The Secretary asks for somebody to put together the additional safeguards that we are asking for on the Israel and Egypt reactors.

The Secretary asks Mr. Atherton to make sure that Fahmi understands the special safeguards under the Nuclear Power Agreement.

The Secretary expresses his instinct to have a suppliers conference first, to talk quietly with the French to invite them and to have bilateral talks with the Soviets to invite them as well.

The Secretary calls for a strategy with somewhat more precise sanctions that can be moved through the Under Secretaries Committee.
THE SECRETARY'S ANALYTICAL STAFF MEETING

FRIDAY, AUGUST 2, 1974 - 3:00 P.M.

PRESENT:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE - HENRY A. KISSINGER

Mr. Ingersoll
Mr. Sisco
Mr. Maw
Ambassador Brown
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Ambassador McCloskey
Ambassador Johnson
Ambassador Tape
Mr. Lord
Mr. Kahan
Mr. Hyland
Mr. Vest
Mr. Ikle
Mr. Van Doren
Ambassador Buffum
Mr. Hartman
Mr. Atherton
Mr. Hummel
Mr. Kubisch
Mr. Mulcahy
Mr. Pollack
Mr. Gammon
SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right. Who is in charge of the paper? Who did the basic work?

MR. IKLE: ACDA and SP.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would somebody like to sum it up?

MR. LORD: I might just make some very brief comments, and Mr. Ikle can present the basic paper.

I will be very brief.

Last time we agreed in principle that there was something you could do about this problem, it wasn't hopeless. This time we are trying to give you a strategic action plan, known in short as SAP.

Rather than summarizing the paper, there are just three or four issues we may want to keep in mind as we go through it. It includes both functional and country approaches. Therefore you have sort of a criss-cross effect. You cannot have an effective suppliers regime unless you go to France and get them involved. So that you have to carefully orchestrate both the broad approaches and the specific country approaches, both of which are outlined in the paper.

Secondly, the whole question turns either on other
countr­ies' capabilities or on their sensitivities to be a nuclear state, and trying to use various positive factors and inhibiting factors, working on those two.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What was one of the statements in the paper that I thought really added to my knowledge -- that deliberation depends on a combination of capability and motivation.

MR. LORD: The point is here.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I hadn't understood that before.

MR. LORD: Seriously --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I find that in the New York Times, I will know that somebody has leaked.

MR. LORD: It is true -- you have to have both to become a nuclear state. And a lot of countries with capabilities and potential capabilities don't have an incentive, and many with the incentive are far away from having the capability.

MR. SONNENFELDT: If you have the capability, though, you can become one. If you have the motivation but not the capability, you cannot.

MR. LORD: Legal and political constraints can work in countries without the incentive and technical constraints can work on the other problem.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is the sort of thing that occupied a good part of our staff meeting. So get to the point. (Laughter)

MR. LORD: I was getting there.

I want to get to Mr. Ikle very quickly.

The third thing I think that emerges from studying the problem is the NPT as a mechanism still remains central to your efforts for a variety of reasons. Without that center-piece being effective, all these other actions are not --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You say "for a variety of reasons." Can you give me three?

MR. LORD: Well, yes. In the first place, it is the major political and world-wide tool that you have got -- for political reasons. Legally, your export constraints are keyed -- whether it is the Zangger Committee of exporters or individual efforts -- keyed to the aspects of the NPT. And thirdly, the NPT prohibits peaceful nuclear explosions.

So whether you are moving on the PNE front or the legal and political front, or the safeguards, they are all inter-related with the NPT and the provisions of that treaty.
So it is an important center-piece, both for its own sake and for its impact in these various fields.

Finally, we are talking here mostly about fairly near-term measures. We have a specific time-table and scenario.

Clearly, there are a lot of longer-term things we have to be looking at, like security assurances, diminishing incentives over the longer term to have nuclear weapons. And as we said before, looking at the problem of how do you live in a proliferated world, assuming the strategy doesn't work, but only delays the problem for ten or fifteen years.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean by security assurances? Guarantees by nuclear powers of non-nuclear powers against nuclear attack?

MR. LORD: That's right. I mean this is a very complicated area. For example, Pakistan -- this is the way to get into the Pakistani problem. But these are the kinds of things we don't think we can resolve over the coming months. But we think there is an urgency leading up to the NPT conference next May, to take some of the steps outlined here, which are more immediate and I don't think involve such profound policy implications as the
security issue, which I think you have to look at in greater leisure.

MR. IKLE: Well, to continue --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why don't you go into a little more detail on precision -- what the strategy is supposed to be.

