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Alva Myrdal, 'New Roads to Disarmament'

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Summary:
The author of “New Roads to Disarmament,” Alva Myrdal was head of Swedish disarmament policy from 1962 to 1973. In her 1967 paper presented at the Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, Belgrade, and Zagreb in 1967, Myrdal positions nuclear disarmament in its broader context and elaborates on her visions of a new world order. She would publicize many of these same thoughts and observations in her 1976 book, The Game of Disarmament. How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race. In 1982, she received the Nobel Peace Prize for her work on disarmament.

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New Roads to Disarmament
by Madame Alva Myrdal, Member of Swedish Cabinet in Charge of Disarmament

I. Introduction.

The title is by far too presumptuous. I can have no ambition to present any spectacularly new ideas as to how disarmament could be achieved in our time or, what is really the political equivalent to military disarmament: how PEACE could be established. The two are by necessity intertwined. Only if there existed at present a realistic and at the same time firmly trusted expectation that a new era of a general political will to co-existence, to world peace was being opened up, would responsible leaders of our many nations, great and small, dare embark now on a course of "General and Complete Disarmament". - To that goal, however, all countries who have the honour to have become members of the United Nations have solemnly pledged themselves. But as the world of our time is shaped, the ambitions of statesmen as well as of us, the discussants of politics, must be reduced to more modest dimensions. We must concentrate on problems that are of immediate significance and of manageable proportions. But, of course, we must at the same time keep open the perspective towards wider horizons.

This paper is thus based on a critical attitude towards disarmament schemes placed in a political vacuum. Even individual
disarmament measures should be examined with regard to their specific political feasability. A scientific task would be to establish as definite a linkage as possible between specific political changes on the international scene and specific disarmament measures. 1)

Today I will attempt to sketch such a more closely coherent pattern of how plans for gradual disarmament could be connected with plans for gradually solving political problems. The two lines of thought are admittedly difficult to bring into a systematic confrontation, but when they are not, the result is that disarmament plans will look as artificially abstract constructs - and peace plans as piously idealistic, if not naive.

In order to present my reasoning in a coherent fashion, the process of development towards a world of peace and at the same time of general disarmament is conceived of as following four different "paths". They are and must be pursued parallelly, although it is also realistic to expect that they will mature within different time-dimensions. These "roads" are thus not to be conceptualized as a sequence of stages, of which one has to be - successfully - completed before the next one is entered upon. The pattern is rather one of developing processes which are incipient already at the present time and presumed to be actively promoted so as to continue to gather momentum. But it is also assumed that as some will mature earlier than others, they would thus also create an atmosphere more propitious for further change along the other lines. This cumulative causation is what signifies the process as a dynamic one.

The main idea, underlying this somewhat artificially con-
strued framework (artificial in so far as it gives the semblance both of a necessary time-order and of different measures as being more independent than they really are) is that for all efforts in the disarmament field, we must as a prerequisite realize that specific disarmament measures are more systematically dependent on specific political changes than is generally admitted.

II. A sequence of possible disarmament measures and relevant political trends.

1) Disarmament measures which could most appropriately be expected in the immediate future would consist in freezing the status quo in regard to the nuclear arms race and, both as a cause and as an effect, obtaining a modicum of détente in the political relation between the two existing super-powers, as well as between them and the rest of the world.

2) A second and wider objective is related to the solution, or at least insulation, of regional conflicts and a reduction of the numbers, frequency and scope of so-called local wars. For this process it is essential that a correspondence be established between on the one hand such disarmament measures which can serve as effective brakes on the military build-ups in various parts of the world and on the other hand the interrelated political measures, consisting in withdrawal of Great-Power military interventions around the globe and increased positive interaction between countries within a region.

3) The two next "phases" would have to be begun concomitantly with the previous ones, but must as a sequence to them be widened into definitive challenges in order to secure the continuation of
the process. Thus, in a third and more remote circle of objectives I would treat a considerably heightened international integration in the economic and cultural spheres, leading to a much more equitable distribution of resources of all kinds and a much more active and effective participation by all peoples in the decisions of world affairs. This major change entails on the disarmament side the completion of a whole series of partial disarmament measures which can assure considerable savings - in money, material, communications, men, and, before all in technical and scientific resources. And, as concomitant political measures, a barrier against or at least vigilant controlling of all tendencies towards international power monopolies - economic, political or cultural.

4) In the most distant future must be placed all plans both to implement General and Complete Disarmament and to establish a world order where progress, liberty and peace would be firmly secured - although also that world would be faced with the eternally ongoing flux of change. What this goal would have to imply of concrete changes is from this far distance impossible to envision. We must, however, already now set in motion the long term strivings by which the United Nations will finally have been built up to such an efficient organ that we can safely transfer to it the functions of protecting and perfecting the world society.

The present historical epoch of Great Power blocs, of mass destruction weapons, of economic monopolies, of political and cultural hegemony by a few strong nations must then belong to the "bygones that are for ever bygones".

Thus, I have presented this distant dream of a peaceful world, which is always in our hearts, not as a choice now open between
different systems or plans such as world federation, which seems to me as a politician utterly unrealistic. Rather, if world peace and general disarmament will become possible at all, it is as the end result of a long uphill struggle.

