
Demise of Detente in Korea, 1973-1975
This is a collection of documents about the end of the inter-Korean dialogue and the demise of detente on the Korean Peninsula after the signing of the historic July 4th, 1972, Joint Communique. For collections focused on other chapters in the inter-Korean relationship, see Inter-Korean Relations after the War, 1954-1961; Inter-Korean Competition, 1961-1970; Inter-Korean Dialogue, 1971-1972; and Inter-Korean Dialogue, 1977-1980.
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January 26, 1973
Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan, "Ramifications of the ROK Troop Withdrawal from Viet-Nam"
Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on ramification of the ROK troop withdrawal from Vietnam, UN policy of the ROK, North-South contacts, ROK National Assembly elections, and the old and new constitution of DPRK.
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February 19, 1973
Telegram from Istanbul to Bucharest, No. 037032
The document comments on South Korea's unwillingness to cooperate with North Korea in any of the framework established under the 1972 joint declaration. While South Korea refuses closer economic and political ties with North Korea, Pyongyang has made the removal of the US troops a major prerequisite, further stalling cooperation.
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March 08, 1973
Minutes of Conversation Taken on the Occasion of the Audience Granted by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the Delegation of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
In a conversation with Nicolae Ceausescu, Kim Dong-gyu discusses the achievements of the 6-Year Plan, progress in North Korea's ideological and cultural revolution, and challenges facing Pyongyang's peaceful approach to unification. The North Korean delegation seeks Romanian help in raising some of the issues on the Korean Peninsula at the UN. In particular, Kim mentions the dismantlement of UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea as a key objective. Commenting on South Korea reaching out to socialist countries, Ceausescu suggests that communist countries should encourage this trend because it helps weaken the United States.
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March 15, 1973
Record of Conversation between the Foreign Minister of North Korea and the First Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Republic
The Foreign Minister of North Korea conveys Kim Il Sung's message to the Mongolian government and continues to explain North Korea's perspective of the Park Chung Hee regime in South Korea. Seeking Mongolian support for the DPRK's unification perspective, he adamantly opposes Mongolian endorsement of the ascension of two Koreas to the United Nations.
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March 17, 1973
Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061084
Lazar discusses the stalling inter-Korean negotiations and blames the overly cautious attitude of the South and the ‘all or nothing’ strategy of the North. He also notes that the North Koreans are buying time until the US disengages from the peninsula to ensure a position of superiority.
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April 04, 1973
Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.113, Urgent, SECRET
KWP Centeral Committee member Kim Yeongnam explains to the Romanian representative that the DPRK proposed changes in the North-South Coordination Committee meeting to ease tensions and transform the armistice into a peace treaty. Kim blames the South Korean hawks and separatists who abide by the interests of the US and Japan for the lack of progress. Despite the impasse, the North Koreans look to the internal dissent against Park Chung Hee in South Korea as a sign of support for Pyongyang.
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April 11, 1973
Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET
Conversation between Romanian and Soviet representatives reveals that North Koreans are slowly withdrawing from direct contacts with South Korea. Instead, Pyongyang is seeking external support for its position. Meanwhile, North Korea is now looking at China with increased suspicion after Zhou Enlai noted that Beijing was not interested in the withdrawal of US troops from Asia. On another note, North Korea asks the Soviets to forbid South Koreans to enter the Soviet Union for the University Olympics held there.