PARAPHRASE of Embassy's telegram No. 688, March 1, 1944, to the Department of State.

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For the President and Acting Secretary. Personal and Secret.

This telegram is in supplement to Embassy's 673 of February 29.

I believe you will be interested in the following amplification of my report following my discussion with the British Ambassador who has shown me his despatch to his Government reporting his talk Monday night with Stalin over the Prime Minister's proposal for a Polish settlement.

The sarcastic manner in which Stalin continuously referred to the Polish Government and his reference to it as "Sosnkowski and his crowd" was emphasized to me by the British Ambassador. Stalin insisted that the Polish Government did not want a settlement and that their purpose was to embroil the British with the Soviet Government. The Ambassador stated that the Poles would never succeed in this, but Stalin replied that it was his fear that they might succeed. There had already been created a rift between the Soviet Government and Eden, and another might later develop also with Churchill. Stalin explained that while the Prime Minister was in Africa Eden had been handling the Polish affair, and Eden's offer of mediation had had to be rejected by Stalin. Thus the Poles had scored a point, and Eden's displeasure had been incurred. Why, Stalin asked, had he been obliged to hurt Eden's feelings? Because of the Poles. Why wasn't the Curzon Line accepted as a basis for settlement of the boundary question by the Poles if they were serious? The British Ambassador's explanations of the difficulties of the Polish Government in doing this were not admitted by Stalin. He said that the Poles had now had the effrontery to suggest that in the administration of Soviet territory east of the Curzon Line representatives of the United Nations should take a share. New demands would always be made by the Poles.

Every time Clark Kerr attempted to explain the British position Stalin replied that while the Poles were "hiding behind the Prime Minister's broad back", the Russians and the British were shedding their blood.

The British Ambassador asked Stalin to make some constructive suggestion, after it became clear that Stalin was determined not to take the Prime Minister's message as a basis for settlement. In reply Stalin said that this
was simple, that he asked for only two things: a recon-
structed Polish Government, and the Curzon Line. The
Poles should clearly accept the Curzon Line if they meant
business. For his part, Stalin said, he would not tol-
erate any further demands put forward by the White Russians
or the Ukrainians. There was no need of waiting until
the recapture of Warsaw to affect a reconstruction of the
Government.

In reply to the Ambassador's question as to what
kind of reconstruction he expected, Stalin explained the
idea (as reported in my previous telegram) of bringing
in Poles from America and Russia. Although no names in
Russia were mentioned, he suggested that some Polish-
Americans such as Professor Lang and Orlemaniski (a Cath-
olic priest) might come to Moscow and advise on the choice
of appropriate Poles, if they themselves did not wish to
take up Polish nationality again. Stalin assumed the
United States Government would not put any obstacles in
the way of its citizens coming to the Soviet Union for
the purpose proposed, and he would not admit that any of
these suggestions presented serious difficulties. The
Polish Government in London, it seemed to him on the other
hand, was too firmly established with its Sosnkowskis and
Kots and their agents in the United States and Canada to
be shaken up.

Stalin concluded with the statement that he would
consult his associates and telegraph his reply to the
Prime Minister.

I called Molotov's office yesterday regarding my
appointment with Stalin but so far no reply has been
forthcoming.

Stalin was undoubtedly ready to see me on Sunday,
but this was before he received your message and the Prime
Minister's proposal. It may now well be that he will
evade seeing me because he does not wish at this time
to involve you through me in an argument over the Prime
Minister's proposal. However, it may be his wish to
formulate before seeing me a definite position and reply
that is delaying our meeting.

It has been made clear again that Stalin considers
that the Polish Government in London do not represent the
Polish people, that they are intrigue against the
Soviet Union and the unity of the United Nations, and that
to have traffic with them is dangerous for all concerned.

Stalin considers, I believe, that at Moscow and
Tehran he and Molotov made their position clear. I
believe he does not regard this position as unilateral
section on the part but not the part to be seen on aspect
within Great Britain and the United States.

I am not in line with any present interest or attitude.
It is for hoped I believe that
we will eventually agree that it is right and proper
many welcome an participation to develop some sort
of a Committee of Instruction which may be emboyled
in a three committee working together.

Unless you wish me to do otherwise, I shall wait
pasting cables to Stiffle without making a further demand.
For an appointment.