In response to a request for further instructions, the Dept. of State informed the Embassy that Washington was looking to establish a common policy on the mandatory application of IAEA safeguards. Until they were closer to agreement, the Embassy should request that the Argentine government apply safeguards to future deals.

In a conversation with one or two State Department officials, a British Embassy officer notes that reports available to both governments estimate Israel's purchases of uranium to add up to 190 tons and proposed a joint US-British approach to Argentina on safeguards.

According to the Embassy, only President Leon M'ba, the Minister of the National Economy, and his predecessor would know of any diversion of any uranium from Gabon to Israel.

The US Embassy in France noted that Gabon produced about 440 tons of uranium metal annually, and any diversions would occur under French, rather than Gabonese, authority.

A request by an Argentine Congressman gave the yellow cake sale to Israel a public airing.

Owing to discrepancies in available data, the Department of State requested information on the amount of uranium shipped to Israel, any new agreements between Argentina and Israel, any safeguards put into place, and the current status of Argentina's uranium processing plants.

The Embassy reported that it had no information on Israeli uranium imports, and the only way to obtain that information would be a high-level inquiry to the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

During a visit to the Nounona uranium mines, Ambassador Bane learned that all processed ore went to France for metal extraction by the Atomic Energy Agency.

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

Although AEC representative Lester Rogers reported that the Embassy had no new information, this airgram includes tables on Argentina's annual production of uranium from 1958-1965 and the production capacities of two uranium processing plants.

The Department of State was unable to locate the Argentine uranium sold to Israel and was disturbed by the fact that the amount exceeded Israel's needs for peaceful use.

The Embassy did not believe it was advisable to inform the Argentine government of US plans to ask the Israeli government about the location of the uranium.

The Department of State requested that the Embassy inform the Israelis that they were satisfied with the inspection of Dimona, but ask Israel to clarify the location of the uranium ore from Argentina.

Ambassador Barbour spoke to Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, who said he would ask about the location of the Argentine uranium.

Ambassador Barbour reports that Foreign Minister Eban will confer with Deputy Minister of Defense Zvi Dinstein on the location of the Argentine uranium.

The Embassy reported the Gabonese government's assertation that France was the sole procurer of Gabonese uranium; however, it noted that this statement did not preclude a possible diversion to Israel.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke wrote this memo to the Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to alert him to the new reality that Israel may already possess nuclear weapons or was very close to that point. Warnke proposed that Laird “consider another serious, concerted, and sustained effort to push Israel to halt its work on strategic missiles and nuclear weapons.”

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for ratification and its chairman, J. William Fulbright (D-Ark), wanted to know where Israel stood on the Treaty. Believing that the issue should be handled at the White House level, Rogers proposed a meeting with Kissinger, Laird, and CIA director Richard Helms. Agreeing to schedule a meeting, Kissinger acknowledged that the issue was also “political.”

Ralph Earle, a senior official at the Pentagon’s Office of International Security Affairs [DOD/ISA] who had worked closely with Warnke, sent Laird a memorandum, requesting a meeting with Rogers, Kissinger, and Helms on the Israeli nuclear problem. The paper further restated the recommendation to keep the issue out of the National Security Council process.

This memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard concerns Israeli efforts to acquire high speed computers for use in a weapons program, and recommends that the United States should oppose these efforts.