Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

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Friday, 29 December 1989
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**Notes**

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29 December 1989
PANAMA: Situation Report

Noriega Still in Nunciature

The former Defense Chief remains in the Papal Nunciature, and talks continue. Col. Arnulfo Castrejon, former Navy Commander, and the PDF Chaplain were detained yesterday by US forces when they exited the residence. Former National Investigations Department chief Lt. Col. Nivaldo Madrinan and Noriega bodyguard Captain Gaitan reportedly have requested asylum in Spain, which has said it will take them if they are not under US indictment.

Endara Receives Unexpected Support

Former President Rodriguez and Labor Party leader Sieiro, Noriega's brother-in-law, yesterday acknowledged Endara's legitimacy. Press reports say pro-Noriega former presidential candidate Carlos Duque plans to pledge his support for Endara...

The Duque and Sieiro statements suggest their parties, which won several seats in the National Assembly in May, plan on participating in the post-Noriega period; they may also hope to head off arrest by US forces.

Banks Reopening for Limited Service

The banking commission has announced that banks will operate for an additional six months under cash withdrawal restrictions imposed by the Noriega regime and that all postdated salary checks issued by the regime will be paid in cash. Most of the funds expected to be released probably will be used to meet salaries and operating expenses, providing little liquidity to the banking sector. Moreover, some insurance companies' claims that they are not obligated to pay for property damage caused by the intervention and looting will hurt rebuilding efforts.

continued

3 December 1989
### Public Services Operational

The electrical institute is providing power to many areas, and telecommunications services reportedly are functioning. The international airport may reopen for commercial service this weekend. Municipalities and public utilities are beginning audits to detect irregularities from previous years, perhaps for criminal prosecution. Several businesses are asking civilians to return merchandise and equipment taken during looting with no questions asked. Food and medical goods reportedly are in short supply in heavily damaged areas.

### International Scene Quiet

Lebanon yesterday became the 11th country to recognize the Endara government. Japan said it will recognize the government as soon as it assumes greater control of the situation. Ecuador recalled its Ambassador for consultations but said he will return in a few days. The UN General Assembly met yesterday to discuss a Cuban-Nicaraguan draft condemning the US intervention. It was shelved in favor of a compromise proposal—to be considered today—that "strongly deplores" the US action and demands the withdrawal of US troops, while recognizing the need to reestablish democracy and ensure respect for human rights and that is expected to receive broad support, say press reports.

More governments are likely to declare their support now that the Electoral Tribunal has validated the May election.

### Threats to US Installations

Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement claimed responsibility for the bombing on Monday of a US facility in rural Peru.

Bombings have occurred against US targets in several Latin American countries, and reports of potential terrorist acts continue to surface.

### Situation on Ground Stabilizing

Incidents of sniping have diminished considerably. Nevertheless, US forces estimate that 150 pro-Noriega forces remain unaccounted for in areas around Panama City and Colon.

An undetermined number of Defense Forces and pro-Noriega irregulars probably remain in the western provinces. PDF contingency plans had called for paramilitary types to form urban guerrilla groups, and isolated incidents and hit-and-run attacks are likely to persist while they are at large.
ROMANIA: New Government Organizing

The leadership of Romania's National Salvation Front (FSN) is settling in but is sending mixed signals about its commitment to a multiparty system.

In the new government's first official press conference yesterday, a spokesman said its priorities will be ending the violence, getting the state apparatus functioning, reviving the economy, and organizing free elections. The FSN also said that most officials who had served under Nicolae Ceausescu will not lose their jobs and that the death penalty will not apply to Securitate rebels who surrendered by yesterday afternoon's deadline. On Wednesday the government published an "antiterrorist" decree giving itself arrest powers tantamount to martial law.

President Iliescu stressed the FSN's commitment to democracy and political pluralism, but he stopped short of advocating a multiparty system. Iliescu also left in doubt whether the FSN will support the promised April schedule for free elections and indicated the drafting of a new constitution will follow the elections. He played down the issue of student dissatisfaction with Communist domination of the new government. The press has reported no new demonstration since Tuesday.

