Colonel Robert P. Pursley, discussed the Israeli nuclear issue with other senior officials at the Pentagon, and drafted a memorandum that the Defense Secretary sent to Rogers, Kissinger, and Helms on 14 March 1969. Believing it is necessary to convey “a sense of urgency,” the memorandum restated the earlier [Warnke’s] points about the need for a meeting and included new intelligence about Israeli efforts to acquire high speed computers for use in a weapons program.

A proposal from JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler favored a presidential-level approach and the application of pressure. Wheeler presented a range of options but recommended a demand to “cease-and-desist” a specific nuclear-related activity.

In his 28 March reply Secretary Rogers agreed that the computer issue needed more examination along with a further review of policy on sensitive technology exports, but he virtually blew off Laird’s request for a meeting and for deliberation outside of NSC channels. Instead, he advised that the Israeli nuclear problem be studied by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.

This memo provided Laird with a scheme for a tough approach to Israel that involved a demarche to the Israeli government for “cease-and-desist” certain nuclear and missile [excised] activities and a demand for private assurances and, ultimately, Israel’s signature on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To seal such a deal Earle proposed an exchange of letters between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir, for which he provided drafts.

Kissinger initiated a formal bureaucratic process to address how the U.S. government should respond to the emergence of a nuclear Israel, a review process managed by Kissinger’s NSC staff, known as NSSM 40. Through the NSSM Henry Kissinger tasked the DCI, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to prepare a report for the President that included the latest intelligence findings on the Israeli nuclear program and policy options with recommendations that the President could use in making decisions.

This may well be the only formal written interagency response to NSSM 40.The State Department and the Defense Department agreed that Israel should sign the NPT and provide assurances not to produce nuclear weapons, but they disagreed on what should be done to get there.

The “Talking Paper,” prepared for the NSC Review Group meeting, summarized the disagreements in the inter-agency report. Nutter (Paul Warnke’s replacement) and Johnson both affirmed the need for high-level pressure; if the Israelis were unresponsive to US requests for assurances it would “affect our ability to continue the present US relationship with Israel.”

Harry Schwartz's memo to the Deputy Secretary of Defense concerns the possible delay of delivery of F-45 to Israel. The draft "Scenario" is referenced and Schwartz hopes this issue will be covered more extensively within it.

Citing the recent developments at the Senior Review Group, Kissinger proposed an NSC meeting on 16 July 1969 to discuss the Israeli nuclear problem.

Packard's plan detailed in this memorandum and its attachments allegedly represented a consensus of the Defense leadership, Kissinger, Richardson, and Helms. Using a tough approach, the memorandum's enclosed plan focused on getting Israelis assurances and signature on the NPTs.

The memorandum lays out substantive and significant line of thinking about the complex problem raised by the Israeli nuclear program. Kissinger thought it might be possible to persuade the Israelis that with all of the NPT’s loopholes signing it would not prevent them from continuing their weapons research and development. Kissinger also recognized the real possibility that the Israeli development momentum could not be stopped.

Letter from Begin forwarding a memorandum to Thatcher on activities of the Pakistani government to build a nuclear weapon.

Chief of Staff of Israel Defense Forces, General Rafael Eitan writes to South African Minister of Defence Magnus Malan shortly after Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In this candid letter, Eitan states that Israel’s “iron determination” would not “allow these crazy Arabs to possess nuclear weapons," adding that "anyone who tries to say that the nuclear reactor in Iraq was only for research purposes is wicked, cynical and oil, not human blood, flows in his veins."

This is an excerpt of a conversation which appears in full at BA-SAPMO J IV 2/201/1416. The conversation opens with the issue of French-Israeli relations. France plans to deliver a nuclear reactor to Israel to the opposition of the Arab world. Also mentioned are the deliveries of arms from the GDR to the PLO. Arafat reports on the use of chemical weapons by Israel in Lebanon. These weapons were reportedly delivered by the FRG. Israel also seems to use biological weapons. Final topics of discussion are the role of the Pope in Poland, the question of Jerusalem, and the Islamic movement in Afghanistan.

Elie Geisler received training as a radiation-safety officer while serving as a solider at Dimona from 1964 to 1966. As the crisis escalated in late May 1967, Geisler was summoned to meet the head of the Minhal Madaii—the secret scientific administration in charge of the nuclear project—who gave him a special assignment: guarding a radioactive “package” to be placed under heavy security. The following testimony was relayed to Avner Cohen through several interviews and follow-up conversations and email exchanges.

A statement written by Dr. Alan Berman about the 1979 VELA Incident.

Accounts and memories of the 1979 VELA Incident and the Ruina Panel put together by Richard L. Garwin.

Statement made by Leonard Weiss about his memories of the 1979 VELA Incident.

Interview with David Ivry, former Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, chairman of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), deputy chief of the General Staff at the IDF, and commander of the Israeli Air Force. Interview conducted by Or Rabinowitz.