Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries With the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons

At the request of Ambassador Merchant, we have compiled evidence to show whether certain European NATO countries (Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey) have been relatively satisfied or dissatisfied with their lack of a share in the present U.S.-U.K. monopoly of ownership and control of nuclear weapons in the Atlantic alliance. France, which is unequivocally committed to acquiring national control of nuclear weapons, and Norway and Denmark, which have been flatly and consistently opposed to obtaining any share of control, are not studied in this paper, nor are the three small countries of Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal.

ABSTRACT

A number of factors determine the attitudes of non-nuclear European NATO countries toward the existing situation in the alliance, in which the United States and the United Kingdom have for the present a monopoly of ownership and control of nuclear weapons. Among these factors is the acceptability to these countries of their own lack of a share in nuclear ownership or control. To the extent that their attitudes on this point can be ascertained from positions taken and statements made by their leaders, it appears that Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, and Greece are not dissatisfied to have no share in existing arrangements; Germany, while disavowing any wish to acquire a national capability, is becoming dissatisfied with its lack of some share in ownership or control arrangements; to our knowledge Turkey has not taken an explicit position.

European NATO countries have taken widely divergent positions toward participation in the ownership and control of nuclear weapons in the alliance, presently a U.S.-UK monopoly. At one extreme are the British, who have nationally owned and controlled weapons, and the French, who are unequivocally determined to get them; at the other are the Danes and...
Norwegians, who oppose any participation for themselves in ownership and control. Between these poles lie Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey. (Iceland, Luxembourg, and Portugal are not considered here.) These six countries have not expressed a desire for national ownership or control like the British and French; nor have they unambiguously opposed any kind of share for themselves in the one or the other, as have the Danes and Norwegians. Within these limits, they have taken varying, though often unclear, positions. The purpose of this paper is to show what positions they have taken, revealing relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their present lack of participation in nuclear ownership and control in the alliance, as one significant factor influencing their attitudes toward proposals to alter existing arrangements.

The evidence presented here consists entirely of statements, public or private, made by responsible leaders in the six countries under consideration. In examining these statements, it should be borne in mind that discussion of this subject within the alliance has been marked by imprecision and clouded with semantic and conceptual difficulties. A statement appearing to show the existence in a given country of a desire for a share in the control of nuclear weapons can often be just as readily interpreted as evidence of nothing more than the desire for a voice in alliance nuclear strategy, not necessarily actual control. Or a share in control may in fact be called for, but only because it is believed to be the sole means of acquiring a voice in strategy. (Indeed, in a sense, control of nuclear weapons is a kind of strategy.) Similarly, ostensible evidence of a desire for a share in ownership of nuclear weapons may reflect only a desire for a share of control, possibly accompanied by a belief that the latter cannot be obtained without the former. Furthermore, statements made and positions taken, even when they have seemed unambiguous, have shown a protean ability to metamorphose when put to the test of an actual case.

With the foregoing caveat in mind, the evidence collected suggests that Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, and Greece have been relatively satisfied with their lack of a share in the U.S.-U.K. monopoly of ownership and control of nuclear weapons in the alliance (which to them means a U.S. monopoly). Where they have looked favorably on proposals to alter present arrangements, it has been for other reasons (not all of them at work in all four countries): a belief that other countries were dissatisfied with existing arrangements and this would weaken the alliance; a belief that changes were necessary in order to forestall or absorb pressures for the development of national capabilities, especially in Germany; a desire to accommodate wishes ascribed to the United States; and others. Germany has become restive with its lack of participation in nuclear matters. To our knowledge Turkey has not expressed a position.
There follow a short summary of the positions taken by leaders in each of the six countries, and a compilation of remarks quoted from or attributed to these leaders, arranged chronologically by country.

**Federal Republic of Germany.** The Germans have followed no consistent line in their statements on ownership and control of nuclear weapons. Disavowals of any desire to alter existing arrangements have been offset by calls for some multilateral sharing of this control, and by hints of an eventual demand for nuclear "parity" with the British and French. It has not always been clear, however, whether "parity" meant the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Germans or their renunciation by the British and French. In general, the German position, has moved in the direction of dissatisfaction with the existing situation.

