

December 4, 1969

Sisco Telcon with Kissinger - Dec. 4, 1969

Citation:

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<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/230157>

Summary:

A telcon from Joseph Sisco in which he discusses the opinions of top government officials in regards to Middle East negotiations.

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KW NARA, Date 5/13/04



Telecon
Joe Sisco
12/4/69 11:48 a.m.

K said how is the just and lasting peace progressing. S said I'm a war monger; I'm for war.

S said the Secretary wonders whether he can get a general go-ahead on that speech. K said it's in the President's office now; K said what is the advantage of giving it? S said it's geared to upcoming summit meeting. S said it's within the framework of our present policy. K said assuming what the P doesn't yet accept . . . that we have to keep pushing negotiations. S said the speech goes down in whatever foreseeable purpose we could have in the future. S said we haven't said anything substantive since March; we haven't taken a balanced stand in the discussions; we think it will bolster the Jordanians, Moroccans and Libyans; it makes our position reasonably clear in circumstances where we are not likely to get a political settlement.

K said he is not at all sure from talking with the P that he believes we are on the right track. K said the P wants to reserve judgment until the NSC meeting. S said it's a statement of policy on what we've done. K said he has passed it on. S said he thought this was based on the assumption that the NSC meeting would be today. K said the more he thought about it he thought to make a major policy decision without the Secretary of State present . . . If it were arms supply for Pakistan or something . . .

S said he has come to two conclusions: 1) we've got to operate on the assumption that we are not going to get a consensus; 2) as long as we're not going to get a consensus, it's better in the area having the disagreement part of the overall disagreement in a four power context rather than we being pushed into a corner where it's 3 against 1 and we can't produce the Israelis. K said I don't understand. S said he is going to try to get this down on paper. S said on the Jordan aspect, we ought to decide what the outer perimeter of what our views are on the Jordan settlement: hope to maintain a toehold on Hussein; consistent with Jordanian security. S said secondly, if Charlie is armed with that-- can say that's out position--it's unlikely to get a Russian agreement. If that's the case we can stand firm on the October 28 document. We can say we think it's a reasonable and fair proposal. We say these proposals stand; there's no purpose in talking further until a closer meeting

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Telecon

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of the minds can be achieved. K said are you doing this as a formal proposal or personal. S said he can't do it as formal. S said he talked with Elliot. K said Elliot agrees with you. K said do you mind if I show it to the President? S said he's only going to make it personal first; only going to give to Elliot and K. S said what he would do for example: ~~X~~ the assistant to the King wants to talk with S--just a friendly chat on December 12; the Secretary is going to talk to Eban on the 16th. S said it's an opportunity to consult generally along these lines. Say this is fair; as far as we are going to go. It's not the Russians playing lawyer for the Egyptians and we for the Israelis. S said we've got to get something if we're not going to let Hussein go down the drain. K said he's just concerned about letting the Russians in on _____.

S said the opening meeting of the four powers indicates that they've pegged out their most extreme position; paper asked for total withdrawal of Israelix forces from all occupied territory. K said including Syria? S said yes, on Syria the President spoke to Golda Meir in a way that would make it tough. K said yes he remembered.