MR. IKLE: Right. On the capabilities, it is interesting that -- this is still an interesting question -- in that many countries that have an ambition to develop explosives do not have the capability for another ten to fifteen years. The control mostly is plutonium. To preserve this situation requires collaboration among the countries that can export the reactors or the plutonium or both. And to get their collaboration, the position of some countries, particularly France, is crucial, and the Soviet Union, regarding India. Hence we are getting down into specific country approaches.

Just to tie up the remarks on the NPT, the three reasons that it is useful -- I think there is a fourth reason.

One, it makes harder the domestic decision in some countries, if they have ratified the treaty. More has to be reversed than if they just continue programs -- like in Brazil and Argentina.
Second, it is useful to tie together diverse interests in slowing down this parade of nuclear explosive capability. For instance, the interests of the Russians and our interests are not the same. They affect entirely different countries in part. But it may help in tying together a common approach. One can speculate there is a Soviet concern about Iranian capability -- possibly some other countries.

The specific approaches, as mentioned by Win -- we have to get in touch with a number of countries. And the incentives and leverage we have differ in each case.

To start with, the two most complex and difficult ones, the French and the Soviets. There have been some very tentative indications from people in the new French government that they are rethinking their attitude towards the spread of nuclear technology, and they have stayed on the margin of our efforts in the IAEA in inhibiting the export --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do we know what safeguards they attach to their reactors?

MR. IKLE: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are they comparable to IAEA safeguards?

MR. IKLE: Well, they use the IAEA safeguards, but
they have not been joining with us in any special committee, the so-called Zangger Committee, controlling the export of materials to countries, particularly non-members of the NPT. It would go beyond the IAEA safeguards attached to, say, the sale of a reactor. I think it is possible that they would be willing to participate there. There is no clear reason why they should not.

On the other hand, if they move in the other direction, and want to undercut us in the sale of reactors, for instance, to Iran, or to Egypt, maybe later on, by cutting their additional constraints, on top of the IAEA constraints, we are in trouble in trying to getting our constraints across.

There is a fair list of reasons why on balance the French Government might be willing to move into more of a supportive position. Technology they are still getting from us, quite apart from their own interest.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just for my education, could somebody put together the additional safeguards that we are asking for on the Israel and Egypt reactors, as well as listing the IAEA safeguards. And, Jerry, will you let it through? Will AFSA protest if I get that paper?

(Laughter)

Okay.
MR. IKLE: I don't know whether you want to go into more detail on the things to discuss with France.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before we get into what we want to discuss with France -- the first thing we ought to discuss is what is the strategy we are trying to pursue. We can try two or three roads. We can first try to talk to all the nuclear exporters, or all the countries that are capable of spreading nuclear technology. Or we can talk to all the countries that are capable of becoming the next nuclear country. Or we can combine two approaches. What is it you have in mind? To talk to these countries individually, to talk to countries as a group, to send all of our Ambassadors in simultaneously everywhere? What exactly do we have in mind?

MR. IKLE: On the exporters, first individually to key countries, particularly France. Then -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why particularly France?

MR. IKLE: Because they are the ones who have not jointed the special export restrictions that the Canadians --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Soviets have not joined.

MR. IKLE: The Russians are observing it. In a formal sense they have not joined that committee. But they are clearly observing it through the IAEA connection. They
are supporting it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who is?

MR. IKLE: The Soviet Union. Then depending on maybe some further discussion with the Canadians and the French, and maybe one or two other countries, one could envisage a conference of key exporting countries to tighten up further these export controls and get a common understanding not to undercut each other's export of reactors or materials. The approach to the potential nuclear weapons states would be more on an individual basis, like an approach to Japan on the ratification; efforts with Brazil and Argentina --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who is going to make that approach -- we?

MR. IKLE: We, yes. Argentina and Brazil -- probably trying to see what their mutual interests are. There are indications they are worried about each other's programs. It is probably less desirable for direct involvement on our part.

MR. LORD: Tab D has an illustrated outline of the steps you might take at what point -- a suggested scenario of how you might move out concretely. The country tabs before that are how you approach each country.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, my question has not
been answered here. Are we going to be everybody’s maiden
aunt around the world, clucking to each country with sort
of a list, with a shopping list of various things they might
do? Or are we going to try to work together with a lot
of other countries in a joint approach? Are we going to
go scatter-shot, to see whether we can get a little bit here
and a little bit there? What is the strategy that is proposed
here?

MR. IKLE: On the export controls, very much a
joint approach. That is the only approach that can work --
so you won’t be undercut. As you know, the Canadians
have come to us, and the British, wanting to know what we are
doing and telling us what they are doing. So far the
Canadians have been very tough on their new export controls,
particularly towards India. Indications are they want to
hold the line -- if they are not alone and being undercut.