**Italy.** The Italians have not expressed dissatisfaction with the Anglo-American monopoly. They did make a proposal, for indeterminate reasons, for the adoption of a majority-decision, U.S.-veto arrangement on the use of nuclear forces.

**Belgium.** The Belgians have expressed no dissatisfaction with their lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons. Their support for proposals to change the existing situation in favor of multilateral sharing has been based on other considerations, such as the belief that a multilateral approach is necessary in order to prevent the development of a German national capability, and that such sharing would have a consolidating effect on the alliance.

**The Netherlands.** The Dutch, with one minor exception, have said they were satisfied with existing alliance nuclear arrangements. To the extent that they have supported proposals for change, this support has not sprung from dissatisfaction with their own lack of a share in ownership and control, but from other reasons, as in the case of the Belgians.

**Greece.** Apart from one recent statement of qualified satisfaction with the existing situation (which the Greeks construe as a U.S. monopoly of control), the Greeks have had nothing to say on the subject of nuclear control in the alliance.

**Turkey.** We have found no authoritative statements by the Turks to show either satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the present situation.

**Statements on Nuclear Control in the Atlantic Alliance by Responsible Persons in Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Turkey**

**Germany**

talk that the Bonn government would not favor the transfer of some nuclear warheads from United States to NATO control. "We are of the deep conviction that for the foreseeable future the defense of Europe rests upon the United States' security guarantee. We want to create no grounds for mistrust of that guarantee," The Times quoted Strauss as saying. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Dec. 1, 1960, SPD Bundestag Member and defense expert Fritz Erler. In a conversation with General Norstad, Erler exposed his views on control of nuclear weapons. He suggested that the North Atlantic Council establish a sort of general rules of engagement for nuclear weapons, with the actual decision to use these weapons vested in the President of the United States. (SECRET)

Feb. 6, 1961, Defense Minister Strauss. The following exchange took place in an interview with Newsweek, published Feb. 6, 1961:

"Q: How do you view the question of nuclear weapons for NATO?

A: We Germans took a positive point of view toward the proposal of Secretary Herter that NATO have its own atomic force.

Q: Would the present German government like to possess nuclear weapons of its own?

A: No--absolutely no. Of course, we want and need a certain nuclear capability, but we always say nuclear armament consists of two components. One is the means of delivery in the tactical field. The other is nuclear warheads. We should have our own means of delivery, but we are absolutely satisfied with nuclear warheads being under U.S. custody and being released either by NATO or released by the American President." (UNCLASSIFIED)

April 18, 1961, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. In an interview reported in the New York Times, following his return from a trip to Washington, Adenauer denied that he had renounced nuclear weapons for West Germany, as two West German papers had reported. But he indicated, according to the Times, that he might be prepared to renounce the supplying of West German forces with their own nuclear weapons if the other Atlantic powers did so. When asked who should have control over the nuclear weapons of the alliance, he replied, "I would not attach too much importance to it." He indicated that the important thing was that the weapons be available to the alliance and that there be complete assurance that they would be used if necessary. He also indicated that he did not favor complicated, multinational consultation as a necessary condition to the use of nuclear weapons. As the Times saw it, "The Chancellor's view appeared to conform to the growing opinion in Washington that the vast complications involved in nuclear sharing among the allies might best be avoided if those weapons were retained primarily by the United States." (UNCLASSIFIED)
July 30, 1961, Defense Minister Strauss. In an interview broadcast by NBC-TV, Strauss said, "We are under NATO commitment to have a tactical nuclear capability. We never have applied for a national control of warheads. The warheads are under United States custody and maintenance. That is the real situation for the German forces." (From a secondary source: UNCLASSIFIED)

