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Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment'

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Summary:

The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle."

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The Political Succession on Taiwan



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Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
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The Political Succession on Taiwan 

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Key Judgments

Information available as of 15 November 1984 was used in this report.

Chiang Ching-kuo  is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle.

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By the same token, Chiang's immediate successors are unlikely to undertake any major new policy initiatives. Thus, we expect they would initially seek symbolic gestures of continued US support to demonstrate that they can manage relations with Washington. We believe they would also continue to hold China at arm's length to avoid Taiwanese charges of negotiating with Beijing in order to perpetuate mainlander dominance on the island.

We believe that no individual will dominate the immediate successor regime. Rather, decisions will increasingly be made by consensus among several powerful figures representing such key constituencies as the military, the party's old guard, and the security services. This collegium, in turn, will seek the formal ratification of the other members of the party's powerful Standing Committee for all major policy decisions.

Over the longer term, a coalition of Taiwanese and younger mainlanders will move up, a transition that Chiang has been preparing since the mid-1970s. As these politicians develop more influence toward the end of this decade, we believe they may press for more innovative approaches to old domestic and foreign policy problems, including relations with the mainland.

Any change they advocated in policy toward China, however, would be tactical and designed mainly to reduce the appearance of Taiwan intransigence. There is no indication that anyone within this group favors reunification on Beijing's current terms, or on anything other than perhaps the most nominal basis.

Still, such proposals could create serious dissension within the leadership on this key political issue. Disagreements between the Taiwanese and the senior mainlanders could also spill over into other areas, such as economic planning and defense allocations.

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Thus, despite Chiang's preparations, the present trend toward a peaceful transfer of power to a more Taiwanese leadership over the next decade is by no means assured:

- Those mainlanders who believe their interests are threatened by Taiwanization could try to slow the process, thus provoking even sharper disputes with Taiwanese in the Kuomintang. Conversely, Taiwanese in the party or opposition could press too soon for a greater sharing of power, as Taiwanese radicals did during 1979, provoking a strong conservative mainland backlash.
- Economic problems could also undermine stability. Chiang has used the phenomenal improvement in the island's standard of living to mute Taiwanese discontent over mainland political dominance. But if the government's present effort to retool the economy—a move intended to ensure that the island's exports remain competitive—falters, the Taiwanese could challenge mainland management, especially if the prospect of a greater sharing of political power proves illusory.

China's immediate response to Chiang's death will probably be a renewed call for reunification negotiations. Beijing might even try to use intermediaries to coax individual members of the collegium to support negotiations with promises of support for their political position. Because the Chinese believe that US arms sales to the island encourage Taiwan to resist Chinese overtures, they might also increase pressure on the United States to halt the sales.

Over the longer term, if the Taiwanese continue to move up within the leadership, Beijing probably would fear that such a leadership might declare Taiwan independent, a step China has said might cause it to drop its pursuit of peaceful unification. We believe the Taiwanese would not take that risk, but Beijing probably would apply political pressure on Taipei to deter such a move unless the Taiwanese took steps to reassure Beijing. Indeed, if the Taiwanese were able to persuade the senior mainlanders to take a more flexible approach toward China, we believe that Beijing would feel less compelled to press for further curbs on US arms sales to the island. This, of course, would ease tension between the United States and China.

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
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The Political Succession on Taiwan



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Chiang Ching-kuo, 74, has been the dominant figure in Taiwan politics for the past decade. Those around him who hold key positions of power and influence in the government and the Kuomintang (KMT) are nearly all mainlanders of the same generation—men such as Premier Yu Kuo-hua, 70, and Chiang Yen-shih, 69, the Secretary General of the KMT. Below them, however, is a younger group of Taiwanese and mainlanders whom Chiang has been grooming as a successor generation.