Still, is even such a scheme for identifying such measures which would allow the construction of peace and disarmament on increasingly firmer foundations, at all a realistic one in the sense that even the most immediate stages could be attempted with some hope of success? I want to answer in the affirmative but under a strict "als ob" assumption: that we as humans could show reasonable sanity. As the political situation reveals itself today we are more justified in being pessimistic. But a certain optimism that the world will try to follow the course of reason is a necessary point of departure for any planning at all. And using the optique of reason, the thesis seems self-evident that there will have to be an increasingly closer relationship between the specific disarmament measures which are contemplated and the specific political problems facing us at each cross-road. This - it seems to me - is really a problem for the political scientists to work on: ingeniously trying to confront the two types of issues with each other. Perhaps then the political decision-makers might be influenced so as not just to pursue schemes for now one and now the other, that is to say, construct disarmament schemes in a political vacuity and improvise the political solutions, if at all tried.

III. Halting the nuclear arms race and establishing a basis of confidence.

The connection between political change and disarmament mea-
sures is least specific in the nearest future: the world is in a state of turmoil where policies are being shifted and improvised under immediate pressure in so many places, while on the other side practically all disarmament measures are as yet untried. In this short range perspective, progress along the road to disarmament seems rather to be dependent on whether any event does occur which leads to a lessening of tensions between the world powers. Our greatest disarmament success so far, namely the partial ban on nuclear-weapon testing, obtained by the Moscow Treaty in 1963, was in some general way related to the fact that tensions between the two super-powers became relaxed after the Cuba adventure. But it seems difficult to discern any inherent affinity between the two advances made. Certainly, the radiation danger which was really the one that became mitigated by the Moscow Treaty, was not hovering over Cuba. Probably the test-ban just happened to be the one disarmament decision for which preparation was most nearly completed. Otherwise the Cuba experience ought rather to have led to an interest in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries, particularly in the sense of non-deployment on new territories. Perhaps it was one of the many entries in the "history of lost opportunities" that the non-deployment and non-dissemination were not briskly broached at that juncture.

A similar "delayed reaction" can be visualized in relation to what is at present our most hopeful endeavours within the actual disarmament negotiations in Geneva, namely to reach an agreement on a "non-proliferation treaty" against additional countries getting control of nuclear weapons. Evidently, that move forward should have been taken — in any rational linking with political
realities - before China became a nuclear-weapon power, or even
before Great Britain and France paid their entrance ticket into
the nuclear club, led by considerations which are now already ob-
solute to a very expensive adventure. As it is, the main interest
on the Soviet side to conclude such a treaty has all the time been
to tie up any ambitions on the part of West Germany to get control
of nuclear weapons, a desideratum which is of course shared by most
nations. But the actual urgency in pushing the treaty through in
1967 is no doubt highlighted by the recent Israel-Arab war: the
sceptre of any nation in such an inflammatory situation having
control over nuclear arms must have animated the leaders of the two
super-powers to finalize a deal on this treaty when they had anyhow
recognized the wisdom of a non-intervention policy in regard to the
combattants.

Turning to disarmament measures at present actively on the
agenda for the negotiations proceeding at the Eighteen-Nation Dis-
armament Conference in Geneva, the maximum to hope for in a rather
near future would be measures to "freeze" present nuclear capabili-
ties. Even for a statement of such modest hopefulness important
reservations have to be made. An important one is the licence given
to China and France when they are not expected to sign our interna-
tional agreements. Another menacing prospect is the temptation for
the two super-powers, unhampered as they will be through this agree-
ment, to start a new phase of the spiralling arms race. They might
already have started to cash in on their liberty by their recent
decisions to step up the deployment of ABM systems of strategic
defense.

"Freezing", "containment", "non-arms" rather than "disarma-
One marks the maximum of optimism, just as it has been the signum of the only agreements reached so far: The Moscow Agreement 1963 not to undertake further nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space, and the convention 1966 about non-discriminatory access to outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies, containing a pledge not to place nuclear devices in orbit or install them on celestial bodies. This last mentioned measure, in so far as it should be classified in the disarmament category at all, seems to be partly related to the political super-power détente during the last years despite the continuation of the hazardous Viet-nam war. But partly it is one of the few testimonies that the political powers have grasped in time that opportunity for a decisive turn in the technological development which always exists in its early stages, in this case the tooling up for a "space race" which now seems to be placed under harness as far as weaponry is concerned.

To a similar category ought to belong the three or four measures dominating the negotiations in Geneva and the debates in the United Nations. Their distinctive feature is an attempt to put on the brake on the armaments race, before shifting the gear to reverse. Let me first briefly describe them under the abbreviated terms we have introduced in the jargon of disarmers. They envisage a "freezing" (containment) of the number of nuclear-weapon States through the so-called non-proliferation agreement, whereby the five nations "licensed" to remain in the club would be the same as those who have the right to permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council; further the "freezing" (non-development) of the quality of their nuclear weapons through a complete test-ban, by which the research and development work for increasingly more effective
means of mass destruction would be impeded by a ban on experimentation; a "freezing" (confining) of the quantity of their nuclear weapons through a cut-off of production of fissile material for weapon purposes, whereby additions to the stock-piles of their already produced or potential nuclear weapons would cease; a "freezing" (limiting) of the strategic delivery systems, both offensive and defensive, but with particular emphasis on so-called defensive installations through halting the deployment of ABM.