Nov. 12, 1961, Chancellor Adenauer. Shortly before leaving for a trip to the United States, Chancellor Adenauer was reported by the New York Times to have said that NATO should be able to order the use of atomic weapons without the prior authorization of the President of the United States. Adenauer reportedly said that this was necessary because a situation might arise in which "an immediate decision has to be taken when the fate of all could be decided in one hour and the President of the United States cannot be reached." Adenauer said the matter was military, not one of politics or prestige. "We must arrange within NATO that a decision can be taken to use atomic weapons even before the President is heard from," the Chancellor said. He noted that a proposal had been made by the Eisenhower Administration to make NATO the world's fourth atomic power. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Nov. 27, 1961, Defense Minister Strauss. The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by Strauss at Georgetown University, Washington:

"...In the past, America provided strategic cover for the entire Alliance; but isn't it now an evident fact that in the future, Europe must provide cover for America just as America must provide cover for Europe? The former one-way street must necessarily become one where traffic moves in both directions - our relationship will have to be based on reciprocity...

"Since those countries which don't belong to the 'Nuclear Club' are practically defenseless as long as the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is not at their disposal, and since on the other hand there are goods reasons why an extension to an increasing number of nations of the control over nuclear weapons, meets with a great deal of political reluctance, one shall have to devise a system of guarantees and formulas which give to the medium-sized and small nations a feeling of partnership and permit them to play the role of active partners. The present US Government as well as the preceding administration have both recognized the importance of this problem and have indicated a possible approach to its solution.....

"...I advocate the creation of competent and responsible political agencies in NATO which would assume certain responsibilities which can no longer be dealt with at the level of national authorities...Among the responsibilities which these top-level institutions (which would have to be controlled by parliamentary authorities) would have to assume, and deal with, would be in particular problems of NATO strategy, control over nuclear weapons, control over their employment....." (UNCLASSIFIED)
Nov. 22, 1961. Government Statement to Bundestag on Policy Toward NATO and Atomic Weapons (Delivered by Vice Chancellor Ehrard). "In the opinion of the Federal Government, the plan for a NATO atomic force should be realized as soon as possible. Formation of such a force is necessary in order to raise the defensive capacity of the armed forces of NATO to the same technical level as that of its opponent. In putting forward this demand, the Federal Government refutes at the same time the charge that it is seeking to obtain atomic weapons for itself. The Federal Government has never raised such a demand."

Dec. 1961. Defense Minister Strauss. The American Embassy in Bonn reported on several accounts carried in the West German press of a television interview with Strauss, made in Washington and televised on December 4 in Germany. According to these accounts, Strauss argued that there should not be first-class and second-class members within NATO. He expressed the hope that England and France would agree to an atomic partnership within NATO, and he put forward what he termed two necessities for such a partnership: first, the decision to resort to the use of nuclear weapons had to rest in responsible political hands at a very high level and not be surrendered to local military commanders; second, the organization for release of the weapons and the command structure had to be very simple so that the decision could be taken quickly. Strauss recognized that in the last analysis no resort to nuclear weapons would be possible without action by the President of the United States. He said that he considered it necessary for all NATO members to have some influence on the principles and rules for use and non-use of atomic weapons, and that the country threatened or attacked should have more of a voice than it had. He disavowed any desire for German ownership of nuclear arms.

(Bonn A-783, Dec. 6, 1961, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
April 7, 1962. Defense Minister Strauss. In an article in the CDU newsletter, Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz, Strauss wrote in favor of a nuclear partnership within NATO that "clearly emphasized the American President's right of decision." He suggested that America's partners have a limited voice in the control of nuclear weapons: "Each European NATO partner should be informed of the nuclear capacity on its territory and should have a guarantee that these atomic warheads will not be withdrawn or reduced without its knowledge and approval." (Reported in New York Times, April 17, 1962, UNCLASSIFIED)

June 18, 1962. German View Reported by NATO Secretary General Stikker. On June 15, 1962, the American Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council made a statement to the NAC that the SACEUR had no urgent military requirement for NRBM's. A few days later, Secretary General Stikker told the US Permanent Representative that "the Germans and others" were disturbed by the American policy of taking care of all targets of the alliance, as showing evidence of an American desire to interfere with and dominate Europe politically. (SECRET)