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To strengthen the legitimacy of the KMT and the prospects for a smooth generational transition, Chiang has broadened the popular base of the party and incorporated key new constituencies—predominantly Taiwanese—produced by Taiwan’s rapid economic development. This “Taiwanization” is gradually beginning to change the makeup of both the party and the government leadership. To underscore his commitment to a gradual transfer of power, Chiang selected Li Teng-hui, a 61-year-old Taiwanese, as his running mate and vice president last spring.



There is no established method to replace Chiang as party Chairman, a position to which a successor must be elected by the KMT Central Committee. Likely candidates include current party Secretary General Chiang Yen-shih, but his power base is also limited.



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We believe Chiang’s decision to seek another six-year term as president—he was reelected last May—despite his poor health stems from his desire to increase the chances for an orderly transfer of power after his death. In the short run, he wants to strengthen the position of his most likely successors—the still dominant mainlander clique surrounding him—while putting more firmly in place his plans for a transition to a younger, more Taiwanese leadership by the early 1990s.



No single leader, in fact, is likely to possess the extensive network of contacts and support necessary to dominate the government the way Chiang has. Thus, we believe that Li and Yu would have to share power with the other senior members of the 31-man KMT Central Standing Committee (see appendix A). The Committee is the ruling party’s highest decision-making forum and will probably assume additional power after Chiang’s death.



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Mechanics of Succession

If Chiang dies during his present term, Vice President Li Teng-hui would accede to the presidency under Taiwan’s constitutional process. But because Li controls no faction of his own, his power would not be commensurate with his position. Premier Yu Kuo-hua would probably be more powerful. But Yu, who was named premier in June, also lacks a strong political base and is primarily a technocrat.



Taiwan’s political leaders are comfortable with such ad hoc political arrangements and have worked well together during similar periods in the past. For example, Chiang Ching-kuo ran the government from the

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The KMT Party Apparatus and the Succession

The Kuomintang in 1922 was consciously modeled after the Soviet Communist Party and remains so today. Chiang Ching-kuo is party chairman, in addition to being president of the state. There are no vice-chairmen, nor is there any automatic process for naming a successor as chairman. [redacted]

Policymaking nominally resides in the Central Standing Committee (see appendix A), which is equivalent to a politburo, and in six subcommittees of the party's Central Committee. The Secretary General, Chiang Yen-shih, is responsible for day-to-day management of party affairs. [redacted]

Premier's office under a caretaker president following the death of his father in 1975. More recently, when Chiang was incapacitated after eye surgery in 1982, an informal group of top leaders took over his responsibilities for several months. A similar group was formed and worked successfully when former Premier Sun suffered a stroke earlier this year. [redacted]

Chiang has carefully tailored the Standing Committee so that it now contains representatives not only of the three traditional bases of power—the military, security services, and the KMT old guard—but also of important new groups from the bureaucracy, business community, and the media, many of whom are Taiwanese. We believe that Chiang envisions the members of this body assuming a greater policymaking role and making decisions representing a consensus of the island's major political constituencies. Chiang also probably hopes this arrangement will forestall any serious challenge to the succession process he has worked out. [redacted]

If Chiang's plan succeeds, as seems likely, his death will set in motion an evolution toward a more pluralistic leadership less dominated by the military and security services. Indeed, once Chiang dies, those at the top will have to assess—for the first time—the relative strength of their own power bases. Until now, their power and influence have depended much more on their relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo than on the group they represent. As political jockeying becomes more pronounced, some of these men will

probably reach out beyond the traditional bases of power in search of allies. This, in turn, should create opportunities for businessmen, technocrats, and media experts to play a larger role in policy formulation than is now the case. We believe the probable formation of such competing power blocs will lead to a more pluralistic system that takes the interests of all the major groupings more into account before decisions are made. [redacted]

Although we believe that no single individual will ever be able to exercise the broad powers of either Chiang or his father, senior Taiwan politicians may—like many of their Asian counterparts—find collegial decisionmaking difficult and eventually turn to one individual to broker decisions. Alternatively, one man could, over time, try to create a power base similar to Chiang's. Because Chiang has prevented any of his subordinates from building power bases that would allow them to challenge his power, predictions about which of the current politicians will emerge are difficult. [redacted]

