

December 7, 1979

**Cable No. 2637, Ambassador Yoshida to the Foreign
Minister, 'Prime Minister's Visit to China (Ohira -
Deng Meeting) (A)'**

Citation:

"Cable No. 2637, Ambassador Yoshida to the Foreign Minister, 'Prime Minister's Visit to China (Ohira - Deng Meeting) (A)", December 7, 1979, Wilson Center Digital Archive, 2004-589, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Also available at the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Contributed by Yutaka Kanda and translated by Stephen Mercado.

<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/209557>

Summary:

Deng explains the "Four Modernizations," and the two sides discuss relations with Vietnam and Cambodia.

Original Language:

Japanese

Contents:

Original Scan

Translation - English

注 意

秘密指定解除
情報公開室

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については電信一般問合せ係 (TEL 2172) に連絡ありたい。

電信写

多くの援助が可能となろう。

(ハ) 中国が国際的に競争相手となるのではないかと心配する向きがある。しかし「4つの現代化」が達成されても、いわば「小こう状態」の現代化であるから心配はいらない。逆に現在のような状態では外資導入、技術導入をしてもその償かん能力に問題が出てくる。また (中国がゆたかになり) 国内の市場が大きくなることによつて現在輸出に向けざるを得ないものを国内向けとすることができる。

(2) 以上に対し大平総理は、わが国の近代化は中国より早く、ある程度の成功をおさめたが、振り返つてみると試行さく誤のくり返しであり、都市政策、かん境保護政策等で後遺しをを残してしまつた。中国はかかる前車のテツをふまないよう、友人として希望しておきたい旨述べられた。

2. インドシナ問題

(1) 「トウ」よりインドシナ問題について述べたいとして以下の発言があつた。

(イ) 中国はベトナム問題を中国の利益からではなく、世界の戦略的かく度から考えている。仮にベトナムが東南アジアを支配しても中国へのきよういはそれほど大きくない。それに中国はまずしくとも大きな国であり、自給自足が可能である。

(ロ) ベトナムがインドシナ連邦を実現するということはソ連がそこに軍事基地を設けることである。たとえ南の方から中国が攻撃を受けても南の3省で結構相手にすることができる。従つてベトナムのソ連基地からのきよういは中国に対するものではない。日本はきよういを受ける方であろう。米国もまたきよういを受ける方ではないであろうか。なぜならばソ連はアジア・太平洋とインド洋で海、空軍の増強を計つており、その間にマラッカ海きようがあるからである。従つてソ連のかかる戦略的な基地の建設を粉さいしない限りとんでもないことになる。この点については日本は意見を

R 0 9 8 8 2 3 - 0 2

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については電信一般 情報公開室 問合せ係 (TEL 2172) に連絡ありたい。

電 信 写

秘密指定解除

異にするかも知れないが、友人として日本政府に真げんに考えてもらいたいと申上げたい。

(ハ) カンボディアについては最終的には政治的解決が必要となろう。ただしその時期は未だ到来していない。政治的解決の前提はヴェトナムがカンボディアから引きあげることである。カンボディアの問題はカンボディア人自身が決めればよく、ポルポトがだめならばシハヌークであれ、だれであれカンボディア人が選べばよい。

(ニ) もちろん、この前提は現在は実現できないが、ベトナムの現在の困難（生活条件の悪さ、物不足、低賃金、食りよう不足）が更に悪化すれば、政治的解決ができる可能性もあろう。

(ホ) 中国は一度教訓を与えた。これを失敗とみる向もあるが、これによつてベトナム軍が60万から100万に増強されたのはわれわれの成功であつた。それだけベトナムの負担が増大したからである。ベトナムはソ連からの1日200万ドルの輸けつにたよつている。モンデイル米副大統領によれば今年のソ連の対越援助は7億5000万ドルにのぼる由であるが、日用品等は少ない。よつて、カンボジア、ラオスへの侵略は、ベトナムにとつて大きな物となる。かかるに物はベトナムがソ連にせ負わせておけばよい。かれらがかかえきれなくなつた時が、政治的解決の時かもしれない。

(ヘ) 現在ベトナムはかん期攻勢をかけているが、民主カンボジア勢力が消めつすることは無いと思う。民主カンボジアがその20%の力を保持できればよい。（ここで中国の抗日戦争の時の軍の縮少の経験につき言及）

(ト) 現在西欧に民主カンボジアの承認をとりけす動きがあるが、中国は賛成できない。

R098823-03

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については電信一般 情報公開室 問合せ係 (TEL 2172) に連絡ありたい。

秘密指定解除

電信写

(チ) 以上がインドシナに対する中国の考え方であるが、もちろん日本の具体的政策は日本の決める問題である。

(2) 上記に対し大平総理は、わが国としては従来より、あらゆる国際紛争は話し合いで解決すべきであると考えていること、対越援助は約束をしてあるので行うが、時期については検討していること、この点については中国は意見があるが、日本政府の立場として聞いてもらいたい旨述べられた。