June 1962. Defense Minister Strauss. An unevaluated intelligence report described a conversation between an American source and Strauss. The source asked Strauss whether, assuming that the French got a full-fledged nuclear deterrent and the UK preserved her present position, political pressures for a German national deterrent would not become overwhelming. Strauss replied as follows: "That such pressure would exist cannot be denied. However the situation as I see it is as follows: the US is and remains the cornerstone of the Western defense system. But the burden is unequally distributed, with the US spending so many more billions than Europe all together. This is unsound and out of keeping with political realities, as Europe has now become very much stronger than she once was. Today, power means nuclear power, no doubt about that. Hence, recognition of reality demands a more balanced picture: here, the US nuclear power; there, European nuclear power. What does 'European' mean in this context? Either a NATO nuclear force or a purely European one; but, in contrast to General de Gaulle, we see in this not a 'third force' outside the USA and the USSR and balancing them, but rather a stronger part in an Atlantic partnership. This is where we differ with de Gaulle. In fact, any discussion of a third force always makes me nervous because it is dangerous for Germany, as it tends to awaken and encourage latent neutralist forces.

"But to return to the question: the pressure for the acquisition of German national nuclear deterrents would become overwhelming only if there were indications that the US was disengaging from Europe or at least that her interests in Europe, her involvement and guarantees in and for European security, were to be materially weakened. Then, the pressure for a German deterrent could not be resisted. But there is no indication that the US is indeed inclined to disengage in any way. I repeat therefore: even with the development of a French independent deterrent, and the maintenance of
the present UK policy, German internal political pressure for a national deterrent would not necessarily become overwhelming if the US really remains in Europe. But there is need for a NATO or European nuclear force. The present imbalance is unsound." (From an intelligence report dated December 19, 1962, SECRET, NOFORN DISSEMIN)

Jan. 4, 1963, Chancellor Adenauer. NATO Secretary General Stikker informed us of talks he had had in Bonn with Adenauer in the wake of the Nassau Conference. Adenauer pointed out that the Germans furnished the bulk of NATO troops, and said these troops could not be asked to bleed to death if Germany had no voice in the decision on atomic weapons. Although the Germans had been assured by the Americans that atomic weapons would be made available when needed, Adenauer continued, the Germans had no control over these weapons and could not be sure that American assurances would be fulfilled. SECRET

April 3, 1963, Foreign Minister Schroeder. In a conversation with Adlai Stevenson, Schroeder is reported to have stated that if the Multilateral Force did not exist, the Germans would ultimately seek equal status with the UK and France as a nuclear power. Schroeder said the Germans preferred the MLF as a solution, principally for political-psychological reasons, although they were happy to note that the U.S. considered it also of military value. It was highly important, therefore, that the MLF control problem be solved without giving Europe a sense of inferiority. Schroeder implied that he was worried at the thought that the U.S. voice might outweigh that of the European participants, although he noted that when the need for the use of the MLF arose, there was not likely to be time to weigh the pros and cons. He thought it was important to set up the MLF in a way that would avoid the charge that the Europeans were paying but the U.S. controlling in other respects. CONFIDENTIAL

May 15, 1963, Minister for Special Affairs Heinrich Krone. Krone, known as a confidante of Chancellor Adenauer, told President Kennedy during a call at the White House that the German policy on nuclear weapons was one of closest possible cooperation with the United States. Krone said he shared the view that had been expressed by the Chancellor to Assistant Secretary Tyler at Cadenabbia that since 97 percent of the power in the Alliance rested with the United States, the ultimate responsibility must also rest with the U.S. CONFIDENTIAL

May 24, 1963, Defense Minister von Hassel. In an interview with German newspaper correspondent Adelbert Weinstein at Ottawa, where he had gone to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting, von Hassel discussed nuclear matters. Relevant excerpts follow:

"On the multilateral atomic force, Defense Minister von Hassel said that at the beginning, the other partners had to understand that the right of veto was to be accorded to the American President. As soon, however, as it appeared that the multilateral striking force was becoming a real