So the next step, after coordination with the key
countries, could well be a small exporters conference.
The formal mechanism there would be simply to strengthen --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The major use of the NPT
among the catalog that you put forward is the provision
of peaceful nuclear explosions.

MR. IKLE: That, and that it settles in a
more definitive fashion in a number of governments the
decision whether or not to go ahead than we now have it settled in Japan or, more importantly, say, in Brazil. We are not optimistic that we can get much wider adherence to the NPT beyond current signatories. It seems unlikely to get it from Brazil and Argentina.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then can you explain to me why do we go in if we don't think it is going to work?

MR. IKLE: The proposal is not to go in particularly in Brazil and Argentina, but possibly in Japan and Italy, where they are close to a decision.

MR. LORD: There I think you would want to get other governments to join you in that approach.

MR. IKLE: The Germans have long preceded us in Rome.

MR. LORD: If you can get the British and Canadians and several other countries --

MR. SONNENFELDT: What is the incentive for people to sign up in the NPT if they have not done it so far, other than for us to go in and tell them they should sign up?

MR. IKLE: We are really targeting on getting the ratification of those who have signed up, rather than getting new signatories.

MR. SONNENFELDT: That is what I mean.

MR. IKLE: In the Italian case, it is the delivery
of our materials to them becomes questionable, because it hangs together with the Euratom safeguards. The whole framework of the Euratom safeguards functioning is in jeopardy if they don't sign up. On Japan, again -- it is an important question what additional incentives can you provide. And the Japanese have been asking that question. There are proposals in here for providing additional incentives to become a member, to complete the ratification process. For instance, availability of enrichment plants, reprocessing plants, which have not gone into non-signatories yet, could well be made contingent on membership.

MR. KAHAN: Mr. Secretary, may I add another point on the technical value of the NPT. The more nations you get, even such as Japan, on board, they become suppliers eventually -- Japan will supply. She is then bound by the NPT to put safeguards on her exports. So your suppliers regime begins to fall out in two senses. One, the obligation for all nations to put on export control, including closing PNE loopholes. And every nation who signs gets safeguards on all their peaceful facilities.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Presumably you could follow this by a deliberate non-proliferation strategy which doesn't necessarily use the NPT.

MR. KAHAN: In principle.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It might even be easier in the case of some countries. There are some countries that might be willing to join a grouping of potential exporters -- the Japanese can export nuclear materials now, can't they?

MR. KAHAN: Yes -- just entering into that stage. Reactors, for example.

MR. IKLE: Certainly two countries where this is probably the only approach to take -- France and later on India, their future exports -- to try to get some mutual agreements on export controls. And Japan could be in a position, if they should not ratify --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me understand. Your NPT strategy is to try to get ratification on the part of those who have already signed.

MR. IKLE: Primarily Italy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Italy, Japan, Egypt.

MR. IKLE: Egypt -- we have not stressed that as an urgent possibility.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Israel has not even signed.

MR. IKLE: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Egypt will never ratify unless Israel does.

MR. IKLE: The dominant pending matter is the safeguards on the reactors.
MR. SISCO: I think the answer to your question is that there are ways in which you can associate other governments in the effort. But basically I don't see how you get around that this is going to be primarily an American effort, with the U.S. really pretty far out in front.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On which -- on the NFT?

MR. SISCO: In both -- in everything. There are ways to water this down. But I think if you look at this scenario, I think it is basically the United States -- and I am not saying we should not be out there.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That assumes we have to follow this scenario.

MR. SISCO: I addressed myself to the question that you posed. Based on this scenario, I think the answer --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On this scenario there is no question that we are way out in front. This is why I am questioning the scenario.

MR. IKLE: In export controls the Canadians are out front -- the British. On pressing the Italians, the Germans are in front -- the Dutch. So it is not necessarily us.

MR. POLLACK: I don't think you can rule out that discussions with the Soviets would indicate they would be
prepared to go quite a way along with us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In fact, I expect that they would.

MR. POLLACK: I think they will.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In fact, you could make a case for the proposition we ought to talk to them first.

MR. POLLACK: Exactly. If we were to move forward with the Soviets in tandem, then I think there is a very good possibility that the British and Canadians would come on board, and you would have the beginnings of a movement; maybe enough of a movement to persuade the French, under some terminology or other, or some terms or other, to play a less difficult role than they have in the past. We have got some new leadership in France, and it is possible you have a new basis for a French position here, a different position than they have had in the past.