The most likely candidate would seem to be Li Huan, a mainlander who enjoys support from the Taiwanese and also has good relations with the security services. But Li is only the Minister of Education, does not currently sit on the Standing Committee, and until recently was absent from Taipei for four years. Nonetheless, Li is, at 67, the youngest of the senior leaders, and he built a strong following during his tenure as director of the party's organization department during the 1970s. In addition, despite his exile to Kaohsiung following election rioting in 1977, Li was able to maintain his substantial faction on the KMT's Central Committee. [redacted]

Policy Continuity

We expect any new leadership—whatever its precise composition—to hew closely, at least at first, to the guidelines that Chiang has laid down, especially in foreign policy, defense, and economic modernization. The key exception could be on the question of the "Taiwanization" of the ruling party and government. [redacted]

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
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Foreign and Defense Policies. Taiwan's historical need to maintain close economic, political, security, and technological ties to the United States will continue to shape the foreign policy of Chiang's successors. We expect no leader or group to question the need for this linkage during the 1980s, although there will be disagreements over how best to manage it. Because nearly everyone within the leadership distrusts the United States to some degree, Taiwan has sought repeated US assurances about its intentions. We believe Chiang's successors will follow suit, both to bolster their own confidence and to demonstrate—for domestic consumption—their ability to manage the US relationship.

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Any new leadership will maintain a strong military deterrent and remain unpersuaded that close United States-China relations reduce the island's military needs. Hence, the new leadership will continue to seek from the United States the weapons and weapons-related technology it believes are necessary to deter China from trying to seize the island.

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Chiang's successors also will probably be loath to change Chiang's policy of "no contact and no negotiation" with the mainland lest they fuel domestic tensions on the island. In particular, any new leadership would have to fear that the Taiwanese majority would interpret such moves as preliminary to a "sell-out." Taiwanese politicians have stressed repeatedly to US and other foreign officials that they will not accept any form of settlement negotiated by the mainlanders.

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The Economy. Chiang's death probably will trigger some capital flight and nervousness among foreign and domestic investors, but we believe that will be manageable. His decision to name Yu Kuo-hua Premier last May probably was intended in part to reassure such investors that there will be continuity in government economic policy. Yu is widely regarded as one of the principal architects of Taiwan's remarkable economic performance. He is also viewed—correctly—as a very conservative economist, who can be counted on to pursue sound, if cautious, economic policies.

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Yu's selection probably also reflects Chiang's judgment that his successors' ability to maintain internal stability after his death will depend in no small measure on how well they manage the economy. The government has been highly successful thus far in muting Taiwanese discontent over mainlander political dominance by sustaining high rates of growth and by ensuring an equitable distribution of the resulting prosperity. As one consequence, most of the large and growing Taiwanese middle class remains more interested in the pursuit of wealth than in political power.

[redacted]

This situation could change, however, if the island's senior economic managers—who are mainlanders—falter in their efforts to maintain Taiwan's strong competitive position in the international marketplace. Low population growth and increased prosperity have sharply pushed up labor costs on the island. As a result, Taiwan's traditional labor-intensive export industries face increasingly stiff competition from such countries as China, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.

To overcome this problem, the government is promoting the development of more technology-intensive industries. Government economists are optimistic that ultimately they will succeed, but even they expect that the transition period may be difficult and are forecasting slower economic growth over the next decade.

Party Reform and the Second Succession

Probably the single greatest potential problem for a successor regime will be managing the pace of Taiwanization. Over the past several years Chiang Ching-kuo has appointed increasing numbers of Taiwanese to high positions in the party and government. Although these moves have thus far been largely cosmetic, half of the Cabinet (see appendix B) and over a third of the Standing Committee are now Taiwanese. Thus, an important precedent has been established that Chiang's successors will find difficult to reverse.

