I saw Stalin tonight. It was not a pleasant talk.
He attempted to dismiss with a snigger the position of
the Polish Government as described in the Prime Minister's message.

2/ He snorted from time to time as I made one by one
the points contained in your telegram. For instance when I said
that the Polish Government had assured us that they would not
disavow our action he said: "Is that serious? How handsome of
them!" When I got to point 2 of your paragraph 2 about the Curzon
Line he broke in with: "But the Polish Government do not want to
give us Lvov and Vilna. If they did, they should say so"? When
I explained that they well understood that they would have to do
so, he replied that this was not clear from the message. Indeed
in a recent official statement they had made it manifest that
their view did not tally with the Prime Minister's. I countered
this by drawing on your telegram but without much success.

3/ At this stage Molotov confused the issue by evoking
the bogey of Osinskovski, which haunted us throughout the talk and
which I tried in vain to shoo away. A long wrangle followed, during
which Stalin said that he had little hope of settling the matter
on the basis of the Prime Minister's message. I said that you and
the Prime Minister would be much discouraged by this and he replied that
he must tell the truth. The Polish Government did not want a
settlement. Its purpose was to embroil us with the Soviet Government.
When I said that if this were so the Polish Government would fail,
he said that he feared that it might succeed. It had indeed made a
rift between the Soviet Government and yourself and might do so later
with the Prime Minister also. The Poles always had fresh demands.
For instance they had had the effrontery to suggest something that
ignored the sovereignty of the Soviet Government over territory
which belonged to the Soviet Union, when they proposed that represen-
tatives of the United Nations should take a share in the adminis-
tration of regions east of the demarcation line.

4/ When I pointed out that the Polish Government had returned from Africa Polish affairs had been in
your hands. You had offered mediation which he had been obliged to
reject. This had been a source for the Poles and you had been dis-
pleased. He had been obliged to hurt your feelings, Why? Because
of the Poles.

5/ I did my best here to explain what was your position in
this affair. To this he replied that the Russians and the British
shed their blood while the Poles sat on your back or hid behind the
Prime Minister's.

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Not for Emb.
8/ When it became clear that Stalin was determined not
to take the Prime Minister's message as the basis of a settlement,
I asked him to make some constructive suggestions. He replied
that this was simple. He only asked for two things: The Curzon
Line and the reconstruction of the Polish Government. If the Poles
meant business they should clearly and openly accept the Curzon
Line, and he for his part would not tolerate any further demands
from the Ukrainians or the White Russians. He dismissed the
Polish contention that it was impossible for them to make such a
declaration at present. If the government were to be reconstructed
there could be no question of waiting until the recapture of Warsaw.
But if a quick reshuffle were effected and genuinely democratic
elements were brought into the administration this would help. (At
this point the bogey of Boskowski stalked across the stage again).
But there arose the question of who would enter a reconstructed
government, and here, to my surprise, he took up the old Molotov
proposal to do some recruiting in America and in this country.
About America I used the now well worn arguments which he finally
admitted had some force, but not until he had tried to persuade me
that dual citizenship was possible—witness ex-President Mosicki
who was both Polish and Swiss.

7/ He then suggested that, if citizenship were a bar, a
couple of Polish Americans—for instance Professor Lange and
Orlemanski (a Catholic priest) might come to Moscow to see what was
going on here and advise on the choice of appropriate Poles. He
did not know either of them, but he understood that they were
"good men, non party men and not Communists." He said that he would
like also to see some recruits from this country, but he could not
name any at the moment. He would not admit that all this presented
any serious difficulty and he assumed that the United States
Government would put no obstacles in the way of its citizens coming
to the Soviet Union. But it seemed to him that the Polish Govern-
ment in London with its Boskwaskis and its Kots and their agents
in the United States and Canada was too firmly established to be
shaken.

2/ This dreary and exasperating conversation lasted for
well over an hour. No argument was of any avail.

2/ When he has consulted his government Stalin will be
telegraphing his reply direct to the Prime Minister.