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military instrument, it had to be possible to dissuade the American partner from its veto and to institute a majority decision for the political and military use of this force. These considerations were especially important with a view to the position of our French partner. 'It must be important to us in the long run to draw the French into this multilateral striking force.' It is we who must have understanding for the French, who will never enter this force if the effectiveness of their weapons system can be blunted by the veto of one state. The solution of the problem whether to have a veto or majority decision, then, will first press for resolution when the military instrument has taken shape'

"Kassel believes he sees the political value of the multilateral atomic force for the Federal Republic and the Atlantic Alliance in the strong meshing of European and American interests that result from it. The Atlantic Pact had hitherto excluded the nuclear side of interdependence. Precisely with the yet closer tieing of America to Europe in an integrated atomic policy was NATO strengthened. There could thus be no question that German support for this atomic striking force was at the expense of Atlantic solidarity. Any speculation that the German side wants to receive atomic weapons for itself by way of the multilateral force is completely off the track. The Federal Republic, in endeavoring to have this atomic striking force come into existence, considers it important that all partners of the alliance, including France, take part in it." (Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 25, 1963 UNCLASSIFIED)

Italy

June 26, 1961, Italian Embassy Washington. During a visit to the United States by Italian Prime Minister Fanfani, the Foreign Minister Segni had made an ambiguous reference to the subject of control of nuclear weapons. Shortly thereafter, a representative of the Italian Embassy, acting on instructions, gave the Department "on a very informal basis," a "tentative" proposal on control, which the Italians said was prompted by President Kennedy's offer to commit five POLAKIS submarines to NATO, and by SAGIN's and SAGIAN's MRBM requirements. Under the Italian proposal, the decision to use specified strategic nuclear forces would be made by a majority of those nations that had "assumed nuclear responsibilities," provided that the U.S. voted with the majority. (Department's outgoing airgram A-1 to Rome and other posts, SECRET)

'"It is not clear why the Italians came forward with this proposal. The Italian Embassy representative himself was not certain whether the proposed system was intended to apply to tactical as well as strategic nuclear forces. Nor was it clear whether it would apply to some nuclear forces not committed to NATO. (SECRET)

March 18, 1962, President Giovanni Gronchi. An unevaluated intelligence report (appraisal of reportorial accuracy:2) disclosed the views of the
Italian President on nuclear strategy. Gronchi told the source that he considered it likely that the Soviets might not consider it advantageous, in the event of a major war, to use their most destructive weapons against Western Europe. The Soviets might reason that while it would be in their interest to inflict as much damage as possible on the United States, the same would not hold true for Western Europe, which the Soviets might well prefer to spare, at least to the extent of not rendering it uninhabitable and hence useless for themselves for a long time. If the Soviets did in fact reason this way, Gronchi felt, there would be no reason to give NATO a strategic atomic capability of its own. The really destructive exchange of nuclear blows would take place over the heads of the Western Europeans, that is, between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., while the defense of Western Europe itself could be conducted by strengthened conventional forces supplied with tactical atomic weapons. (Intelligence Report dated April 9, 1962, CONFIDENTIAL NO FORN DISSEM CONTINUED CONTROL)

Feb. 26, 1963. Italian NATO Permrep Alessandrin. Weighing the prospects for Italian participation in the MLF, Alessandrin told Finletter that he thought it would be useful if the U.S. could say something about the prospect of some easement of the American monopoly position, even if only as a long-range possibility. CONFIDENTIAL NO FORN DISSEM CONTINUED CONTROL

Belgium

March 28, 1962. Belgian Permanent Representative to NAC De Staercke. Under instructions from Foreign Minister Speak, De Staercke delivered to U.S. Permrep Finletter a letter giving Belgian government views on various aspects of the nuclear weapons question, in anticipation of the imminent Athens Ministerial meeting. Relevant extracts:

"The Alliance will undoubtedly note, and approve, the conditions under which the President of the U.S. plans to utilize the atomic power of the U.S., whether or not it is placed at the disposal of the alliance. It will also take note with the greatest satisfaction, I am sure, of the expressed intent by the U.S. of consulting, insofar as possible, in the NAC prior to the use of atomic weapons anywhere in the world. Finally, it will establish a group or committee which, by virtue of the confidential information it will receive will be able to ascertain at all times that the atomic defense of the alliance is carried out in the most adequate manner.