Prodemocracy groups apparently are concerned that many top military, security, and political leaders associated with Ceausescu at one time or another are now calling the shots for the FSN. They probably will need time to organize themselves, and they may be willing to give the government a breathing period to restore order. But the issue of broader participation in the government is not likely to go away—especially if Iliescu begins to drag his feet on scheduling the elections.
Senior Soviet military officers are increasingly critical about developments in the independent-minded Baltic republics, including the creation of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party.

In a recent Red Star article, the Baltic Military District's chief political officer described how Soviet military personnel and their families have been subjected to an escalating series of indignities, including the denial of housing and ration cards as well as antimilitarism and anti-Russian hatred. He and other senior military officers serving in the Baltics shared their "alarm" at the two Central Committee plenary meetings this month.

President Gorbachev said he was under increasing pressure to take action from military leaders—especially General Staff Chief Moiseyev.

The military apparently is getting bolder in taking its case to the top levels of the party hierarchy. It is already worried about the implications for Soviet interests of the breakdown of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and may be concerned that the Lithuanian party's declaration of independence from the CPSU is a first step toward secession, not only of Lithuania, but probably the rest of the Baltic states and perhaps other non-Russian republics, such as Moldavia or Georgia. The high command may feel that Moscow must hold the line now in Lithuania or face the unpalatable alternative of using the army to suppress rebellion in several republics in the future.

Gorbachev undoubtedly is feeling the sting of military pressure, but he may also regard the airing of the military's discontent at this time as bolstering his leverage on the Balts, especially the Lithuanian Communists, whom he hopes to persuade to reconsider their break with the CPSU.

Net debt is gross debt less Soviet assets in Western banks

Billion current US dollars

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Debt</th>
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<td>1980</td>
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*Estimated.
The USSR’s growing hard currency debt and Western uneasiness about Soviet creditworthiness are making Moscow more cautious about using loans to finance imports for its sagging economy.

Concern that top Soviet leaders have expressed recently about the debt was echoed by the Congress of People’s Deputies last week when delegates adopted language calling for the 1991-93 economic plan to define measures to reduce the foreign debt.

Moscow has accelerated borrowing to help finance increased purchases of light industrial equipment, agricultural products, and manufactured consumer goods.

Some Western lenders are increasingly concerned about the USSR’s creditworthiness despite its assets of Western banks and Soviet gold reserves valued at $28 billion.

Western bankers are tightening credit to the USSR because of the slow pace of domestic reforms, growing unrest in the republics, and the lack of financial information on new borrowers who are now allowed to seek loans as a result of decentralization but who have no credit record. An oversupply of Soviet commercial paper to finance imports over the past year has also boosted the interest rates Western banks are charging.

The resolution of the Congress will strengthen the hand of the leadership as it tries to fend off calls by some economists to borrow more to finance much higher import levels. Soviet officials have assiduously guarded the USSR’s credit standing and would like to maintain it in the event that unexpected problems such as a poor harvest, a sharp downturn in oil production, or serious consumer unrest create a need to borrow heavily.

Moscow is having no problem in servicing its debt—its debt service ratio is about 25 percent—but it would have to draw down reserves to meet payments should it encounter an unexpected earnings shortfall. The Soviets probably will carry through with a planned moderate increase in imports of consumer goods next year but will attempt to hold down borrowing by cutting some imports for the industrial sector and by increasing soft currency trade with countries such as China and India.
BULGARIA: Regime Bows to Dissident Pressure

Bulgarian dissidents and the more radical reformers in the Communist Party, partly spurred by the upheaval in Romania, have increased pressure on the government to move faster on political reform. The party leadership agreed to begin roundtable talks with the opposition after striking workers at some 70 enterprises this week demanded the resignation of party leaders. The Central Committee is meeting in emergency session today to move up the next party congress and reassess the assimilationist policy toward the country's Turkish minority. The hardline Minister of Interior was replaced by Deputy Minister of Defense Semerdzhiev.