I think a key question was put by Hal, as to what the present inducement is. The only inducement that I know of today for Japan to join in is the concept that they would rather be a world leader, in the Far East, in any case, in a world in which non-proliferation has a better basis for achievement than it would if Japan were to stay aside. But it would be very useful if you could get a consortium of suppliers together, one way or another,
where you could establish some benefit in terms of availability of supply, conditions of supply, or what-have-you, to parties to the treaty, as distinct from those who are not. That doesn't exist today. U.S. policy makes no distinction between these two in our commercial sales in the nuclear field. Japan uses this argument. So do others. I am not saying that is where we would come out. But we ought to make an effort to find some way to pay a return to the party to the treaty as distinct from the non-party, maybe by different conditions to the agreements that we supply reactors, provided we could get the other suppliers to follow roughly the same line.

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Mr. Secretary, I would like to amplify this a little bit. With respect to the Soviets, our discussions with them in Vienna, they have been very strong in -- let's get on with the NPT; let's make it work.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have been strong, or they have?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: They have.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because they eventually want to turn it on the Chinese.

AMBASSADOR TAPE: I won't look behind that. But I say they have been strong. One of my problems with their
pushing, however, has been in the area of they have not
looked to the major countries we are talking about in terms
of their doing the pushing, when they talk about getting
Italy on board -- they say, "You, the United States --
get Italy on board."

So although they are talking this way --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: "And we Russians will
get the Chinese on board. We will put an inspector on every
reactor there."

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Now, with respect to some of
the other efforts, you heard about the exporters, the
Zangger Committee work, and so on. The Community members
in the Zangger group have been working on France from time
to time to try to get them on board, and have at this
moment --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In what respect are they not
on Board? That isn't clear to me from this discussion.

AMBASSADOR TAPE: We have asked the French
that even though they do not wish to participate as a sort
of official member of the group, would they follow the same
route as the Soviets. The Soviets are not official members.
But they have assures us they will participate and behave
in that same mode. And therefore we would like to see the
French do as much.
I think the French are tending to say they will behave that way, but it is one of those sort of iffy situations right now. And again, as was remarked by Fred, there seemed to be some indications that there might be some re-thinking along these lines. And I think it really is going to be beholden on us to do a lot of the follow-up with respect to the French.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Excuse me. I will be right back.

(Short recess)

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Mr. Secretary, may I make one or two other remarks.

I was saying I think we have a fair amount of assistance from other countries. But we still will have to take the initiative.

May I also clarify one or two points with respect to the French and amplify something that Fred said.

In my discussions with Jerot, who is chairman of their Atomic Energy Commission, and Goldschmidt, who is their international man, they made the point to me that they do believe in non-proliferation and they will behave as if they had signed the treaty. So that is a starting point. They then go on to say that they prefer bilateral arrangements with other countries, because this gives them
quote -- more control -- more selectivity, and so on.

Now, this is why they claim to prefer that, rather than supporting many of these things, let's say, under IAEA.

The information I have, Fred, is that they will not insist on IAEA safeguards in one of these other arrangements, although IAEA safeguards would be acceptable and preferable to them. But they won't insist on it.

So there are occasions where they will have French bilateral safeguards. And if you ask me how extensive they are, I have got to say to you that I don't personally know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: For example, with Iran, what are they?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Iran is a party to the NPT and has a signed agreement with IAEA as of last May, so hopefully Iran is not a question in that context.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Even the French reactor?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Any reactor.

MR. POLLACK: They have agreed under the treaty to put everything they have in the nuclear field under international safeguards.

MR. SISCO: But it does raise the question with us, where with the Egyptians and the Israelis we are applying IAEA plus the bilateral safeguards -- query: are
we satisfied when we come to the Iranians with merely
the IAEA safeguards, or do we try to apply the more stringent
ones, in circumstances where the French are not applying
any more than the IAEA?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: That is correct.

MR. POLLACK: We are going to work on that later
this afternoon. We have a meeting.

AMBASSADOR TAPE: One other point about the French.
In their statement to me about this, they will respect a
country's decision as to what it would like to do. For
example, if some country decided it wanted to go the nuclear
weapons route and so stated, they would say okay, and
they then follow on and say "We will not penalize them for
having made that decision." In other words, if they decide
to go that route, they would not foreclose supply, materials --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They would not then adjust
their safeguards to the desire of the recipient country?
Or would they insist on their safeguards?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: I think it depends on the
situation. For example, they tell me in India now that they
are asking for safeguards on materials which they will supply
to India. At the same time they make remarks -- they
have sinned but once in this area, and that was Demona,
in Israel.
MR. SONNENFELDT: But if they didn't, they would not be behaving as though they were a member of the NPT, if they were actually willing to support somebody's nuclear weapons program.

MR. IKLE: The Spanish nuclear weapons program, for instance.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But if they will respect the wishes of the host country with respect to safeguards -- and secondly, that they will not penalize them for a weapons program -- then the recipient country determines really the nature of the safeguards as well as the use to which --

AMBASSADOR TAPE: This is where I think discussions are very useful. And also I might add that much of this developed as policy in prior administrations. And at the time I was talking, the new look had not penetrated --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Alex, do you have a view on this?