"All this, which may yet be defined more clearly and improved upon before Athens, will constitute real progress but will not fundamentally alter the present situation....

"If I understand correctly, there is a NATO military requirement, in years to come, to count on a certain number of MRBM's.... The U.S. could probably meet this military requirement alone within the framework of the alliance, as it has already started to do, whether on the European continent or in the waters of the Atlantic or Mediterranean. But one might ask whether..."
such a solution would be politically satisfying or whether there might be some way of finding another solution by returning to the idea, already many times advanced, of a 'force de frappe' belonging to the alliance.

"I would like to examine this idea from various angles. It seems to me that it would have a certain number of advantages. In the first place, it would anchor the U.S. in a permanent way to the Atlantic Alliance and this would make it possible to allay the apprehensions, however unjustified they may be, of a certain number of people in various countries; in the second place, and this is an even greater advantage, because of the adequate defense it would provide to the 'Atlantic Plan,' it would make the creation of national 'forces de frappe' unnecessary in countries other than where they already exist; thirdly, it would not prevent already existing national 'forces de frappe' to continue in existence but the countries having them could contribute, in varying degrees, to the creation and development of the common force...."  

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Feb. 21, 1963, Defense Minister Segers. In a conversation with Ambassador MacArthur, Segers said Belgium was quite prepared to have the United States assure its nuclear defense.

Feb. 26, 1963, Foreign Minister Spaak. In a speech on the floor of the Belgian Senate, Spaak said, "If Belgium were alone in this cause [NOTE: It is not clear from the context what 'cause' Spaak referred to; he apparently meant the cause of European defense partnership with the United States], I would not be an advocate of a multilateral nuclear force. But I accept Mr. Kennedy's conception that Western defense is interdependent and indivisible...and when President Kennedy says that the defense of Europe and that of the United States are inseparable, nothing permits me to doubt his word.

"I recognize how a large country such as France would want to participate on such an essential element of defense as nuclear forces. The best way and the least expensive is through a NATO nuclear force. We should examine if there is not something better than the dispersion of nuclear arms...."  

(Embassy Brussels Airgram 1068, Mar. 11, 1963 UNCLASSIFIED)

May 26, 1963, Foreign Minister Spaak. Asked by Under Secretary Ball for his views on the proposed multilateral force and on the possibility of an eventual German desire for a national nuclear capability, Spaak said he was convinced that unless the Germans participated in an MLF, they would achieve a nuclear capability whether independently or in concert with the French. In the latter case, the Germans would have nuclear weapons within two or three years; otherwise, it would take them many years. Such a development would create serious problems for the smaller countries. Spaak said Belgium was content with United States control of and responsibility for the nuclear deterrent, and could also accept the turning over of nuclear responsibility to a group of countries, as in the multilateral force.

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The Netherlands

July 17, 1962, Tammenoms Bakker, Director NATO Affairs, Dutch Foreign Office. In a discussion with an officer of the American Embassy, Tammenoms Bakker summarized Dutch thinking on alliance nuclear matters. He said the Dutch felt they could rely on present arrangements and had no qualms about U.S. willingness to employ the deterrent in accordance with agreed guidelines, and they were reasonably content with present U.S. undertakings regarding information and control. They remained ready, however, to explore the feasibility of establishing some sort of fully integrated multilateral NATO nuclear force, which in their view would involve some sort of integration of the U.K. and French forces. They considered such a force desirable, not for its own sake but as a means of preventing the creation of French and other national forces. (Embassy The Hague Airgram A-52, July 19, 1962 SECRET)