Perhaps more significant over the longer term is the fact that Chiang has worked since 1977 to expand the party's popular base to incorporate new social groups that have emerged as a result of Taiwan's economic development. As a result, the composition of party membership has changed dramatically. The KMT is

now three-fourths Taiwanese, young—60 percent of the members are under 35—and primarily middle class, closely resembling the island's demographics.

[redacted]

These reforms markedly strengthen the party's popular appeal and sharply increase the prospects for the maintenance of one-party rule on the island. At the same time, they guarantee that the party's present mainlander leadership will face increasing pressure from below from competing new interest groups. For example, many of the new Legislative Yuan members elected in the relatively honest elections since 1977 represent grassroots interests and a powerful force for change to which senior party mandarins will have to pay increasing attention.

Another group that is moving up inside the party and will be a strong voice for change is the younger mainlanders (see table). These individuals recognize that they are unlikely to inherit the power of their fathers or other powerful relatives to whom they trace their political lineage, and thus have made a strong effort to cultivate close ties with influential Taiwanese politicians. Their connections and knowledge of foreign affairs and foreign languages will, at the least, guarantee them some influence in future governments.

Managing the Pressure

As long as the successor leadership does nothing to slow or block Taiwanization, it should be able to control the pace of this process. Thus far, the Taiwanese inside the KMT have been patient, and we believe they will remain so because they believe time is on their side. In fact, two of the most powerful Taiwanese KMT politicians told US representatives in Taipei last year that they hoped Chiang would outlive his appointed mainlander successors so that he could hand over power directly to them.

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Influential Younger Mainlanders

Name	Age	Position	Father's Position
Chen Lu-an	47	Chairman, National Science Council	Deceased Vice President
Chien Fu	49	Director, CCNAA/W ^a	Deceased president, Academia Sinica
Sung Chu-yu	42	Director, KMT Cultural Affairs Department	Deceased Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Chiang Hsiao-yen	42	Chief, US Affairs, Foreign Ministry	Current President
Chiang Hsiao-wu	39	President, Broadcast Corporation of China	Current President
Kuan Chung	44	Chief, Taipei Municipal Party	Father-in-law is Deputy Defense Minister

^a Coordination Council for North American Affairs/Washington.

The political opposition to the KMT—almost exclusively Taiwanese—is too weak and divided to apply significant pressure on the government to accelerate Taiwanization and will probably remain so. If the opposition pushed too hard, it would run the risk of being repressed. In 1979, after the US recognition of Beijing, the more radical opposition politicians concluded that the government had been so weakened that they could challenge it directly. That confrontation resulted in a tough government crackdown and the arrests of many radical Taiwanese leaders.

The radicals could see a new opportunity to confront the government after Chiang's death, but in our view that would be a serious miscalculation. We believe the security services would stifle such a challenge. An initially weak or uncertain government might even allow the security apparatus greater latitude than it now has and, as a consequence, countenance a harder crackdown.

Indeed, we believe that the security services represent the greatest obstacle to eventual Taiwanization of the government and party. The garrison command and

the police have monitored and checked Taiwanese political activity since the 1940s, and there is a strong residue of suspicion on both sides.

With one exception—Chen Shou-shan, commander of the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters—mainlanders still man all key security posts. We believe that there probably is an increasing number of Taiwanese at lower levels, but they are unlikely to reach senior positions soon.

Most of the security services' efforts have been aimed at anti-KMT dissidents, but we believe that the security services look askance at all Taiwanese political activity, even that within the KMT. We believe the security services fear that a future Taiwanese leadership might be less willing to crack down on what they see as the activities of anti-KMT Taiwanese, something they define more broadly than the Taiwanese themselves.

The security services, therefore, could put pressure on the government to slow the pace of Taiwanization, posing problems for Chiang's successors. Still, President Chiang has been careful to stress military subordination to civilians in his selection of top officers and has already moved to limit the future power of this group. Most notably, in 1983 Chiang demoted and transferred Gen. Wang Sheng, then head of the General Political Warfare Department and a symbol of opposition to Taiwanese political aspirations.