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: No, I have nothing -- except talking -- Bob should do this -- talking about Japan, your question, what advantage do they get out of ratifying, is very, very much the key question. And my underground among the Japanese say that the principal argument they have been using has been that if they did not ratify, they over a period of time would stand in danger of losing us as a
source of supply for commercial fuel. And that the agreement
that we have made, or the announcement we have made with
respect to Egypt and Israel has pulled the rug out from under
the people that are making that argument.

Now, the sooner we are able to work out and we can
work out our agreements with Israel and Egypt, indicating more
stringent safeguards than on other signatories, then I think
that this will help restore the balance a little bit in
Japan.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In what respect are the
safeguards more stringent? Can somebody give me one example?

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: I am told --

MR. POLLACK: We have added what we call a series
of special conditions, because we like to reserve the term
"safeguards" for what the IAEA does. The special conditions
involve essentially these things. We have said that we want
the right to agree where the spent fuel will be stored,
where it will be reprocessed, and where it will be fabricated
into conceivably plutonium elements. We have said that we
want the right to agree on the physical security conditions
that are going to be observed in the location and the
protection of the plant. Basically our concern is terrorists
rather than robbery, because there are some inherent conditions
in the radioactivity and the danger of the fuel that make it pretty self-protecting from people who might want to come in and steal the material.

We have also incorporated in the note -- and this we have not done as a normal practice -- a requirement from these two countries that they would confirm that they would not in any case ever make any use of this material for PNE. And then we went one step further. We have a provision in our note where they would be required to confirm -- that say that any material that they receive from any external source will be subject, from this point forward, -- case in the future tense -- will be subject to international safeguards and will not be employed for PNE purposes. This means, for example, in the case of Israel, with respect to any future material that they might import for the use in Demona, if they were to try to do so, they would be committed under this arrangement with us to put that under international safeguards.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is why they are not in such a hurry to sign it, to go along with it.

MR. POLLACK: The Egyptians also have an unsafeguarded reactor. It is a very small one, a research reactor. The Egyptians at this point have indicated a desire
to speed up the process of this agreement. Whether they have really read the terms at this point I don't know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do these terms mean, concretely? If we don't agree as to the adequacy of a safeguarded facility, what happens?

MR. SISCO: We don't sign the agreement on cooperation, because it is within the framework of the so-called agreement on cooperation.

MR. POLLACK: You will have signed it first, Joe. But if you don't agree on the adequacy of the physical security, you are not going to supply the fuel.

MR. SISCO: You have got that very delicate situation on the Hill on this thing.

MR. KAHAN: The abrogation of the safeguard question, might have been part of what you have in mind, is begged in large part because a lot of the material is dangerous, will be reprocessed and stored outside the country. The question of whether you have a hundred percent effective safeguard or what you do if they abrogate is not as serious as it would be if you left the plutonium inside.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is it going to be stored outside the country?

MR. POLLACK: That is our intention. We say we will
have to agree where it will be stored. Our answer to that query is that for the present we intend to store it elsewhere than in Egypt or Israel.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you think the Egyptians understand this?

MR. POLLACK: I think the Ministry of Energy understands it very well. I don't know if the Foreign Office has focused on it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we had better explain it to them before we pull it on them, after they have signed the agreement. Roy, will you make sure that Fahmi understands this, if that is what he wants to sign. We don't have to do it by cable. I would hate to get into a position where their political leadership suddenly realizes that we are insisting on storing the nuclear material outside the country.

MR. POLLACK: They had some conversations with the AEC on the basis of the first version of this agreement, where it was explained.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just want to make sure their political level has been formally told this.

Okay.

What we have to decide, then -- it seems to me the relevance of the NPT is that it eases the problem of PNE,
plus the IAEA safeguards; but that it really applies only to a few countries that have not ratified the agreement yet having signed it. So it doesn't seem to me to be an inevitable part of it, though it would be a helpful part.

The second thing is whether we are going to do all of this essentially alone, the non-NPT part -- I recognize on the NPT, we probably have a special responsibility, and the only other country we can get involved on the NPT is the Soviet Union. And a joint démarche by us and the Soviet Union would not sit too well in a number of countries.

MR. IKLE: In the case of Italy, you have the Euratom members joining us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you assume that they really wanted to sign; unless you think there are some of them who want to use Italy to cop out.

MR. HARTMAN: They want a continued supply from us, because without it, you don't have the safeguard system covered under our agreement with Euratom.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, in any event, can somebody over the next week, Fred and whoever has been working on this, work out a less scatter-shot approach. In other words, do we talk to the Soviets? I have seen this -- I have got it.
Of course, you are starting with something that I can almost not resist -- world-wide distribution of my remarks to Senator Fulbright.