What is then the relationship existing between such measures and the political realities of our period of history? It is truly a dramatic one. Because the political impact relates to a most significant interplay: on the one hand there is the possibility for either a strengthening or a weakening of the competition between the super-powers, and on the other hand there is the concomitant possibility of a strengthening or weakening of their monopoly in relation to other states. If they decide to lower their guards, i.e. seek to maintain the balance of security at a lower level, then an immediate result would be the creation of a new political confidence that the world might be moving forward. I believe this to be the imperative question just at this moment of history: are they choosing to lead us in a hopeful direction, or not?

As this "package" of related measures is on the immediate agenda, it deserves a closer look. The political observer will find that all of them, except the first one - the non-proliferation treaty - would call for some renunciatory action on the part of the nuclear-weapon powers. But such is the power situation of today, that it is only that first one which has won their unconditional support and thus become the only one now actively promoted by them.
It should therefore not be surprising that the non-nuclear-weapon States, and particularly those countries in the Geneva Conference who are not members of the Great-Power-alliances in Europe, are adamant in claiming for simultaneous progress along several of the lines indicated.

It would be wholly unwarranted to conclude, however, that although we have an interest in getting those powers who do possess nuclear weapons also to accept some restraint, that would imply that the others would want to acquire nuclear weapons. That certainly is a non-sequitur. The situation should be understood in political terms: we are desperately interested in a lessening of tensions between the super-powers but likewise prompted to take a stand against any increase of Great-Power dominance in the world. The results to be obtained if progress could be made in regard to the entirety of measures enumerated in this first category is modest enough: no reverse, but at least some brakes applied to the frightening increase in nuclear armaments and in concentration of power. Such steps would consequently fit in with the "scheme" I have indicated: they would lie within the sphere of possibles for disarmament, which in turn would engender increasing confidence in the political climate that the world was moving in the right direction.

To follow my method of asking for the political appropriateness of various disarmament measures one might be tempted to draw the following conclusions. The non-proliferation agreement is obviously directly connected with political interests of today to reduce the number of possible initiators of nuclear war. This issue is of particular relevance in relation to geopolitical situations
where two nations are paired-off in seemingly permanent positions of mutual military threat and where at least one of them has the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons or the political aspiration to acquire them from a nuclear-weapon power. The issue has also, and quite predominantly, been discussed in relation to the risk that nuclear weapons be disseminated within alliances. Those are certainly topical issues of today; we can all fill in the particulars. A considerably more complex case, which is the one India often refers to, relates to threat perceptions in geopolitical situations where one party already possesses nuclear weapons and the other one does not. This raises exceedingly difficult questions

a) whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons would really assure "security", and

b) whether "security" should be guaranteed by outside nuclear-weapon powers.

Thus, what might look as a fairly simple pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons must in regard to some nations raise very complex political problems.

As this is the background - not often discussed - to our present labours in the stony field of disarmament I might be allowed to dwell on the alternative solutions we sometimes contemplate. "We" then stand for the non-aligned countries whose voice, less often heard, I believe it is my task to present to you today. Taking into account the specific political aims of a non-proliferation treaty, just referred to, the most urgent task is obviously to make certain that there is no spread of nuclear weapons. From this ultra-realistic point of view and in the light of the difficulties, at present persisting, to obtain adherence by a number of states, crucial
in this context, to a complex treaty, it might in the first instance have sufficed to get a simple "non-dissemination" treaty: i.e. the nuclear-weapon States pledging themselves not to transfer controls of such weapons to any recipient what so ever and the non-nuclear-weapon States committing themselves not to receive such transfers of weapons. Such a treaty might even be extended to cover a symmetrical obligation not to assist and not to require assistance for the acquisition in other forms of such weapons, also between nuclear-weapon powers.

That would have implied leaving the whole question of independent manufacture of nuclear weapons temporarily open.

The next efforts - and I must stress immediate, and preferrably simultaneous efforts - should then have been devoted to plugging that loop-hole, which could with great efficacity have been done through agreements on test-ban and/or cut-off. It is explicitly recognized that there is not the same hesitance on part of the "might-be-nuclears" to sign such agreements. And it is a conviction that needs no dispute, that the test-ban as well as the cut-off would effectively stop the have-nots from starting nuclear-weapon production. At the same time they would have involved mutual obligations on the part of the nuclear-weapon countries, thus effectively halting the arms race and improving beyond comparison the climate of confidence in our world's future. It remains a riddle to me why the Great Powers have chosen the strategy of giving priority to such an ineffective measure as a non-proliferation pledge, particularly as it draws the thunder of political criticism over their heads.

Let us, however, summarize, as political scientists must do, what will be the political result, if a non-proliferation treaty of
the scope now envisaged would be signed and ratified by all those States, who are relevant in the context. We should then expect reduced tension around certain local zones, and also reduced tension between the two nuclear super-powers, but, I regret to say, in all frankness, if no countervailing forces are in the offing, also somewhat increased tension or at least a sense of malaise between the super-powers and all the smaller States. Or, to put it in more general terms: what we must now fear is an increase in mankind’s lack of trust in the future of this world, as it would continue to live under the scare of the nuclear armaments race. 2) But let us take a quick look at the political "scenario" also for the other disarmament measures, discussed under the adequately modest term of "partial" measures. The test-ban issue - which is the one technically most ripe for solution - could dispel what is perhaps the gravest uncertainties as to the future of the world, namely that the incessant competition as to research and development in weapons technology might bring about one-sided advance for one of the two super-powers. Because that would spell the end of the present balance of deterrence. We cannot conceal our fear that this probably is exactly the objectives of the military machines within each of these countries. Competition in increasing demands is the very air all military men seem to breathe - in all countries. It would, however, lead to an enormous increase in the nuclear scare and the political distrust of the future on the part of the large majority of mankind. In order to diminish the discrimination I have so often referred to, the super-powers would really be most advised to agree on a test-ban.