Opposition to Taiwanization could also come from the military, but during discussions with US representatives on Taiwan most high-ranking officers seem resigned to the eventual transfer of power to a Taiwanese civilian leadership. The changes that took place within the party and the government during the late 1970s are beginning to occur in the military.

Although there are only about a dozen Taiwanese general officers, a review of those just below flag rank indicates that their numbers will increase significantly by the end of the decade. Enlisted men are overwhelmingly Taiwanese, as are most junior officers.

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Military opposition would be constrained by fears that Beijing could exploit any serious civilian-military tensions. Like the senior mainlander political elite, the military and security services believe that China might undertake military action at any time and are reluctant to participate in activities that might increase Taiwan's vulnerability to such a move. [redacted]

Future Policy Disputes

Foreign Policy. As the Taiwanese and younger mainlander politicians become increasingly involved in decisions affecting defense and foreign policy—discussions from which they are currently barred—they might begin to question openly current policies, creating dissension within the leadership. [redacted]

Although the rising young Taiwanese officials, along with younger mainlanders, agree with the present ruling elite that US arms and security guarantees are important, they are also concerned about what they see as excessive reliance on the United States. They believe the government should put much more stress on domestic political and economic developments, claiming that Taiwan's security and stability are enhanced more by its international economic position and peaceful political evolution than by close ties with the United States. Success in these areas, they argue, attracts investors and trade and generates concern in Europe and Japan—as well as in the United States—over any Chinese attempt to bring about reunification by other than peaceful means. We believe Taiwanese businessmen, who dominate the private sector, would support them. Such businessmen have repeatedly criticized Taipei's ban on trade with the Chinese mainland. [redacted]

By the same token, some Taiwanese politicians have also been critical of the current leadership's strict limits on athletic, intellectual, and cultural exchanges with China. In private conversations with US officials, Taiwanese politicians have argued in favor of increased exchanges, not because they agree with Beijing's view that this would eventually lead to reunification, but because it might reduce Chinese pressure on both Taiwan and the United States to begin the process. These officials are critical of what they term the current leadership's "paranoia" about such activities and of the resulting policy of "no contacts." These politicians believe that this approach

denies the island a valuable ploy to use against the mainland and leaves the island's security overly dependent on decisions made in Washington. [redacted]

Many younger mainlanders are just as critical of current policies and are already exploring ways of dealing with the mainland that are quite different from those of the current leadership and sometimes even offensive to it. For example, Sung Chu-yu, until recently director of the Government Information Office and son of the late Lt. Gen. Sung Ta, a close associate of President Chiang, has ended the ban on factual reporting on life in China, in the apparent belief that Taiwan can only profit by the comparison. [redacted]

Another example is Wei Yung, currently the head of a research organization under the premier. Wei has put forward the highly controversial "multisystems nation" theory—which would allow Taiwan to merge nominally with China but remain independent in fact—as a possible solution to the problem of reunification. Several other, younger mainlanders have told US officials privately that they subscribe to a similar notion, the "German formula," for reunification, whereby China is viewed as one nation divided into two political states. [redacted]

It is not clear whether these younger politicians have considered all of the ramifications of such schemes. In particular, they appear unaware of concerns voiced frequently by current Foreign Ministry officials that Taipei's requests for continued US arms sales might be received less sympathetically in Washington if Taiwan were more responsive to Chinese overtures. As these politicians move from their predominantly domestic interests to address foreign policy issues, we expect that their awareness of the complexities of such issues will sharpen. [redacted]

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Other Potential Conflicts. Conflicts between the Taiwanese and the senior mainlanders could also arise over the nature and pace of economic modernization. Senior economic planners have traditionally yielded to the military's desire to attain self-sufficiency in defense-related industries such as steel and aluminum. Taiwanese officials closely tied to the island's private economic sector could in the future oppose such expenditures as wasteful and unnecessary. If so, they would find allies among mainlanders such as Chao Yao-tung, director of Taiwan's economic planning agency, who also oppose such projects. [redacted]