Party leader Mladenov probably will continue to try to appear responsive to dissident demands without giving up the reins of power. Next week's roundtable is not likely to produce a compromise that will satisfy demands of the opposition for a role in the government, and that failure might provoke renewed protests. Mladenov probably chose an Army general to lead Interior in the hope of avoiding a confrontation between military and security forces like that in Romania.

YUGOSLAVIA: Party Endorses End to Political Monopoly

A Yugoslav Communist party Central Committee plenum preparing for a national party congress next month has approved draft stands that would eliminate the party's political monopoly, lift restrictions on political activity, and allow direct secret ballot elections. The plenum stopped short of advocating a multiparty system, probably because of opposition from the Army and strongman Milosevic in Serbia. The five other republics have called for multiparty elections, and at least Slovenia and Croatia are planning free elections in the spring.

The party's draft positions are a compromise. Party leaders probably fear that a more explicit stand on the multiparty system would encourage new conflict by Serbia against Slovenia and Croatia and possibly precipitate a breakup of the national party. The congress probably will adopt the compromise, opening the door for free elections in most of Yugoslavia by the end of 1991. Milosevic's refusal to keep pace with growing reform sentiment may further isolate him in the federation and erode his power base in Serbia. Milosevic probably would answer any challenge to his authority with purges or a crackdown.

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USSR: Yeltsin Running for Russian Republic Presidency

Political maverick Boris Yeltsin has been nominated by voters in a small town near Moscow for the presidency of the Russian Republic, but Yeltsin is the only prominent candidate for the post so far. The incumbent, Politburo member Vorotnikov, has not yet announced whether he will run. The president will be chosen by the republic legislature that will be elected by the population in March. Yeltsin probably views capturing the Russian presidency as a critical step in a political comeback that has been marred by recent scandals. His populist and antiestablishment stance is likely to continue to appeal to restive Russian workers and nationalists, although it is uncertain how he will fare among delegates to the legislature. The presidency of the Russian Republic is likely, in the course of political reform, to become an influential position, and as president, Yeltsin, who has ties to the radical Interregional Group in the legislature, might pose a serious challenge to the party in the republic. Mikhail Gorbachev, however, heads the recently created Russian Republic party bureau and is therefore well positioned to act as a counterweight to a Yeltsin presidency.
Brazil: Consumer Price Inflation

Percent change per month

0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

*Projected.
BRAZIL: Financial Markets Resume Slide

The victory of centrist President-elect Collor over his Marxist opponent briefly calmed Brazil's financial markets, but predictions of spiraling inflation have caused the currency to resume its sharp decline. The cruzado last week dropped 14 percent against the dollar following official projections that consumer prices will rise by as much as 55 percent this month. This week, rumors of 80-percent inflation for next month caused a similar decline. Brasilia has denied it will freeze prices and instead continues to raise interest rates on its bonds, most recently to 85 percent per month. Collor has yet to name his cabinet, which the markets are interpreting as a deliberate go-slow approach.
LEBANON: Fighting Between Rival Shia Militias Eases

Mediation by Iran and Syria appears to have temporarily calmed fighting between Lebanon's Amal and Hizballah militias. The clashes began in midmonth in the Bekaa Valley and spread to southern Lebanon, where they intensified last week. Syrian troops in Beirut have prevented fighting there.

The latest round of fighting is the most serious since Iran and Syria brokered a peace agreement last January. Hizballah leaders have grown impatient with Amal's refusal to implement provisions of the agreement allowing Hizballah to increase its presence in the south, which Amal leaders fear would provoke Israeli retaliation against Amal villages. Amal is not likely to abide by a cease-fire that leaves Hizballah forces in place.
CHILE: Taking First Steps in Difficult Transition

President Pinochet has made several moves to facilitate a smooth transition when he relinquishes power on 11 March, but he continues to try to limit the next government's room for maneuver. Pinochet and President-elect Aylwin held cordial talks last week and established ministerial-level working groups. Meanwhile, the Pinochet regime named conservative loyalists to the nine appointed seats in the Senate, denying Aylwin's coalition a majority in the upper house. Despite the lack of agreement on substantive issues, the meeting set the stage for further negotiations and helped calm fears that Pinochet will try to disrupt the transition.

