

February 4, 1957

**Memorandum for the Director of Central
Intelligence, 'Planning for Possible Acceptance by
Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offers to be
Vice Premier'**

Citation:

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Summary:

Analysts at the CIA assess whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to become a Vice Premier for the People's Republic of China, following Zhou Enlai's offer to that effect.

Credits:

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Original Language:

English

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DD/P 3-626

4 February 1957

Executive Registry
9-0440

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans) *nt*

SUBJECT: Planning for Possible Acceptance by
CHIANG Kai-shek of Chinese Communist
Offers to be Vice Premier

- REFERENCES:
- A. Memorandum, subject as stated above, to the DCI from Inspector General, dated 3 January 1957
 - B. Memorandum, subject as stated above, to the DCI from Assistant Director, National Estimates, dated 17 January 1957

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. The Far East Division concurs with the conclusions reached by the Assistant Director, National Estimates, in reference B.
3. To support his views, the Assistant Director, National Estimates, notes in paragraph 1 of reference B the following quotation from NIE 43-56:

"so long as President CHIANG remains in power no substantial change in Nationalist policy is likely to occur."

The Far East Division concurs insofar as this statement applies to Communist China. However, should any third country (including the USA) change its policy toward Communist China, the Nationalist Government would be expected to change its policy toward that country.

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 NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S *03011*
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 AUTH: HR 70-2
 DATE: 25 MAR 1987 REVIEWER: _____

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4. The Far East Division is endeavouring to assist the U. S. Government intelligence community in its estimates of political conditions on Taiwan by:

a. An intensive political action program designed to win the confidence of high officials of the Nationalist Government and thus influence their attitudes toward international events;

b. The initiation of monthly estimates of political conditions on Taiwan to be originated by senior personnel

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CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

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CFE

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DATE

29 March 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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MAR 29 '57

CONCURRENCE

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FE-1841

SUBJECT: (Optional)

MEMORANDUM

FROM:

FE

NO.

STAT

DATE

4 February 1957

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DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1.	[Redacted]		4 FEB	[Redacted]
2.				
3.	ACFE/2		4 FEB 1957	
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5.	CFE			
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[Signature]

17 January 1957

Executive Registry
9-0202

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Comment on "Planning for Possible Acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offer to be Vice Premier"

REFERENCE: Memorandum, subject as above, to DCI from Inspector General, dated 3 January 1957

1. We believe that Chiang Kai-shek himself would not respond favorably to any invitation to assume a position in the Chinese Communist regime. Chiang considers himself and the National Government as the guardians of traditional Chinese culture and traditions and we believe that his anti-Communist attitudes are so deeply rooted that he would not accommodate to Pei'ping even in the face of the desertion of his principal subordinates. This view of Chiang's position is implicit in the statement in NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China", published 9 October 1956, that "so long as President Chiang remains in power no substantial change in Nationalist policy is likely to occur." We have received no intelligence tending to alter this view.

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2. Chou En-lai's public statements about a position in the Pei'ping regime for Chiang Kai-shek were almost certainly made in order to stimulate doubt and uncertainty in lower levels on Taiwan, rather than with any expectation of subverting Chiang. The Chinese Communists have been attempting for at least two years to subvert individuals and groups at all levels on Taiwan, and we share the concern expressed in the referenced memorandum both as to the possibility of success of these Communist efforts and our lack of information on the success or failure of the Communist effort to date. In NIE 43-56 the intelligence community agreed that "If Communist China continues its peaceful pose, avoids serious internal tensions, continues to make substantial domestic economic progress, and attains increased international recognition, an increasing number of mainland Chinese on Taiwan will be conditioned to look more favorably upon the Communist regime and upon the possibility of reaching some accommodation with it."

3. We have indicated our concern in this matter both in direct communication with FE/PP and through the post-mortems

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to the NIE's on Taiwan. Our post mortem to NIE 43-55, dated 15 November 1955, stated that "Our estimates on Taiwan could be strengthened by fuller and more specific information on the extent and nature of Communist subversive efforts, the effectiveness of Nationalist counterintelligence, and by more positive information on the state of civilian morale on Taiwan, especially among officials." In the post mortem to NIE 43-56, dated 10 October 1956, the intelligence community agreed that we need more information on "the effect of Chinese Communist propaganda directed toward Taiwan and individuals on Taiwan."

4. We understand that a concerted effort is underway on Taiwan to develop capabilities to obtain from controlled sources the type of information discussed above and in the referenced memorandum. In the meantime we agree with the referenced memorandum that collection requirements should be kept under review. In view of our lack of solid information concerning attitudes of top Nationalist leaders, contingency planning to cover the possibility of high level defections and serious unrest on Taiwan should receive some priority; although we believe the defection of Chiang

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himself most unlikely, we would not recommend barring such a development from contingency planning.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



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SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP		
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS DATE
1	MR. KIRKPATRICK	<i>PK</i> 31 Jan
2	[Redacted]	<i>51 Jan.</i>
3	A/DDIP	[Redacted] FEB 1
4	C-FE	<i>1 Feb 57</i> ✓
5	FE/2	✓
6	D-1	
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
		<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Pls see Director's note "to note and comment".

No comment. Believe they have been alerted - both ONE & FI.

To 4 Suspense 7 Feb.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
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ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>Pls note suspense date. FE date is 6 Feb to give time to get to hill by 7 Feb.</i>		
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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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