In a similar vein, reform of Taiwan's financial institutions, which is long overdue, has been blocked by opposition from the security services. Taiwanese businessmen remain frustrated over the unwillingness of the security services, for example, to allow expanded international telex services or freer travel to and from the island—two important prerequisites for reform. [redacted]

Despite the potential for serious disputes, we believe the Taiwanese will continue to exercise the caution and patience that are their hallmarks. Even the most impetuous of the Taiwanese, Vice Premier Lin Yang-kang, recognizes the limits of tolerance for debate at the top. Thus, none of the changes currently advocated by the Taiwanese will occur soon. Over the next five years, we believe the senior mainlanders may, at most, moderate their views slightly toward the position of the Taiwanese. This moderation would accelerate only if the Taiwanese and younger mainlanders succeeded in gaining the support of one or more of the senior mainlanders. Changes during 1981-83 in Taipei's policy toward China, for example, including a sharp reduction in rhetoric, were promoted by former Premier Sun, who was strongly influenced by a coterie of younger advisers. Conversely, Sun's incapacitation following a stroke earlier this year put an end to these policies because the young advisers lost their patron. [redacted]

The End of an Era

When Chiang Ching-kuo dies, it will mark the end of his family's control of the Kuomintang, as well as of the state and military organizations—control that has existed since the 1920s. Chiang Wei-kuo, reportedly the half brother of Chiang Ching-kuo, has a poor reputation on the island and has held few substantive positions during his career. His performance as an officer in charge of Taiwan's military logistics has been unremarkable, and he was moved last June to a largely ceremonial post. Given his poor reputation, we believe political groups would be unlikely to turn to him, even as a figurehead. [redacted]

Chiang Ching-kuo's children also are poorly positioned to succeed him. His oldest son is physically unable to assume any responsibilities. Chiang has failed to groom the others and has kept their hands far from the levers of power. They are also not well regarded, in part because they are half Russian—an important consideration in racially conscious Chinese society. [redacted]



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The View From Beijing and Implications for the United States

Beijing will probably treat the death of Chiang as the beginning of the end of mainlander rule on Taiwan and conclude that his successors—being politically weaker—would be even less inclined to hold reunification talks. Even so, Beijing probably would make new overtures to Taipei to encourage discussion of reunification. If Beijing does believe that the successors are weak, it might send private messages to one or more members of the collegium—via intermediaries—proposing Chinese support for their political power in exchange for the opening of reunification negotiations. We believe such probes would be rejected. At the same time, China might renew pressure on the United States over arms sales to Taiwan, which Beijing views as encouraging Taipei's refusal to begin negotiations.

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Over the longer term, Beijing probably would be uneasy about the emergence of a predominantly Taiwanese leadership, fearing it would be more likely to declare Taiwan independent. Time is not on Beijing's side. China has long pinned its hopes on reaching an accommodation with the present leadership in Taipei and has tailored its reunification initiatives to appeal more to the mainlander elite than to the Taiwanese majority. In addition, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly has warned that any declaration of independence could lead Beijing to abandon its peaceful reunification policy and possibly to invade the island.

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If the rising Taiwanese and younger mainlanders are successful in promoting increased contacts with Beijing, China's fears might be mitigated. In this case, Beijing would see little need to increase the pressure and might be content, at least for a while, to explore such initiatives with Taiwan.

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If Beijing does believe that the chances for reunification are slipping away, and especially if Taiwan continues its policy of no contact with the mainland, Beijing probably will increase the pressure, both public and private, on the United States to end arms sales to Taiwan.

