-US relations.
He urged that the GOP find some way to allow
independent verification of their assertions. Noting
that on this issue trust alone would not suffice.

1. FM Junejo on May 24 told Solarz that an
anti-Pakistan lobby was vilifying his country's nuclear
program. Pakistan did not have the capability to make
bombs, though India, which had to be a factor in
Pakistan's calculation, had already shown it could
explode a bomb. Junejo also noted that the GOP had to
consider the massive Indian arms purchases when trying
to evaluate GOI intentions. He ended by
stressing that a U.S. government which had accepted
the word of a military regime should be willing to
accept the word of an elected government. An ambassador
said this argument would not work on such a critical
issue when intelligence assessments remain in doubt.

2. President Zia on May 25 told Solarz that
Governments sometimes get emotional on certain issues,
despite capable of who is in power, no Pakistani
government would allow its sovereignty to be
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CHALLENGED, AND VERIFICATION BY THE U.S. WOULD
CONSTITUTE SUCH A CHALLENGE. ZIA ASSERTED THE U.S. AND
PAKISTAN HAVE A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS. IF, DESPITE
THIS, THE U.S. WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONCLUDE THAT IT IS
IN AMERICA'S INTEREST TO BREAK UP THE PRESENT STATE OF
AFFAIRS -- BECAUSE, AS HE PUT IT, OF INDIAN
INTRANIGENCE -- THAT IS A DECISION FOR THE U.S. ZIA
SAID PAKISTAN IS NOT ENRICHING URANIUM ABOVE THE FIVE
PERCENT LEVEL. IT HAS NO INTENTION OF DOING SO.

S. ZIA REFERRED TO HIS CONVERSATION LAST FALL WITH
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND NOTED HE HAD GIVEN THE PRESIDENT
CARTE BLANCHE, IN TERMS OF NEGOTIATING ON PAKISTAN'S
BEHALF A REGIONAL NUCLEAR ACCORD WITH INDIA. THAT WAS:
ANYTHING WE COULD ACCEPT, HE COULD ACCEPT. THE ONLY
QUALIFICATION WAS THAT BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAD TO BE
TREATED EQUALLY. INDEED, WE CONTINUED TO SOLARZ.
INDIA, BEING THE LARGEST PARTNER, SHOULD BE PREPARED TO
TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES TO SELECT A QUESTION.
PAKISTAN BELIEVES INDIA DOES HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HE DENIED, HOWEVER, THAT INDIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE NUCLEAR CLUB HAD LED TO A DECISION TO GO NUCLEAR, SAYING PAKISTAN'S POLICY ON NON-PROLIFERATION IS ONE OF CONVICTION -- "IN THE INTEREST OF HUMANITY." HE REPEATED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST PLACE EQUAL OBLIGATION ON BOTH PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO VERIFY THEIR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS.

12. MINISTER OF STATE NOORANI ON MAY 25 TOLD CONGRESSION THAT S 0LARTS SUGGESTION FOR A PRIVATE INSPECTION OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT REMAIN PRIVATE. EVERYTHING IN THE U.S. LEAKS SOONER OR LATER. IF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP IS TO WORK, IT HAS TO BE ON A BASIS OF TRUST. IF THE WRITTEN ASSURANCES PROVIDED BY PRESIDENT ZIA ARE NOW BASED WHIHYL NTA AND REVITALIZE ITS AFGHAN ACTIVITIES, WHICH MIGHT NOT CONTINUE IN THEIR PRESENT FORM, BUT WHAT THOSE CHANGES WOULD BE, WE COULD NOT SAY AT THIS TIME. ANY ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THE U.S. HAS TO BE WITHOUT ANY STRING ATTACHED. NO GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN CAN DO SOMETHING ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS THAT INDIA DOES NOT DO.

12. MUHAMMAD KHAN, DURING A MAY 25 MEETING SOLARTS HELD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH SENIOR BUREAUCRATS, SAID:

-- PAKISTAN HAS NOT ENRICHED URANIUM ABOVE 0.5 PERCENT AND HAS NO PLANS TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE.

-- ALL PAK NUCLEAR FACILITIES, INCLUDING HANAU AND UNDER THE ACES OF THE PACT, AND FACILITIES UNDER PAKISTAN'S SECRETS.
MINISTER SUREJO, who holds the portfolio of minister for nuclear energy,

-- to Solerz's question about hypothetical uses of uranium enriched above the five percent level, Khurshid said Pakistan's research reactor currently uses ninety percent fuel -- under IAEA safeguards -- but Pakistan, in the context of an IAEA project, is now considering retrofitting the reactor to use twenty percent fuel. He said, as well, enriched uranium could be used for material testing, e.g., reactor components. Finally, he noted that, but for U.S. opposition, Pakistan would have already completed a thousand megawatt light water reactor, which would be using 3-5 percent enriched uranium. He noted Pakistan would not want the fuel supply for such a reactor to be subject to outside manipulation.

-- he had gotten little positive reaction from Indian atomic energy chairman Samana on any of Pakistan's proposals. India had rejected the NPT and full scope.
Safeguards as discriminatory and an infringement of sovereignty; Ramana turned down the idea of reciprocal inspections, on a nuclear free zone in South Asia (land areas only). Munir had a sense Ramana did not completely rule out the idea. Similarly, with a joint declaration -- morally binding -- on non-acquisition, non-manufacturing, Munir had a sense there may be room for further discussion. Ramana, however, had no counter proposal that could have moved the dialogue along, though Rajiv made his no attack on nuclear facilities proposal to Zia the following day.

13. Solarz had a further private talk with Munir Khan at residence May 22. In a broader discussion, including the British and Australian charges, the latter two both pressed to Solarz for a response to his question about the consequences of aid terminated next year, that the U.S. would seek an accommodation on Afghanistan -- perhaps some secret...