MR. SONNENFELDT: As long as you are mentioning that irresistability -- you did point out in that testimony a point that I don't think is yet generally accepted, which is that there is a valid distinction maybe that can be made between PNEs and weapons-type explosions, when you come to countries that already have highly sophisticated weapons technology. At lot of our approach is still based on the essential identity of these kinds of explosions. And I think we have got to make up our minds.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We can't do that in any event consistent with Article 3 of --

MR. SONNENFELDT: Article 3 in effect is based on that hypothesis, or that assumption, that there is a distinction, at least for countries like the United States and the Soviet Union. And I think we have got to get some clarity into our own view on this. Because we cannot carry water on both shoulders.

MR. KAHAN: They are technically different, and the objectives are different. So we have not yet discovered a way of translating those procedures and objectives.
MR. SONNENFELDT: We are operating on an assumption with the Soviets that we are going to have a negotiation which will establish some way to assure us that Soviet explosions that are called peaceful are in fact that.

MR. IKLE: We are trying to work out conditions to make sure such explosions will not serve military purposes.

MR. SONNENFELDT: However you phrase it.

MR. IKLE: The work has not been finished. But the Soviet Union has done a few weapons tests, so the situation is quite different from a country which has not.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Our policy has not yet recognized the point that the Secretary made to the Senator on that score.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It isn't all that unusual.

MR. IKLE: How do you mean our policy has not recognized that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In what area?

MR. SONNENFELDT: Well, we are not as a matter of policy yet making the distinction that we are making in Article 3 with the Soviets; between that and our view of the Indian explosion, which is --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But I think there is a difference.

MR. SONNENFELDT: There is a difference.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Hal, I think in countries with advanced nuclear technology, you can make a distinction on the basis of the type of device that is being used.

MR. SONNENFELDT: That is right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In the case of countries in a rudimentary state of evolution, the mere fact that the thing goes off serves a military purpose.

MR. SONNENFELDT: It may be a semantic point. Page 11 of the Tab A asserts that the technologies are indistinguishable. I think we should be clear that we are trying to establish some distinction as between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

AMBASSADOR TAPF: Hal, there is one other question, though, and that is with the 150 kt threshold, that modifies that statement, too.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But again -- I think we have to get the record straight. In the Soviet Union, in our discussions with the Soviet Union, there was no implication whatever that the 150 kt threshold applies to PNEs. However much we may wish it, that was explicitly rejected -- because if it applied to PNEs, we would have been able to conclude the agreement then. There is a clear understanding between us.
and the Soviet Union that there will be two levels. One is below 150 kt there is pre-notification and a number of safeguards; above 150 kt, there can be observers. But the Soviet Union explicitly rejected the idea that the threshold applies to PNEs. And I see no possibility of reinstituting this in the follow-on PNE discussion.

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Mr. Secretary, I didn't want to bring that point up. What I wanted to say is because one is permitted to do either under 150 kt, some of these restrictions are not quite as clear. It goes back to your point that for the developing country that does it at 10 or 20 kt, there is no difference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That I agree with. But I just want to make sure that in the preparation for the discussions with the Soviets, we won't try to reopen issues that they have every reason to believe have been settled, and that we concentrate on how we can monitor PNE tests above 150 kt. And we have no interest in having them do tests above 150 kt. But they have every reason to suppose that we agree that the PNE discussions with the Soviet Union will concern the question of how you can make sure that tests above 150 kt do not serve military purposes. Below 150 kt, we don't care what purpose it serves, as long as we know it is
below 150 kt.

MR. SONNENFELDT: If it is off-site, it has to be PNE.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If it is off-site, it has to be a PNE. But it is not a matter of great concern to us whether they are exploding a military device or -- there you can distinguish it by the purpose. Above 150 kt, you need some demonstration that it is not a military device. But that is a different problem.

What we now need to do is -- you have all these countries listed separately.

MR. IKLE: Yes.

MR. LORD: With the suggested leverage.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I understand that. But is it the idea that we approach them each individually, or is it your idea that we call a suppliers conference or what is your idea?

MR. LORD: It is both. As I was trying to say in the opening remarks about the criss-cross effect about the functional and the country approaches -- it would depend on which issue you are talking about. You would have key suppliers get together first. Italy and Japan -- I think other countries ought to join us in
the approach. I agree with --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, Japan is a supplier.

MR. IKLE: She is observing the export restrictions.

There is no issue on that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just a moment. If we are trying to get a handle on the proliferation problem, do we need a suppliers conference?