Here I want to enter a special plea for the "test-ban", i.e.
the freezing of the quality of nuclear weapons through a complete ban on all testing of such weapons. There is no shortage in the quantity of nuclear weapons already produced, which on the contrary already represent "overkill" capacity, as Mr. McNamara has so eloquently stated when giving the reasons against an ABM deployment before recommending its acceptance. Therefore the stopping of testing, i.e. of development of these weapons through experimentation, would probably be the one measure most effective in hampering the arms race, because the competition nowadays centers on the quality of these weapons. Thus, a test-ban would probably be most conducive to improvements in the political atmosphere in the world. I might add that this is so not least because this is exactly the point where the super-powers are floundering the dictate of the United Nations Member States, who have decidedly condemned the continuation of tests - and we know these are not only continuing but increasing in frequency and yield.

Closely connected with this issue, and most specifically with any endeavour not to upset the hitherto prevailing balance of terror, would be an agreement to curtail the development and deployment of ABM. More generally, a freezing of the development and deployment of strategic delivery systems, both offensive and defensive, would have important effects in bolstering the world's trust in its own future. But instead new "horizons of horror" are just being opened to us. The decisions to deploy anti-missile-missile systems show most clearly the political obstacles which render any agreement difficult at the present juncture. The weighing of the issue, at least as reported from USA, seems to hinge on the fine point whether the détente with the USSR is so reliable that it
would permit scrapping the projects of large-scale, "massive" deployment in favour of a "thinner" and cheaper system, motivated by what is perceived as a threat from China. We now know that both these objectives are to be hit by the same stone, presumably by each one of the super-powers. Is this a point of no return in the race between disarmament negotiations and armaments build-up?

In regard to an agreement as to the cut-off, which would imply the restriction of nuclear-weapon strength to present quantities, the reasoning will have to strike a different note. Per se, it should hardly need to be any bone of contention. Both super-powers are admittedly saturated with overkill capacity; and their levels are so incomparably much higher than any other nation's that it would seem to be a matter of sheer convenience to them to agree to the quantitative halt. Also, the control system raises no technical difficulties at all. It will in principle have been solved in connection with the non-proliferation treaty. And in practice a ready-made system of safeguards, universally applicable, is at hand in the IAEA. Thus, a cut-off agreement might follow by practically imperceptible efforts.

But the political pressure from the outside, which I discern as a strong one for the previously mentioned measures of partial disarmament does not seem to be equally strong. It exists, of course, in the generalized way as a clamour from most nations that the senseless increase in overkill capacity on the part of a few nations should stop. But, in a way, we consider it, as the American saying goes, as "their own funeral" when they are paying these apparently unnecessary costs. Economic arguments would speak strongly in favour of a cut-off of production of fissionable material for
weapon purposes. This takes on an international hue when we all
know how the world is pressing for aid to economic progress. But
how could the demands for a decisive effort to promote development
in hitherto less privileged parts of the world become the political
trigger for a cut-off agreement? Surely the alternative uses of the
resources of nuclear energy would open up fascinating vistas for
development.

Also on the political side, a warning of caution must be
voiced in relation to one detail: the chances of succeeding to con­
clude a cut-off agreement might easily be lost if the negotia­tions
become infected with the virus of prestige. Thus, we should be weary
of any requirement that the dimensions of existant stock-piles with­
in the nuclear-weapon States be made known, be it by any assumptions
being brandished about as to how much stronger one country's nuclear
arsenal is than another's. Here I want to be undiplomatic enough to
say that the West has probably committed a diplomatic error by sug­
gesting, not a simple cut-off of production of fissionable material
as of a specific date, but coupled it with proposing a quota on the
reduction of the stock-piles of fissionable material, giving the
proportions 60-40 to USA and USSR respectively.

If it could ever be achieved, the contemplated first series of
"freezing" disarmament measures would produce rather enormous im­
provements in the political climate of our time. Therefore, the en­
deavours made by the non-nuclear-weapon nations to get the two
giants released from the fetters of their single combat position
must be recognized to be of positive value. It should not be sur­
prising to anybody that specifically the non-aligned among the non­
nuclear-weapon nations, which are members of the ENDC, charged as
it is with actual negotiations, have been quite dissatisfied and have also voiced their dissatisfaction in regard to the direction, the speed and the manner in which the super-powers have led these negotiations during the last year. I do not want to be overly critical, but I simply fail to understand why they have chosen their particular priority – i.e. a single-minded preoccupation with the non-proliferation treaty – or their particular procedure, i.e. secluded consultations between them and their European allies for nine long months.

We have untiringly pointed to the necessity to advance speedily in regard to the whole package of related partial disarmament measures which rightly belong as constitutive elements in what I have outlined as a first stage of endeavours. This lack of progress is so much more inexplicable, as the omnipresent control issue, that is the monitoring of possible violations offers no unsurmountable technical or financial problems.

