

## **May 8, 1946**

### **Telegram, Lozovsky to I. V. Sadchikov**

#### **Citation:**

"Telegram, Lozovsky to I. V. Sadchikov", May 8, 1946, Wilson Center Digital Archive, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 317, ll. 0066-0068. Translated by Gary Goldberg.  
<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/209092>

#### **Summary:**

Lozovsky passes on instructions from the Soviet leadership to Soviet Ambassador in Iran Ivan Sadchikov. Among other things, he tells the Ambassador to support Qavam in his struggle against Anglophiles in the Iranian government and to instruct President of the People's Government of Azerbaijan Ja'far Pishevari to do the same.

#### **Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from MacArthur Foundation

#### **Original Language:**

Russian

#### **Contents:**

Translation - English

NKID  
10TH DEPARTMENT  
□□□  
□□□□

Outgoing № 8923  
Form № 18 □□□  
□□□□

Received at 0450,  
8 May 1946  
TOP SECRET □□□  
□□□□

Sent at 0640,  
8 May 1946  
Spets. № 481-483 □□ □□

CABLE

to where TEHRAN□ to whom THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR □Copy № 1  
□□□□□TO SADCHIKOV

FLASH PRECEDENCE

Take our following instructions for guidance:

1. A conflict is occurring right now in Iran between Anglophile circles and the Qavam government, which desires to establish good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. However reactionary Qavam was in the past he is now forced to engage in some democratic reforms, including reforms concerning Azerbaijan, in order to strengthen his government and weaken the opposing camp. We should use this conflict, giving support to Qavam in the struggle against the Anglophiles. Based on this, we should not allow Pishevari to break with Qavam since this would weaken Qavam, strengthen the Anglophiles, and worsen the position of Azerbaijan in the event that Qavam falls and an Anglophile government appears. Make Pishevari understand so that together with the Soviet Union he supports Qavam in his struggle against the Anglophiles, using the conflict between Qavam and the Shah and seeking the best terms for Azerbaijan.

2. The main thing now is not the Constituent Assembly and not a change in the Constitution but the elections to the Majlis and getting a majority of deputies in the new Majlis against the Anglophile elements. Qavam, who would like to have the Azerbaijani deputies on his side against the Shah and the Anglophiles, evidently also understands this. If Qavam agrees to some further concessions to the Azerbaijanis then Pishevari should join some bloc with Qavam, promising him support in the elections and in the Majlis. As regards the Constituent Assembly and a change in the Constitution then it can be spoken of seriously only after ensuring a democratic majority in the Majlis.

3. Qavam's declaration with those changes of this declaration which were recently planned in the process of the talks need to be placed as the basis of the talks on the Azerbaijani question. We approve leaving state lands [which were] divided among them free of charge in the hands of the peasants. We think that privately-held lands

handed out to peasants should be bought back from the Azerbaijani budget over 10-12 years at a minimum price. We consider it a serious achievement that 75% of the income of Azerbaijan remains at the disposition of Azerbaijan. We favor the fedayeen [fidai] being reorganized into a gendarmerie subordinate to the Azerbaijani provincial Enjumen. As regards the regular national troops in Azerbaijan, there is little hope that Tehran will now make such a concession. It is possible that the candidacy of Pishevari for Governor-General of Azerbaijan is not suitable. In such an event Pishevari should be nominated for another candidacy from the Azerbaijanis, and Pishevari himself should remain in the post of head of the Azerbaijani self-government and leader and inspirer of the National Democratic Party.

4. As regards your 12 points with respect to our assistance concerning the elections to the Majlis we cannot accept points 6, 7, 11, and 12 since there is a real danger that carrying out these points with all the inevitable mistakes would provide a pretext to the Anglo-Americans and Iranian reactionaries to scream about our interference in the elections. We accept all the remaining points.

At the instruction of the leadership [instantsiya]. LOZOVSKY

3 copies. nk  
Sent on 8 May 1946

Authenticated [by]: Kozlov

Copies to:

1. Cde. STALIN
2. Cde. MOLOTOV
3. THE 10th DEPARTMENT

Cdes. Vyshinsky, Dekanozov, Silin, and Sychev have been familiarized [with this cable]

[handwritten:

3164

5154/[illegible letters]]