January 10, 1957.

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)

subject: Depreciation of American Propaganda Broadcasting.

[redacted]

At the request of Identity A, there is enclosed a paper prepared on the general topic of American propaganda broadcasts. Identity A would like to discuss the subjects raised in this paper with Identity B at the latter's convenience.

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Attachments: paper described

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IDENTITIES

Identity A - Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy
Identity B - Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles
Problem:

Developments in Eastern Europe since the 20th Congress of the CPSU (including the growth of "dissident" in Poland and the recent and subsequent Soviet military reprisals in Hungary), and increased Soviet activity in the Asian-African area, underline our prior assumption that the conclusions and recommendations of the Jackson Committee require re-study on an urgent basis to determine whether our national information program should not be re-orientated to current tasks. In the light of the new budget hearings, which will affect plans by VOA, AR and IR to carry out their internal expansion, this problem has particular immediacy, and unless we assume that NSC Government financial resources are sufficient to permit the carrying out of all plans for radio-station expansion simultaneously, most or should entail considerations of re-orientation as between media networks and geographical target areas.

Discussion:

1. At the present time, the United States finances and operates, directly through ARS and indirectly through CIA, three major radio networks devoted to the implementation of American foreign policy objectives. Unlike VOA, whose programs are worldwide, ARS concentrates on the satellite nations of Eastern Europe, while IR broadcasts to the Soviet Union only in the Russian and certain minority languages. The manner in which these two ostensibly private networks operate, i.e., through committees located in New York but with operating facilities largely decentralized in Germany, has in the past made effective guidance by the Department in the furtherance of overall US policy objectives difficult, particularly in time of stress. While the problem of policy guidance and implementation during the current Hungarian revolt has been the subject of other charges, from this office, it should be pointed out here that recent experience raises the question of the practicality of concentrating a major portion of the US investment in overseas radio output in the decentralized form in which it now exists. Operation of radio broadcasting through an organization such as the ARS Europe Committee seems to have most of the disadvantages inherent in "official" broadcasts, since it is widely assumed that ARS/IR speaks for the US, and an additional disadvantage, not shared by VOA, of being more or less unsponsive to current US policy because of the delay in its day-to-day operations held by officers. It should be noted that so-called "black" radio differs in kind from IR in that it is uncontrolled, widely, relatively inexpensively, and can be terminated as soon as its effectiveness ceases. The Jackson Committee's statement that our national information program has suffered from the lack of effective central direction continues to be a valid criticism of current operating procedures.
2. Respecting radio programs broadcast to the USSR, the Jackson Committee's view that straight news is the most efficacious way of conveying our objectives to the Soviet peoples appears particularly applicable to VOA. It is the opinion of RL, however, that there is a place also for a radio network which would devote itself to a sustained discussion and examination of internal Soviet problems, scholarly analyzing and exposing the weaknesses in the Soviet system which have become more evident in recent years. If it is to fulfill this role, "Radio Liberation" must undergo a fairly substantial reorganization, including a change in name to something like "the voice of democracy". This reorganization, based upon a re-definition of the RL concept, should include greater control by responsible Americans over program content, and the dropping of the fiction that RL is a Russian opposition station. The reorganization should include consideration of the possibility of RL broadcasting to the Asia-African area, using the experience it already has had with Nigerian and the strengthening of its physical facilities, which today are admittedly inadequate. Thought should be given at the same time to re-location of transmitters to avoid undue concentration in any one area, e.g., Germany.

3. The future of VOA depends to a very great extent on considerations of public policy, for as the Jackson Committee pointed out, "propaganda cannot be expected to be the determining factor in deciding major issues". VOA in the past several years has played a major role in pointing up nationalism in the satellites, and giving specific focus to grievances of the satellite peoples. Unless we are prepared to support the spread of radio propaganda with concrete efforts, the impact of radio programs will be limited to any event, its value will be minimally effective. The two are interdependent.

Another factor affecting VOA is the involvement in Poland of "Solidarity", which is the basis of current policy requiring VOA media to refrain from aiding that organization in any way. The attempt tooding that organization in any way. The mission of conveying straight truth to a divided nation is day by day thrown on an attempt to achieve some degree of independence from Moscow, and a measure of internal liberalization must appropriately can be filled by VOA as in the case of Yugoslavia.

h. As indicated above, a main purpose of both RL and VOA has been to appear as the voices of indigenous opposition elements. In this context, both networks rely heavily on exiles persons, whose role in the implementation of policy directives at times has varied on policy determination itself. Experience has shown that the interests and objectives of these exiles have not always been identical with US interests and objectives. Moreover, as groups, they have a tendency to become somewhat removed from events in their countries of origin, and to be unsympathetic to the political currents which move those who have remained behind. This trend was graphically illustrated in the case of the Hungarian revolt.
Not only may the agencies carry on undesirable influence on broadcast policy, when organized in national committees, and similar groups, they have to represent an end in themselves and to serve as an independent control of media and thus in terms of their usefulness to US policy objectives. The parent of BHU and NFR, the Free Burma Committee and the American Committee for Liberation, are heavily committed to the concept of radio communication as a national necessity. These activities must be directed into specific and focused efforts not primarily connected with the foreign policy and intelligence fields for which the Department and CIA are responsible.