IV. Insulation of regional political conflicts against foreign interventions and arms build-up.

I now turn from what in Geneva and the United Nations is actually discussed as practical possibilities of disarmament to broach situations of a greater complexity, where I have to rely more on my personal liberty for some free-hand drawing of what might come to be our tasks in the future. I also want to place on record the general reservation that my statements are not intended to be normative, to be prescriptions, but rather to show how if you want one measure of disarmament you may have to consider certain concomitant political changes. It is just presented as a
framework which political scientists should, of course, improve. Any wider range of disarmament measures can only be conceived against a background where Great Powers renounce any special "police" responsibilities on an international scale, a renunciation which in turn is related to the prospects of greater calm on the world scene. Partly that calm would be engendered by the halting of the nuclear arms race indicated in the previous section. It would seem futile now to proceed to suggest international legislation about prohibitory measures, such as those exemplified in the following, if there were not a corollary readiness on the part of Great Powers to relinquish tendencies towards interventions on their own in the political affairs of nations around the globe. On the other hand, if a political climate allowing gradual independence for various regions of the world would be created, rather farreaching disarmament measures become so much more appropriate. This is because the cumulative causation process which, while insulating the world more and more securely against the effects of local or regional conflicts, would at the same time help to minimize them.

Let us try to examine first what limits to our reasoning is set by political realities.

There are, of course, numerous, quite varied types of political problems alive in the regional or national conflict situations which we can presently perceive. Even under a precursory view they must be recognized to be so serious that they can certainly not be set aside by a wisp-of-the-hand. Thus, in many regions of the world conflicts are breaking forth and will continue to germinate by the claim for greater equity in economic conditions and broader participation in political responsibility. Also, colonial oppression -
or just traditions of colonial oppression; - as well as tribal strife, racial hatred and many other growth-pains have to be overcome. In the most populous and the most desperately poor countries of the world, the struggle for development is tragically hampered by seemingly senseless wars and war traditions and desperate internal unrest. Just this year it is brought home to us all how in West Asia (or what we ethnocentrically call "the Middle East") there are gigantic tasks facing the future in order to secure a decent livelihood for all its peoples and evoke constructive neighbourhood relations - once the aftermath of hostilities has been cleared up.

Only one thing is certain about these disparate and often despondent situations: they are not and will not be remedied by military interventions by Great Powers.

It ought to be self-evident that something totally new, yes, a hitherto unseen creative and disinterested readiness to cooperate is needed in our world. Efforts from the outside to regulate matters by interventions, by domination, by competing for "spheres of influence" are certainly doomed to be inadequate - and most probably in the main destructive.

How constructive alternative solutions to the manifold political problems should be shaped, both at the national and at the regional level, must be left for their own peoples to decide. That there must be some substitution by positive contribution from abroad only needs mentioning: a generous inflow of assistance, not by agents but by foreign scientists, technicians, research workers etcetera, under independent national or regional or United Nations management, only not directed by outside governments.

Our interest should rather turn to which disarmament measures
would be of an inherently related nature in order to proceed parallel with such a development of independent remedies for the local and regional conflicts.

The very first requirement would probably be de-politization of "military aid". An embargo on deliveries of arms from abroad, whether gifts or sales would, by the way, be a rather strict parallel to the "non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons. The whole problematics of military aid and arms trade is ripe for a fresh and frank analysis. It is in fact extraordinary that the effects of the free-for-all principle in regard to armaments have been left unscrutinized. Compare the efforts since 50 years in stopping the international traffic in narcotics. What has been the real motivation and the moral justification, in the industrialized countries, when they have undertaken to arm the veritable powderkegs in various parts of the world, which we have so clearly identified through political analysis? A study of the arms sales, of arms flows, of embargo policies already set afoot in some countries is urgently needed. Several such studies have been initiated and I am happy to know that SIPRI - the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - is embarking on a thoroughgoing analysis of this "export for destruction". Of course, counterpart studies should also be made of what it means in terms of balance if only those countries, who are well equipped for production, can go on piling up hugh arsenals. Disarmament also at home must follow suit in order to equalize the effects of arms production, just as well as of arms exports.

The question of the possibility of some international control on arms trade and production as a forthcoming disarmament measure is closely related to the political one how to neutralize the in-
creasing international superiority of the militarily already superior nations. Their monopolies would, as a matter of fact, to some extent even be fortified by an arms embargo. As a detail in this complex enters the question of elimination of foreign military bases in the sense of those being more or less permanently established in peace-time and often as parts of a global defense system, rather than such bases which might just be organized on the demand of certain states for collectivizing local self-defense in times of war, as foreseen in the United Nations’ Charter.

I am quite convinced that this problem, as a general feature of disarmament, should be inscribed within this second circle of concerted efforts towards both a political and a military insulation of different regions from Great Power politics. I am afraid it is but illusory to propose evacuation of foreign bases as a disarmament measure to be agreed upon already at the present stage of world affairs. A rule against foreign bases has its appropriate place in a systematic demounting of foreign military postures and ambitions for military interventions around the globe. - If this is true as a part of a general pattern: it should, of course, not debar any nations from taking unilateral, ad-hoc decisions at any time in the direction of evacuation of military strongholds on other nations’ territory.

The one disarmament measure in this second category which can be undertaken most rapidly because with maximum independence is the one of zonal denuclearization and armament regulation in other forms, or even demilitarization. Latin-America has already pioneered in the denuclearization field by this year’s Tlatelolco treaty. Still, that case also demonstrates what considerable com-
applications are introduced by Great Power politics; it may suffice to mention the place names Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico - and the Falkland Islands - creating different arguments for not adhering to or endorsing the treaty. This despite the propitious facts that Latin-America is a region, which is geographically fairly secluded from Great Power competition and that it is also in the main free from intraregional military threats between its constituent nations.