MR. LORD: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You say no.

AMBASSADOR TAPE: I say no.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If we don't need a suppliers conference, are we doing anything, than just trying to get countries to join in the NPT?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Let me answer the following. To me the suppliers conference type approach has been going on through the Zangger Committee work for several years now. They have reached a point where they are going to put their efforts into practice -- I keep saying "Soon" -- it is always this month or next month -- but I still think it is soon.

Now, there are some hang-ups there. And one of them is the point that Fred made about the French and how they may operate in this environment. My shaking
of my head was more in the context of let's understand the French position before one gets into a follow-on with a suppliers conference. That is really what I meant. Not now.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Once we have understood the French position, what do we do?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Probably back to the drafting board.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I beg your pardon?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Probably back to the drafting board. Seriously, the problem I have is if there has been or is apt to be a change in the French position, and if they would come down strongly on the sorts of things we and the other suppliers have been talking about, this question of pressure on non-parties to really move in the direction of NPT I think would be improved tremendously. One would know just how one can behave vis-a-vis India, Italy and so on, and move those pressures along. If they are going to take the position that we exert the pressure and every time the other country says no and can go to France and get the supply of all its materials --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The only objection I have to the NPT route as the only route is that it puts us way
out in front. We are going to be going around the world browbeating, begging, lecturing. We love to do this. But we will be the ones that are lining everybody up. The other countries can take -- France can scream "Condominium" The Common Market can sell reactors. And we are the ones that claim we are primarily worried about non-proliferation. The fact of the matter is that there is no nuclear country whose nuclear capability will threaten us before it threatens fifty other countries. So that our interest in non-proliferation, except for our highly-developed moral sense, which I don't want to decry, and to which I want to pay high tribute, in fact -- except for that, if we do it on the basis of interest, we don't have to take the lead. We should do it together with some other country. If we do it with some other countries, we can do much of what we want to achieve through, for example, a suppliers conference.

If we added the safeguards that we are adding now to the Egyptian and Israeli one, and got them internationally accepted by all other potential suppliers, that would put a big crimp in other countries' PNEs. And then we could still go ahead on the NPT. I am not decrying the NPT. But the logic of the position that the Zangger Committee already takes care of all reasonable suppliers needs is that it is really to say non-proliferation strategy is the United States
lining up whomever it can on NPT. And that in effect means Japan and Italy -- plus browbeating France if we can into a better cooperation with the Zangger group. Isn't that right?

AMBASSADOR TAPE: Not quite in the way I view it. France, to me, is a key in this suppliers question that you are talking about. And I simply am suggesting that there be some consultations with France so we have a better view as to the success or failure of that kind of approach; whether you call it suppliers group or whether you call it NPT I don't really care at the moment. The Soviet Union then has a parallel one.

MR. IKLE: It may come down to a coordination of the interests which do not fully coincide, but could move in the same direction. I think it stands to reason that the French would prefer the Italian ratification, and gradually see the PNE program developed, and similarly for Spain, and maybe Algeria and Libya. The French have been very restrained with Algeria or Libya.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean by restrained?

MR. IKLE: In apparently turning down requests for reactor assistance. So it is very clear -- say with the Canadians --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They would have to be demented
to give it to Libya.

MR. IKLE: As long as we can coordinate with these convergent supplier interests; the Canadians quite clearly want to coordinate with us, the Germans and the British -- we have the basis for an agreement, strengthening the Zangger Committee, either with a suppliers conference added to it or just beefing up the function of that committee.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My question is -- you are then saying the United States ought to be the country that does all this lining up.

MR. IKLE: So far it has been the Canadians coming to us and trying to line up the British and the Germans.

Really we are saying --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why don't we have a multilateral meeting with them?

MR. IKLE: That would be the suppliers conference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What's wrong with that?

MR. IKLE: It is suggested here.

MR. KAHAN: It would be a sub-set of the Zangger group, the major suppliers.

MR. IKLE: It is mentioned here.

MR. VAN DOREN: But in advance of that get some feel for the new French government's attitude -- seeing if
there is any chance of them coming along.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And if there is not, then what do we do?

MR. VAN DOREN: I think there is a chance. I think we have quite a bit of leverage with the French.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like what?

MR. VAN DOREN: Like they need some of the nuclear technology we have, they need highly enriched uranium for the next five years.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which we are now giving them?

MR. VAN DOREN: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And which you would then propose to cut off if they don't cooperate. I am just trying to understand the strategy of what we are trying to do.

MR. POLLOCK: I think that is too quick an answer.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not giving the answer. I am trying to understand it. What are we saying in this paper about France? What is your strategy? Are we cutting off enriched uranium to France?