Dec. 14, 1962, Vice Admiral Bos, Head of the Netherlands Defense Study Center (Dutch Equivalent of U.S. National War College). In a speech to an association of Dutch businessmen interested in maritime matters, Admiral Bos stressed the absolute primacy of the United States as the backbone of free-world defense and the importance of strong European support for the United States leadership in this defense. He emphasized the reliability of the United States in the discharge of its obligations, and said that the nuclear deterrence afforded by the United States was all the nuclear deterrence needed by the free world, which should therefore not endeavor to develop national or "European-NATO" nuclear capabilities. (Report from U.S. Naval Attaché, The Hague, Dec. 19, 1962, CONFIDENTIAL)

Jan. 8-9, 1963, Catholic Party Spokesman Schuilt, Labor Party Spokesman Goedhart. In a statement in the Dutch Parliament, Schuilt summarized his views as follows: "I should like to say that the American monopoly regarding use of atomic weapons should in the long run be changed into a NATO Says [NOTE: the word translated, "say" can also be rendered as "control," "decisive authority"] in proportion to which partnership is realized within the Atlantic Alliance. In this way, the European influence shall have to be strengthened in proportion to cooperation achieved in Europe and as European efforts assume their proper balance. It goes without saying that real political integration in Europe is a condition for realization of such a balance." Replying, Labor Party spokesman Goedhart said he saw no point in trying to get around the fact that America had the atomic power in the alliance. He described any European atomic force as a "costly, useless and fatal illusion," and any national European force as "even more so." He thought complicated proposals for joint control only blurred reality and would not achieve greater independence for Europe. He felt that Europe's task was to strengthen its conventional forces, and he saw no danger that America might leave Europe. Later in the debate, Schuilt backed away from some of the implications of his remarks, and although he had made clear that his remarks had been delivered on behalf of his party, there were indications that he had not been authorized by the party to advocate any departure from government policy. (Embassy The Hague Airgram A-467, Jan. 17, 1963 CONFIDENTIAL)
Jan. 1963, Defense Minister Visser. During Parliamentary interrogatories on the 1963 defense budget, Visser stated inter alia that the Dutch government had absolute confidence in the United States promise to defend allied territory and had no objection to the U.S. monopoly of nuclear arms. He said the government recognized the existence of political factors in Europe which might make it desirable for NATO to have a nuclear role, but that this should take place in strictly integrated form, although it might be necessary to proceed without French participation. (Report from U.S. Army Attache, The Hague, Feb. 11, 1963, UNCLASSIFIED)

Feb. 26, 1963, Dutch Permanent Representative to NAC Boom. The Dutch Permanent Representative told Ambassadors Merchant and Finletter that the Dutch government was satisfied with existing nuclear arrangements, but if the other European allies wanted a multilateral force for reasons of allied cohesion and because of a general interest in multilateralism, the Dutch would be favorably disposed.

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April 10, 1963, Foreign Minister Luns. In a briefing on the Nassau Conference, Luns told Parliament the government was satisfied with existing nuclear arrangements. He said some of the allies did not share this view, and in any event, the government believed allied cooperation was desirable in order to avoid the threat of disintegration of the alliance posed by the prospect of additional separate national nuclear forces.

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April 16, 1963, Foreign Minister Luns. In a talk with Merchant and Finletter, Luns reiterated that the Dutch were on the whole satisfied with the present NATO arrangement under which the United States had the finger on the trigger.

SECRET

Greece

April 22, 1963, Prime Minister Karamanlis. In a conversation with Ambassadors Merchant and Labousisse, Karamanlis suggested a possible approach to national nuclear preoccupations of the alliance. He proposed that the United States make a statement that its nuclear power was in support of all NATO territory. If such a statement could not be made, then Karamanlis preferred an agreement to the effect that a decision to use nuclear force would be made by majority vote. He felt the influence of the United States was so great that it could be sure it would always be in the majority. In general, Karamanlis thought the question of nuclear control was theoretical; for in practice one country would be making the decisions, which was acceptable to the Greeks.

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Turkey

No statements are known to us revealing Turkish satisfaction or dissatisfaction with existing alliance arrangements on ownership and control of nuclear weapons.

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