The interest in taking regional initiatives for creating zones of denuclearization or arms regulation has made its appearance also in various other parts of the world, although as yet hardly transgressing into the realm of practical politics (Central Europe, Africa, Balkan, etc.). Here I just want to draw attention to two aspects of this issue. One is its connection with the theme "elimination of foreign bases", "evacuation of foreign troops", etc., where obviously brisk initiatives from within the regions themselves and even joint regional planning would be of crucial value. The second is that a regional approach to arms regulation probably would have to take into account the problems of preserving or establishing some kind of mutually respected equity or balance within the zone so as to assure permanence of the solutions obtained.

For establishing a denuclearized zone in Europe - be it according to the pioneering Rapacki plan for such a zone in Central Europe - with its Gomulka and Lacks versions - and/or the Kekkonen formula suggesting a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries or a zone of armament regulation also with regard to conventional weapons, it is even more obvious than elsewhere that vested Great Power interests are of enormous and probably decisive importance. This illustrates the sagacity of placing measures with regional disarmament effects
in a stage subsequent to the one of a more primary relaxation of tensions and diminution of that Great Power antagonism which in turn has called forth so much competition and also division lines within geographical zones, not least ours here in Europe.

Perhaps I need not reiterate that all these and many other measures, must begin to be definitely planned already now in order to de-escalate the tensions in various local and regional contexts as well as prepare for a more and more puritan policy of non-intervention by Great Powers. The fact that I have treated these issues as pertaining to a second category is explained only by my desire to pinpoint in a more systematic way the linking of the political and the disarmament actions. But although they do belong to a higher order of complexity nothing should stop us from paving the way for them here and now.

V. Widening international interdependence and beginning of effective disarmament.

A more complete economic integration and political cooperation in the world - so often dreamt up in development programmes - must also be realised through a gradual process. It ought to be self-evident that before it can become a potent reality it presupposes a diminishing dominance of Great Power interests, militarily and politically as well as economically. Genuine loyalty between peoples, which is the foundation of real integration as we know from the maturation of the same process within our own national boundaries, can only be created when there is a fair degree of equality.

This is not the place to speak about "aid to underdeveloped
countries", nor to speak about the even more important switching of our commercial policy from one of trade obstacles into one of trade promotion. The scale on which such changes must sooner or later be introduced has as yet not been discussed as a subject of actual policies. My duty today is restricted to throwing the search-light on any possible connection with disarmament.

Attention has then to be directed to the topic known as "disarmament economics", on which a large and continuously growing literature is emerging. Pioneer in the field was the United Nations report: Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, elaborated by economic experts from countries belonging to different politico-military blocs and published in 1962. It was an excellent structural analysis of the problems involved in transfer of resources from military to civilian uses, from destructive to constructive purposes. But, of course, it is far from a final study.

In the special context of the present paper it is particularly regrettable that it was just a comparison of the situations before and after total disarmament and that no attempts have been made to draw up a grid for the gradual transfers of resources, a time-table of change. It would be desirable to use the scheme presented by me, or other such sequences of mutually reinforcing political and military measures of de-escalation, and calculate in terms of economies made, which specific resources would be released in connection with each specific disarmament measure proposed. That the "savings" on disarmament would largely be used in favour of the less developed countries, is here taken as a non-disputed assumption; the whole question of the distribution of benefits gained can only be opened when these benefits have been mapped out.
Here I can only indicate a few conjectures of what types of transfer of resources could materialize in connection with each type of disarmament measure. The list may be sketched somewhat as follows:

a) non-proliferation would only be accompanied by indirect savings on "non-arms" in the countries which do not "proliferate";

b) comprehensive test-ban would most significantly allow a release of experts, technicians and research workers, surely to be counted by tens of thousands, this because the test-ban would imply a practical foreclosure of research and development work for nuclear weapons, which is the phase of weapon production absorbing the greatest share of human talent;

c) cut-off of production of fissionable material would allow conversion of reactors and other installations to producing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the dimensions of which could be easily calculated;

d) freezing of strategic delivery systems would entail savings in material, electronics, technicians, probably of the same high order as the test-ban under b) above;

e) embargo on arms trade would, if no compensatory increase in domestic consumption were foreseen, allow conversion of some arms manufacturing plants to civilian production; as a probable side-effect it might even entail limitation also of domestic markets as certain production lines would become prohibitively costly without export outlets;

f) elimination of foreign bases, again if it is not only a question of re-deployment to home bases, would permit transfers
of airplanes and ships to civilian uses, particularly those built for cargo and transport purposes; more specifically, there would follow conversion of plants for production of new generations of military planes and ships to construction and production of civilian transport and communications; added to this would be very considerable savings in communication networks; this specific measure would furthermore, from a quantitative point of view, probably cause the most important savings in man-power;

   g) nuclear-free zones would, as a "non-armament measure", only cause indirect savings;

   h) reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons would mean an enormous increase in sources of energy through the transfer of their fissionable material, already produced and paid for, to civilian purposes; IAEA a few years ago indicated as a yardstick the doubling of the world's output of electric energy through this measure alone;

   i) reduction of conventional armaments would, of course, mean savings within all categories of material and man-power on their non-production;

   j) reduction of military standing forces would in the long run, when the perhaps somewhat painful process of re-allocation is carried through, lead to corresponding increases in the labour reserves.