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Appendix A

KMT Standing Committee (Elected in 1984)

Rank	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Position
1	Yen Chia-kan	1905	Mainland	Former President
2	Hsieh Tung-min	1907	Taiwan	Former Vice President
3	Sun Yun-hsuan	1913	Mainland	Former Premier
4	Ku Cheng-kang	1901	Mainland	Policy adviser
5	Huang Shao-ku	1901	Mainland	President, Judicial Yuan
6	Ni Wen-ya	1904	Mainland	President, Legislative Yuan
7	Yuan Shou-chien	1903	Mainland	Policy adviser
8	Kao Kuei-yuan	1907	Mainland	Policy adviser
9	Li Teng-hui	1923	Taiwan	Vice President
10	Ma Chi-chuang	1912	Mainland	Minister Without Portfolio
11	Shen Chang-huan	1913	Mainland	Secretary General, Presidential Office
12	Li Kuo-ting	1910	Mainland	Minister Without Portfolio
13	Yu Kuo-hua	1914	Mainland	Premier
14	Sung Chang-chih	1916	Mainland	Defense Minister
15	Hao Po-tsun ^a	1917	Mainland	Chief of General Staff
16	Wang Ti-wu	1913	Mainland	Chairman, <i>United Daily News</i>
17	Lin Yang-kang	1926	Taiwan	Vice Premier
18	Chiu Chuang-huan	1925	Taiwan	Taiwan Governor
19	Yu Chi-chung	1909	Mainland	Chairman, <i>China Times</i>
20	Hung Shou-nan	1911	Taiwan	Vice President, Judicial Yuan
21	Yen Chen-hsing	1912	Mainland	Chairman, Atomic Energy Council
22	Tsao Sheng-fen	1914	Mainland	Chairman, <i>Central Daily News</i>
23	Chao Tzu-chi ^a	1915	Mainland	Legislator; Secretary General, KMT Central Policy Coordination Committee
24	Ho I-wu ^a	1913	Mainland	Secretary General, National Assembly
25	Ku Chen-fu	1917	Taiwan	Chairman, Taiwan Cement Corporation
26	Lin Ting-sheng	1919	Taiwan	Chairman, Tatung Engineering Corporation
27	Huang Tsun-chiu ^a	1923	Taiwan	Vice President, Control Yuan
28	Lien Chan ^a	1936	Taiwan	Communications Minister
29	Kao Yu-jen	1934	Taiwan	Speaker, Taiwan Provincial Assembly
30	Chang Chien-pang ^a	1929	Taiwan	Speaker, Taipei Municipal Assembly
31	Hsu Shui-te ^a	1903	Taiwan	Kaohsiung mayor

^a New member.

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Appendix B

Taiwan Cabinet (Inaugurated on 1 June 1984)

Position	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth
Premier	Yu Kuo-hua ^a	1914	Mainland
Vice Premier	Lin Yang-kang ^a	1926	Taiwan
Defense	Sung Ch'ang-chih	1916	Mainland
Economic Affairs	Hsu Li-te ^a	1931	Mainland
Finance	Lu Jen-kang ^b	1927	Mainland
Communications	Lien Chan	1926	Taiwan
Foreign Affairs	Chu Fu-sung	1915	Mainland
Education	Li Huan ^b	1917	Mainland
Interior	Wu Po-hsiung ^b	1935	Taiwan
Legal Affairs	Shih Chi-yang ^b	1935	Taiwan
No portfolio	Ma Chi-chuang ^b	1911	Mainland
No portfolio	Chao Yao-tung ^a	1915	Mainland
No portfolio	Kao Yu-shu	1913	Taiwan
No portfolio	Chang Feng-hsu	1928	Taiwan
No portfolio	Li Kuo-ting	1910	Mainland
No portfolio	Kuo Wei-fen ^b	1936	Taiwan
Taiwan Governor	Chiu Chuang-huan ^a	1925	Taiwan
Taipei mayor	Yang Chin-tsung	1923	Taiwan
Kaohsiung mayor	Hsu Shui-te	1931	Taiwan
Overseas Chinese Affairs	Tseng Kuang-shun ^a	1925	Mainland
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs	Tung Shu-fan ^b	1924	Mainland

^a New position in cabinet.^b New to cabinet.

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