UN: Security Council Membership Rotation Next Week

Cuba will chair the Security Council in February, not January, as indicated in the Daily on 27 December. Ivory Coast chairs the Council next month.
### In Brief

**Americas**
- Nicaragua on Wednesday put military on highest-level alert, warning of possible US invasion... reserves, militia, and demobilized veterans called up... probably latest ploy to fuel popular resentment against pro-US opposition.

**USSR**
- Lithuanian radio said yesterday: Soviet party Central Committee delegation will visit on Tuesday. President Gorbachev on 6-7 January... trying to persuade republic party leaders to reconsider split with Moscow.

**South Asia**
- Four legislators in India's Andhra Pradesh kidnapped over weekend, Sikh legislator from Punjab vanished yesterday... government's recent capitulation to Muslim extremists who kidnapped minister's daughter encouraging radicals.
- Nepal's Foreign Minister visiting New Delhi 3-4 January for talks on 10-month dispute over expired trade, transit treaty... new Indian Government pledging to improve relations with neighbors... Kathmandu calling talks exploratory.

**East Asia**
-...
Polish Economic Reform—An Outline

The reform package is assuming greater urgency because the economy continues to decline:

— Industrial performance has dropped steadily since April; monthly output now is 9 percent below that of a year ago.
— Inflation, now running 50 percent per month, will total 900 to 1,000 percent for 1989.
— Declining coal production has cut export earnings and may further crimp industrial performance. The Soviets have reduced oil and gas deliveries, forcing Poland to arrange hard currency imports.
— A hard currency trade deficit of at least $50 million is expected this year, following three years of $1 billion annual surpluses.
— Warsaw has ceased all commercial and official debt payments.

The proposals before the legislature are intended:

— To transform financial management of state enterprises by forcing them to operate on a profit-and-loss basis.
— To further encourage private enterprise and foreign investment.
— To eliminate tax loopholes favoring heavy industry.
— To make the National Bank of Poland more a central reserve bank.
— To remove currency and foreign trade restrictions.
— To provide for layoffs and firings and unemployment compensation.
— To discourage excessive wage hikes through tax penalties.

Reforms will also affect routine economic legislation due before the Sejm (lower house) as soon as this week, including the budget law; the annual credit plan; and cultural, training, and science and technology funding.
POLAND: The Big Push on Economic Reform

Protracted debate in Poland's legislature over landmark economic reforms will sorely strain the Solidarity-led government coalition, and the reforms probably will cause initial economic disruptions greater than the government anticipates, risking widespread labor unrest. Slowing the pace of reform, however, might jeopardize the Western aid and investment that Poland needs to rebuild its economy. Polish officials will press for more Western help by arguing that a failure in Poland would lead other East European regimes to scale back their reform efforts.

All the coalition parties have criticized some aspect of the program and will push their own agendas. Many deputies question whether the government can provide for laid-off workers, and Rural Solidarity—which earlier this month selected a more confrontational leader—is seeking farm subsidies and price guarantees. The Communists are focusing on opposing privatization.

All the parties nonetheless realize the need for fundamental economic reform and probably will keep the coalition together at least long enough to launch the program. Opposition to the specifics of reform has produced neither a solid voting bloc nor credible alternatives, and using special committee sessions rather than plenary debate should speed the legislative process and keep concessions to a minimum.

Although Finance Minister Balcerowicz may accept some watering down of his initiatives, Lech Walesa’s claim this month that Poland’s critical situation warrants government resort to emergency powers also appears to have discouraged deputies from breaking ranks.

Testing Worker Tolerance

Balcerowicz’s prediction that the reforms will lead to a 5-percent unemployment rate in 1990 and a 25-percent drop in income appears optimistic. Most government and enterprise officials are inexperienced with market mechanisms; removing price controls probably will increase inflation more than production in the short run. Output will be lower and unemployment higher than Warsaw expects, and the unemployment compensation system being developed could collapse under the strain.