The list might be continued at will. It is presented here as a challenge to the economists to proffer calculations of disarmament savings in actual figures. We sorely need a vision in concrete terms of the riches to be released through one and each disarmament measure, specifically.
What I have here schematically discussed as a third "phase", although the process would permeate the whole international development from the beginning on, might mature as a crucially creative one, when the gains from disarmament would more systematically be harnessed to the constructive tasks of the world. As that world would pari passu have been made more secure, great developments might also be expected towards international integration through various networks of interdependence and enterprises with truly international management. This feature is conditioned most specifically on a materialization of what I consider to be the most dynamic element in a system of disarmament economics, namely the release of huge cadres of experts. Those who are now mobilized for military purposes - and in the great industrialized nations a very important part of total scientific research is now being directed and financed through the defense authorities - are after all the very people who are "specialists in the delivery of solutions to complicated technical problems". It challenges our imagination to try to conceive of the gains for the world that could be made if that valuable brain-power were redirected to fields such as medicine, urban and rural rebuilding, including preserving nature and beauty, new techniques for food production, for spreading knowledge, etc.

If the world should ever have hopes of entering upon this kind of a new, creative course, there must not only have been pursued a dynamic process leading to gradually more considerable disarmament, as indicated above. Also, barriers must have been built against overriding power concentrations, which automatically seem to follow in the wake of modern technological developments in the
large scale range - if special inhibitory mechanisms are not introduced. A dominant theme in my scheming has been the necessity to break the tendency to concentration of power, alas, inherent in the present conflux of technological and economic development trends.

A couple of examples may be hinted at, where we probably already at present stand at some very decisive cross-roads. One is concerned with the development of deep sea resources. Age-old traditions in international law and praxis referred to "the freedom of the seas". This freedom has now not only to be defended on a non-discriminatory basis, excluding any self-established "right" to disturb civilian traffic through nuclear experiments or military manoeuvres. But those high seas, considered as belonging to everybody and nobody, are also threatened to be expropriated and divided. The struggle for extending territorial waters and proprietorship to parts of the continental shelf is indicative. Here as always where there is an object of contest, there also exists an opportunity to develop as an alternative a system of international cooperation; the riches of the oceans may be made available to us all by brave initiatives. They would be concerned with an international safe-guarding of the ocean depths against national installations on the ocean bed (where even military ones for sub-marine monitoring etc. now belong to the possibilities). But they must also construct methods for some form of joint international ownership of deep sea resources.

Similarly, the technical possibilities to develop the telecommunication satellites to such a point that the most isolated village in the most distant continent can be reached by one and
the same powerful transmitter, place us before the choice between a gigantic plus and an equally gigantic minus. The technical advance can either be utilized for establishing a system of equitable interdependence between nations and peoples, creating by truly cooperative international management a wonderful opportunity for a glorious new era of give and take of experiences, ideas, art on a world scale. Or, it might mean a system of as yet unimaginable cultural hegemony by the technologically, industrially and economically strongest nations.

After this furtive glance into what is now often called "les futuribles" we have to revert to the problem of the institutional foundations of a secure world - and thereby facing the ultimate question mark whether it can be considered as at all attainable - even if we muster considerable patience.

VI. A future world order of security.

Only a gradually more and more successful dedication to the many laborious and perhaps superhumanly difficult tasks outlined so far, would make it possible to blueprint an international order for peace, progress and security. It is simply impossible now to visualize any adequate construction that would substitute for the present world order where conflict, competition and violence, yes, brutality rules.

In this paper I do not intend to deal at all with the international aspects of economic interdependence and cooperation, or with legal safeguarding of civil liberties, nor with machinery for arbitration, mediation and other non-violent peace-keeping measures. I only wish to test my main thesis that disarmament measures must be
systematically harmonized with political changes, thus concentrating on the military aspect of international peace-keeping.

It has been taken for granted in all disarmament schemes that in a final stage national armies should be abolished and a United Nations force organized to safeguard the world against brush-fires of violence. The two existant formal plans for General and Complete Disarmament, one proffered by the United States and the other by the USSR, have advocated quite different structures for this system of a future United Nations world police force.\(^3\) In simplified terms: the United States has advanced the view that the United Nations should organize standing forces of its own, while the USSR has been of the opinion that the United Nations should only have the right to call on contingents from various national militia groups. It would, of course, not be difficult to draw up a compromise of a practical order: a unified United Nations' command with some permanent stand-by forces, plus the possibility to draft reserves from militia in various member nations. More important is a consideration of principle. The two schemes presented seem to me afflicted by some unhistoric flaw in the reasoning, or rather in the very premises. They are still fettered in the thought-ways of nationalism, of war threats, yes, of Great Power reluctance to give up its own superior status.

But along those lines we will never obtain that new world which would both vouchsafe peace and permit general disarmament. The organizational basis both for the military and the civilian international order of the future must necessarily be conceived in the terms of a "democracy of nations". That is, nations whose independence should have become strengthened and made much more
equitable pari passu with their ever firmer interlocking in international cooperation. There can be no world order, no world peace, and no United Nations police force to ensure that peace as long as we cannot free our thinking from the image of Great Power blocs, Great Power hegemony - as long as all our plans aim at preserving the splitting of the world instead of at joining it together.