MR. IKLE: It would start out with a conversation initially, as pointed out there. I think one way to begin is to see how the French want to proceed -- given their interest in a number of countries surrounding them not acquiring nuclear weapons capability, such as Italy and Spain,
and Libya.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Basically you are saying we should start with the French?

MR. IKLE: Probably timing it first with the Russians.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And we say we want what from the Russians?

MR. IKLE: Their support on our approach to India.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who would do that, incidentally? How would we do this? Through our Ambassador?

MR. IKLE: We are proposing that contingency papers be prepared, prior to a definite decision on going ahead; how this would be done, and who would do it, whether the Ambassador, whether people from the respective commissions, which may start from France -- depending on the country.

MR. LORD: Maybe the way to tie all this together -- you mentioned trying to boil down the scatter-shot approach -- would be to have us prepare for you a brief in effect draft, memorandum to the President, whatever you want to call it, which would lay out this thing in concentrated form for your review. And if you bought the basic approach, I think it could be circulated among the agencies as an interagency
matter. And then get Presidential approval. But in the meantime, on a contingency basis, without committing ourselves, to go into depth on how you would specifically do this country by country, and what specifically you would say, and what the trade-offs would be. Because it obviously would take a few weeks to get approval of the basic policy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And you would do what in the meantime -- work it up here?

MR. LORD: We could get you --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You are not suggesting you rehearse it with their ambassadors.

MR. LORD: No -- internally -- we boil down the strategy in a draft memorandum, which eventually could become the basis of a MESDA. You would check that. If you basically approved it and circulated it among the Under-Secretaries Committee, on the way to the President for his approval -- so as not to lose time during that process, we ought to look in depth at France and the Soviet Union. We have the elements here. We need a specific scenario on how you would do it, the timing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can I understand the following. What is the reluctance around this table to sit down with the countries you all claim are interested in this and make them share some of the responsibility? Why not sit down
with Japan, Germany, Britain, Canada, and say we have got a non-proliferation problem, "You are all suppliers. We are willing to do something."

MR. IKLE: We have been authorized to do so with Canada, which we did.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know. But if we work out this strategy, why do we bilaterally start with France? Why not first talk with these other countries and then jointly talk with France, or invite France?

MR. IKLE: We have talked with the British and with Canada.

MR. LORD: You mean get them all together at once as a first step.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's right.

MR. POLLACK: You would ask the Canadians what their interest would be in joining in an approach to the French. I think that is an excellent idea. And I think the Canadians --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just have a reluctance to have the United States go charging around the world, like Don Quixote, for every conceivable problem, including one of great importance, when there are other countries whose interest in it ought to be even greater, who affirm loudly that they are interested in it, and not make them
share some of the responsibility.

We still wind up in a leading position. Many of the sanctions we are talking about would have to be ours.

MR. LORD: The only question now is whether you move the suppliers conference up to the beginning of the scenario.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Supposing you talk to France -- the U.S. talks to France, and France says no. Then we have a suppliers conference. Then it is immediately an attempt to isolate France. While it is perfectly rational for the United States to call a meeting of all the countries that are suppliers, that are interested in the proliferation problem, to discuss it, including France -- then let France at that meeting say what it won't do. We don't have to mention the Zangger Committee. And if we separate that meeting from the NPT, then France will lose that theoretical reason for not participating. In addition, as I understand the discussion, the NPT has in any event to be a largely U.S. initiative, except in those places where a joint U.S.-Soviet initiative might work. Maybe the Euratom with Italy.

Well, Win, can you work out how this thing would proceed, together with Fred? My instinct is first of all for not everybody to talk simultaneously to everybody. My
instinct is to get a strategy set here. Then it may be that I might want to talk quietly to the French and tell them what is coming. And if they have an overwhelming desire for preliminary bilateral talks with us, maybe we will do it. But it puts us in the position where if the French refuse, they are then stymied. Because if we go ahead without the French, we are going to be accused of trying to isolate them. So I want to think through how to do this.

My basic instinct is to have a suppliers conference first. It is a perfectly legitimate concern. Many of these countries have stated publicly a greater concern than we have. It does not then look like the United States attempting to impose non-proliferation on the rest of the world as a unilateral move. I do think we ought to have a bilateral talk with the Soviets, so that they will support whatever comes out. They might even come to the conference. In fact, they should.

MR. LORD: It appeals to me.

MR. HYLAND: What about inviting China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not unless we know they are going to come.

MR. IKLE: They are not suppliers.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would certainly give them
the option privately. But I don't think we should invite the Chinese publicly to anything.

Okay.

This has been very helpful.

If you would work out this strategy with somewhat more precise sanctions, we can probably move it then through the Under-Secretaries Committee and get a decision within two days.

(Whereupon at 4:10 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)