Warsaw is taking every opportunity to bolster public tolerance for reforms. Prime Minister Mazowiecki, Walesa, and Solidarity legislative leader Geremek used a joint press conference on
Polish Reform—The Legislative Process

The government's goal of legislative approval by 1 January is difficult but not impossible to meet. The bills are before a special committee of the Sejm. The committee is chaired by a Solidarity economist, and Solidarity and the junior members of the coalition—the Democratic and Peasant Parties—hold 27 of the committee's 43 seats.

Solidarity and its newfound allies also control 269 of the 460 Sejm seats and so could in theory pass the economic legislation in the face of solid opposition from the Communists. In practice, voting on previous government initiatives has not been on strict party lines, and the government may lose some coalition votes. But it may also pick up support from reformist Communists, five of whom recently quit the party and now sit as generally progovernment independents. Other Communists may abstain to avoid being labeled obstructionist while positioning themselves to counterattack if the economy fails to respond to the reforms.

Once approved by the Sejm, the bills go to the Senate, where Solidarity controls 98 of 100 seats. The Sejm can override any Senate amendment by a two-thirds vote of members present. The final step is endorsement by President Jaruzelski, who has repeatedly endorsed economic reforms and is not likely to stand in their way. A presidential veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Sejm.
10 December to stress their agreement on the package, cautioning the public that the road ahead will be difficult. They also announced local elections will be held by next summer, providing an opportunity to remove Communist local officials. The election pledge is intended to reassure people that reforms will have an effect at the local level and to provide an outlet for anti-Communist sentiment.

Mazowiecki will get an indication of the public's willingness to go along with reforms when Warsaw raises coal and other energy prices as much as 400 percent on Monday. Although an immediate round of massive protests appears unlikely, workers will press factory managers to raise wages, and resistance to such demands might lead eventually to a surge in strikes.

Depending on the West

Polish officials probably will face a deepening economic crisis by summer when unemployment and industrial decline threaten to undermine reform efforts. They can be expected to seek more Western aid, probably claiming that the rapid pace of reform encouraged by the West helped create the problem. They also could persuasively argue that the failure of Warsaw's program would reduce the impetus for reform throughout Eastern Europe. The Poles may contend that the West must help underwrite unemployment compensation and stand ready to supplement the zloty stabilization fund, if they are not to fall back on subsidies and guaranteed unemployment to avoid widespread labor unrest.
Special Analysis

**USSR:**

*Perestroika's Bumpy Ride in the Countryside*

President Gorbachev has had mixed results from moves to implement his policies at the local level such as appointing reformers to regional party posts, stimulating grassroots involvement in decisionmaking, relaxing party control over the economy, and granting local state institutions more independence. Some progress has occurred where local leaders have mobilized popular pressure, but resistance from middle-level officials remains widespread, and the absence of explicit guidelines on implementation has left many local party bosses confused and powerless to manage the restructuring process. Gorbachev may attempt to give local party officials clearer direction, even at the risk of backtracking on key aspects of perestroika.

Gorbachev's strategy has succeeded in a handful of regions in the Russian Republic. He has singled out Orel and Lipetsk, the home bases of two newly appointed Central Committee secretaries, as models for the firm local party stand on perestroika and grassroots activism he is trying to foster. He has praised party officials in those areas for innovative methods that have improved agricultural production. Even in areas where bureaucratic resistance remains high and grassroots pressure is weak, tentative steps are being taken to open the political process and democratize the party. In the past two months three regional party committees have used multiple-candidate elections to select first secretaries.

**Despite Progress, Resistance Still Strong**

Many party leaders remain unwilling or unable to implement Gorbachev's policies. An article in the leading party journal *Kommunist* recently asserted that conditions are not yet ripe for rapid democratization and that forces opposing reform are as strong as those promoting it. Gorbachev told Pravda last month that only 32 of the 79 regions in the Russian Republic are developing to his satisfaction.