5. The so-called uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa today are being flooded by Soviet and anti-Western propaganda. In the future allocation of available BIs resources, a major effort should be made to build up effective American broadcasting to that area, without diminishing the important task of broadcasting to the Jewish areas, while the possibility of the primary responsibility of broadcasting to Asia-Africa, thought should be given to employing the resources of the American Committee (HC) in that area, making use of multi-purpose transmitters. Such transmitters should be located in or near the Asian-African areas, and should be designed for broadcasting to the Jewish areas on short-wave and to the adjacent area on medium-wave.

6. Criticism of RB and other American broadcasting media in present weeks has become more vigorous, not least of all in the German Federal Republic which forms the target for a major part of all American broadcasting facilities. It seems to be the United States Air Force that criticism of RB and other media and the United States must emphasize this situation, and that there may be potential in the case of each one or (a) a greater role in what is said from existing facilities in Germany, and (b) the removal from Germany of some of those facilities based on the trend to concentrate Soviet attention in Germany. Reasons for this pressure include (e) domestic German political considerations, (d) the desire of many Germans for a normalization of relations with the USU as a possible prelude to German reunification, and (c) the likelihood that the federal government in the future will seek to achieve mass media influence with the Soviets. Under these circumstances, consideration should be given to whether it is economically feasible for the US to increase its investment in facilities located in one country, or whether we should not seek to diversify our investment through construction in countries other than Germany.

Recommendations:

1. That for the immediate future priority be accorded to
   over both RB and NFR in the construction of new facilities in the enlargement of existing ones, and that the burden of the burden be lifted in view of its immediate consideration of the 1955 budget request of RBU
   and NFR.

2. That no advancement is possible indefinitely in
   with private or government involvement.
2. That the Department express to CIA its belief that the basic concept of Radio Liberation and the manner in which policy is implemented, be re-examined urgently by the Department and CIA with a view to making the a more effective instrument. A satisfactory re-definition of the AL concept should precede any augmentation of physical facilities.

3. That the Department propose to CIA that no further expansion of AL can be justified at this time, and that a gradual reduction of AL activities seems desirable. This recommendation would work with the Polish and Hungarian translations.

4. That the totality of present policy guidance to all areas on Eastern Europe be re-examined urgently with a view to realizing the goal which has existed between the national aspirations for the political freedom of the satellite and the specific policy objectives. This redefinition should take into account the respective rates and targets of up and 30%, and a reassessment of the 35% and should have as a main objective, the gearing of media support to realizable actions by the U.S. in support of freedom for the satellite and internal freedom for the peoples of the USSR itself.

5. That the Department坐落 to CIA its desire that the methods by which policy guidance to the three countries be altered, and its explanations, be designed to ensure that the U.S. could make AL and its counterpart to all areas are to be re-examined and transmitted in its response with national policies; that countries can possibe still consider the U.S. as a country and in the second in its capacity as an ally, to include a permanent in the people's Soviet Union and the progressivelyist of the people's movement as a result of the results of the people/freedom for the peoples of the USSR itself.

6. That the Department express to CIA that the attention of AL to the USSR is to be placed in a manner which is consistent with the understandable desires of the peoples in the areas of the USSR and the people's Soviet Union and that attempts should be made to avoid any perception that rapid change is occurring in that area.

7. That the Department express to CIA and DIA that a re-examination of the relative costs and benefits of Radio Liberation should lead to a conclusion that it be re-examined in the People's Soviet Republics and to that area, and no change in the People's Soviet Republics.

8. That, in line with recommendation 7, there should be an additional effort be made to achieve a re-examination of radio policy, in order that the overall policy be maintained in the People's Soviet Republics and to that area, and an agreement to the People's Soviet Republics.
9. 

That, provided discussions with USIA and CIA of the above recommendations point to the advisability, consideration be given to

the formation of a committee (on the lines of the Jackson Committee) to

undertake further American propaganda broadcasting, and to formulate

indigenous recommendations.