The necessary prerequisite for creating peace in the world and assure it through a system of collective security is that States - or perhaps regional groups of States - arrive at a much more equitable status, that they consider themselves and act as neutrals but at the same time are so closely interrelated with each other, yes, unremittingly interlocked with each other, that they have arrived at safe methods of joint decision-making. To say that they would unquestioningly be guided by one and the same goal, based on a genuine harmony of interests would probably be going too far - even in the distant Utopia I am now talking of. Instead, the world will have to learn to live with conflicts, as conflicts will always arise.

But the political corollary to such cooperation for peace-keeping is, as I just stressed, that the United Nations will become a true "democracy of nations". The Great Power duel for dominance which has so far marked the organization may come to an end by the force of events, as, for instance, Walter Lippmann already read the signs on the wall of "Great Powers dethroned". If there were a growth in the role of smaller powers and their peaceful regional cooperation, one might perhaps hope for the beginning of real negotiations within the United Nations, and within the international institutions generally. Because a pertinent question is whether
those who conceive of themselves as wielding Great Power can ever truly negotiate, at least in their relation with the rest of the world. This is a question which raises itself with some pertinence in the wake of my experience in the Geneva disarmament committee. They are either inpenetrable, unperturbable, or they begin to get closer to each other through what might be likened to a kind of cautious trial-and-error method. The possibilities for the smaller powers to enter into a real process of give and take of arguments are at present weak, indeed.

To create a truly working machinery for international democracy presupposes increasing possibilities to participate in world affairs for smaller, yes for all countries, as the Charter so proudly intonates: "We, the peoples...." A growth in their sense of responsibility is, of course, equally needed. But I believe there is a fair chance that it would so grow simultaneously with the relinquishing of Great Power dominance. The nationalism of most countries would, I sincerely believe naturally tend more and more to follow a neutral course when the bonds of blocs and alliances are no longer hindering them. This may to you look like a specifically Swedish point of view. True, I feel no need to conceal our predilection for neutrality.

It is impossible for me here to give any full treatment to the whole problem of how the world of alliances might develop into one of non-intervention and neutrality. It may suffice to remind us that certain developments in prospective United Nations policy point in the direction I have here outlined. One is the resolution on non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, practically unanimously accepted and now the object of intensive legal study.
in a special committee (the "friendly relations committee") in order to achieve a more binding instrument through a convention. The second is that the collective security system towards which the United Nations was aimed, foresaw a cooperation of a very different pattern from that of competing alliances (this said in full cognizance of the importance of the veto rights for Great Powers and also of the permissiveness of Article 51 about the right for Member Nations to obtain outside aid for self-defense in times of war).

I can personally do no better than refer to the Swedish philosophy of neutrality with which I have grown up. While we have been favoured by peace for more than 150 years we have also during the last 100 years or so developed a set of principles of neutrality and, what is perhaps more important in the long run, become imbied with attitudes of neutrality as non-alignment, non siding; yes, of an admiration for impartiality. The concept "neutrality" has been most explicitly analysed by our former foreign Minister, the great international lawyer Östen Undén. He came to uphold what you might call an ideology of combining neutrality with peaceful co-existence and with collective security; to that he opposed the "primitive" system of alliances and balance-of-power games. This has more or less explicitly become our official policy. I may here quote the statement made in the present Swedish Government's declaration of foreign policy - rather prophetic if you consider its date, 24 October 1945:

"On their part the people of Sweden have reason very warmly to desire that no political division of the States into opposing groups may take place, both on account of our own vital interests and for idealistic reasons. We are will-
ing to join a common security organization, and in the case of a future conflict to relinquish our neutrality to the extent demanded by the statutes of the organization. But if, contrary to expectation, there should appear a tendency within the organization to a division of the Great Powers into dual camps, our policy must be not to let ourselves be forced into any such grouping of bloc."

The same main conclusion would be valid for all perspectives of a peaceful world order: it can simply not be conceived if we continue to think of the world as being permanently split into opposing "blocs" - whether two or soon enough perhaps in three - and a few of our nations trying to remain outside of any such fold. No problems can be solved on a long-term basis as long as that is our image of the world. The fact that as yet we lack the foundations for any such realistic and at the same time creative vision of long-term solutions, is exactly the reason why we have to return to the modest beginnings of international strivings I started to outline.

Footnotes:

1) Footnote on terminology: "Disarmament" is not a very suitable generic term for all measures usually assembled under this heading, as at least those presently on the agenda envision no real reduction of armaments but, at the most, a "freezing", a "non-armament". "Arms control" as it is also the one used in the U.N. Charter. "Arms control" should definitely be outlawed as it implies, at least as an innuendo, that control be exercised by somebody.

2) An interesting side-issue is the possibility to introduce some of the symmetrical obligations already in the non-proliferation agreement. Several governments have wanted the controls that fissile material are used for peaceful purposes extended also to facilities
in the nuclear-weapon countries. This has led the Swedish Government to propose a limited extension of the scope of the international safeguards which are to ensure that nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes only. The actual proposal is, that all transfers, i.e. exports and imports of source or fissile material or certain equipment be subjected to IAEA controls whether to or from nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon countries alike. Such a provision seems to me personally indispensable from a point of view of international morality. Nations who surrender their own nuclear-weapon option should not be encouraged or even allowed to contribute to the building up of nuclear-weapon arsenals in other nations.

3) This dissension does not just relate to such provisional, you might say "experimental" peace-keeping operations as those recently organized by the United Nations in Gaza, in Cyprus etc.
This paper has been presented at the Institutes of International Affairs in Warsaw, Belgrade and Zagreb.