

October 20, 1976

Cable, Cornell, Swedish Embassy, Pyongyang, to the Cabinet, Stockholm

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Summary:

Swedish Charge D'Affairs in Pyongyang Erik Cornell reports, after a conversation with the country's Deputy Foreign Ministe, that the North Korean government is distancing itself from its diplomats' smuggling and resents the unilateral decisions taken in Copenhagen and Oslo to expel North Korean diplomats. Cornell also notes the vulnerable position of the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang and urges caution.

Credits:

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Svensk Pyongyang 1976-10-20

Cabinet Stockholm

Pol

M Y C K E T B R Å D S K A N D E för Polchefen.

P r i m o Sent tisdagkväll kallad till vice utrikesministern som alfa tog klart avstånd från egna ambassadtjänstemäns oögliga handling som skulle straffas strängt

beta beklagade Köpenhamns och Oslos plötsliga utvisningsbeslut som icke föregåtts av konsultationer

gamma nu ville få till stånd konsultationer med oss som enligt nyhetsbyråer stod i tur. Verkade som förenad nordisk aktion riktad mot Nordkorea. Om samma sak hände i Stockholm skulle det få allvarliga återverkningar på förbindelserna. Särskilt ambassadörens ställning känslig och utvisningen av denne är här liktydigt med avbrytande diplomatiska förbindelserna.

S e c u n d o Nordkoreanerna tydligt angelägna hitta face saving formula och ber oss uppenbarligen låta nåd gå före rätt beträffande ambassadören. Styrkan i förtäckta hotet avbryta förbindelser omöjlig bedöma. Får jag föreslå möjligheten övervägs utvisa underordnande omgående och vänta med ambassadören men låta honom förstå han bör resa frivilligt. I så fall torde vi ~~ha~~ icke behöva evakuera. Avser själv bearbeta viceministern kalla hem ambassadören snabbt. Allt i bedömningen var Pyongyang-ambassadens existens väl tyvärr motiverad av planerade ankomsten 50-tal montörer och fortsatt skuldindrivan etc.

T e r t i o På danskt cementfabriksbygge F L Smith finns svensken Meyer med hustru och tre barn.

Cornell

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET [Ministry for Foreign Affairs]

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Swedish [Embassy] Pyongyang
1976-10-20

Cabinet Stockholm

VERY URGENT for the Chief of Police.

First: Late Tuesday night, [I] was called to the [North Korean] Deputy Foreign Minister who:

(a) clearly distanced himself from the illegal actions carried out by the embassy officials [in Stockholm] that would be severely punished;

(b) regretted the sudden decisions taken by Copenhagen and Oslo for the deportation [of North Korean officials]. Such decisions were not preceded by consultations;

(c) now wanted to arrange consultations with us, that were due according to news agencies. It seemed like a united Nordic campaign aimed at North Korea. If the same thing happened in Stockholm, it would have serious repercussions on relations [between North Korea and Sweden]. The position of the ambassador is sensitive and the expulsion is equivalent to terminating diplomatic relations.

Second: The North Koreans are clearly eager to find a face saving formula and obviously ask us to let mercy take precedence over the ambassador. The force of their veiled threat to terminate relations is difficult to judge. May I suggest for consideration the possibility of immediate action with the subordinates while waiting [to act] on the Ambassador, but let him understand that he should travel [out of Sweden] voluntarily. In that case, we should not have to evacuate [the Swedish

Embassy in Pyongyang]. The Deputy Minister intends to call the Ambassador shortly. Unfortunately, the existence of Pyongyang Embassy was well-motivated by the planned arrival of some 50 assemblers and continued debt recovery, etc.

Third: At Danish cement factory building F.L. Smith, there is the Swede, Meyer, with wife and three children.

[Erik] Cornell

[Illegible signature]