(丁)

写手交済(7日4時59分)

R098823-04

Number (TA) RO98823 5188

Primary: Asia and China

Sent: China, December 07, 1979, 03:15

Received: MOFA, December 07, 1979, 04:41

To: The Foreign Minister

From: Ambassador Yoshida

Prime Minister's Visit to China (Ohira - Deng Meeting) (A)

Number 2637 Secret Top Urgent

Concerning Outgoing Telegram No. 2636

The parts concerning the situation in China and the Indochina problem are as follows:

1. The Situation in China

(1) In response to Prime Minister Ohira asking how he himself thought China would be in the future and within what kind of framework modernization and democratization would be carried out, Deng remarked as follows:

(a) The "Four Modernizations" were first proposed by the late Chairman Mao and the late Premier Zhou. The goal is to change China's poor and lagging condition. That is to say, we want to raise the people's standard of living and contribute to international society in a way appropriate to China. If we lag behind, we will be despised. The Soviet Union is now looking down on China.

(b) The "Four Modernizations" are China's way of accomplishing this. Even by the end of this century, China's income per capita will probably be very low. Uncommon effort will be needed to reach one thousand dollars. We are not thinking of a car in every home. However, when we have carried through the "Four Modernizations," even greater aid to poorer countries in the Third World will probably be possible.

(c) There are some who worry that China may become an international competitor. However, even when the "Four Modernizations" have been carried through, it will be what you might call a modernization of a "moderately well-off condition," so there is no need to worry. On the contrary, in our present state, even if we introduced foreign capital and technology, the problem of repayment would emerge. Also (when China becomes rich), with a large domestic market, we will be able to use at home what we now must export abroad.

(2) In response to the above, Prime Minister Ohira said that Japan's modernization had been earlier than China's and had achieved a certain degree of success but, in retrospect, there had been repeated trials and errors, which had left behind aftereffects in such areas as urban policy and environmental protection policy. He expressed his hope, as a friend, that China would not follow in Japan's footsteps and make the same mistakes.

2. The Indochina Problem

(1) Deng, saying that he would like to speak concerning the Indochina problem, made the following remarks:

(a) China is not thinking of the Vietnam problem in terms of China's interests but from a global and strategic point of view. Even if Vietnam were to dominate Southeast Asia, the threat to China would not be so great. Moreover, even if poor, China is a

great country and capable of self-sufficiency.

(b) Vietnam's realizing the Indochina Federation would mean Soviet Union military bases there. Even if China were to come under attack from the south, our three southern provinces could readily handle it. Consequently, the threat from Soviet bases in Vietnam is not to China. Japan would more likely be threatened. Would not the United States, too, be threatened? The reason is that the Soviet Union would attempt an increase of naval and air forces in the Pacific and Indian oceans, because between them is the Malacca Strait. Consequently, it will be a terrible thing unless the construction of such Soviet strategic bases is thwarted. Japan's opinion on this point may be different but, as a friend of the Japanese Government, I raise it to have you think seriously about it.

(c) Concerning Cambodia, ultimately a political settlement will probably be necessary. But that time is not yet here. The prerequisite for a political settlement is Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia. It will be good if the Cambodian people themselves settle the problem of Cambodia. If Pol Pot is no good, then let it be Sihanouk or whomever. If the Cambodian people choose, then good.

(d) Of course, this prerequisite cannot now be realized, but if Vietnam's present difficulties (poor living conditions, shortages of goods, low wages, shortages of food) grow even worse, then there likely will be the possibility of achieving a political settlement.

(e) China has taught a lesson. There are some who see it as a failure, but we succeeded in that Vietnamese troops were increased in number from 600,000 to one million. That alone has greatly increased the burden on Vietnam. Every day Vietnam depends on a transfusion of two million dollars from the Soviet Union. US Vice President Mondale reportedly said that Soviet aid this year to Vietnam will reach 750 million dollars, but daily goods are scarce. Consequently, the invasion of Cambodia and Laos will become a great burden for Vietnam. It is good if Vietnam can have the Soviet Union shoulder such a burden. When they can no longer bear it, it may then be the time for a political settlement.

(f) Vietnam is now conducting a dry-season offensive, but I think that the forces of Democratic Kampuchea will not disappear. It will be all right if Democratic Kampuchea can maintain 20 percent of its strength. (At this point, Deng touched on the reduction of the army in the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan.)

(g) There is a movement now in Western Europe to rescind recognition of Democratic Kampuchea, but China cannot approve of it.

(h) The above is China's thinking in regard to Indochina. Of course, Japan's concrete policy is an issue for Japan.

(2) In response to the above, Prime Minister Ohira remarked to the effect: As ever, Japan thinks that all international disputes should be settled by negotiation. We are giving aid to Vietnam because we have promised to do so. As for the period of time, we are examining it. China likely has an opinion on this point, but the position of the Government of Japan is that we would like you to hear ours.

(End)