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Digital Archive International History Declassified

December 02, 1963


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    The report discusses North Korea's relationship with China and the Soviet Union, North Korean foreign policy, North Korea's position on demoblization, Kim Il Sung's personality cult, and German reunification. The report also discusses worsening relations between North Korea and GDR.
    "Positions of the Korean Workers Party Leadership on the Basic Issues of our Epoch," December 02, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.
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SED Central Committee

Department of International Relations

Archival Signature: SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A2/20/251

[GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs]

1st Extra-European Department

Section Korea

A/804/219 and V 108 - 219

Berlin, 2 December 1963

Positions of the Korean Workers Party Leadership on the Basic Issues of our Epoch

I. Up to the XXII CPSU Party Congress, the leadership of the Korean Workers Party essentially adopted a middle position on the confrontations between the Marxist-Leninist parties and opinions held by the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian Workers Party. The statement by the KWP delegation at the XXII Party Congress, and the latter's evaluation made at the 2nd [KWP Central Committee] Plenum, has to be considered a non-Marxist but still centrist position. Though influences from the CCP leadership were already notable back then. While the KWP arrived at clear positions on international issues (relevance of the XXII Party [CPSU] Congress and its adopted program, leading role of the CPSU, German question, disarmament, struggle against colonialism, et cetera), it adopted opportunistic attitudes on questions like the cult of personality, the anti-party group, and the anti-Leninist positions of the Albanian leaders. Since then, the KWP leadership gradually moved towards positions of the CCP leadership. It can be assessed today that KWP leaders have ended the period of vacillations since the XX and XXII [CPSU] Party Congress. Now they are essentially in agreement with the damaging positions of the CCP leadership. There was a period when the Korean press printed almost all documents of the CCP leadership directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Now it increasingly publishes its own Korean statements, culminating in an article by KWP central organ “Nodong Sinmun  (Nodong Daily)” on 28 October 1963. This major statement was Kim Il Sung's speech given to the 7th Plenum of the KWP Central Committee held between 3 and 5 September 1963. Where grave calumnies and distortions were directed against “some people” in the newspaper article, the speech itself had named them as “the CPSU leaders”.

II. Positions of the Korean Workers Party Leadership on the Basic Issues of our Epoch

1. War and Peace

On the question of war and peace the KWP leadership has adopted a non-Marxist and adventurist position. It is rejecting any negotiations conducted with the imperialists in the interest of securing the peace, and likewise the results (guarantee declaration for Cuba, Moscow Treaty) and compromises achieved by those negotiations.  The Korean comrades hold opinions according to which negotiations with imperialists only increase the latter’s aggressiveness and the danger of war, encourage them to criminal actions, and overall represent a rejection of Marxism-Leninism.

The rejectionist KWP position is reflected in the DPRK not becoming a signatory of the Moscow Treaty and in corresponding articles published [in the Korean press]. The Soviet Union and Comrade Khrushchev are accused to have surrendered to the imperialists. Also propagated is the alleged “diminishing of the GDR's international authority”. The main groundswell of Korean publications is: “this treaty only serves U.S. imperialism's policies of aggression and war” (“Nodong Sinmun”, 11 October 1963).

“In fact, the Moscow Treaty has offered convenient paths to the U.S. imperialists to assume superiority in the field of nuclear weapons and to produce ever more of them, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war even more.” (“Nodong Sinmun”, 4 August 1963).

Concerning its positions on the crisis in the Caribbean, the KWP frequently stated its displeasure with the measures to secure peace in the Caribbean sea by making omissions [in public statements]. Here as well the Soviet Union is accused of retreat and unprincipled compromises. “How can they [the modern revisionists] say the following: Since there was no outbreak of global war during the 'Caribbean Crisis', this constitutes a 'merit' of Kennedy's and a couple of other 'rational people's' 'levelheadedness'? Such are nothing else than dumb maneuvers by those who retreat from the nuclear threats of U.S. imperialism and make unprincipled concessions and compromises. Now they just want to justify their shameful position.” (“Nodong Sinmun”, 22 October 1963).

Struggle for peace is reduced to the struggle against U.S. imperialism, including the use of armed force and the risk of a nuclear war. The destructive force of nuclear weapons is deliberately belittled. “The power and the revolutionary spirit of the Korean people to protect their homeland is stronger than any nuclear bomb and missile” (5th KWP Plenum, December 1962). “The imperialists possess nuclear weapons and missiles. Yet they cannot have that large moral political missile [of ours]” (brochure “On the Current Situation, July 1963).

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are constantly accused as not conducting the struggle for the peace: “Peace can only be protected if all anti-imperialist forces unfold a determined and persistent struggle against imperialism; not by begging, however, as the revisionists claim.” (5th KWP Plenum, December 1962).

2. Peaceful Coexistence

After initial official statements of approval for the policy of peaceful coexistence, the KWP leadership is now moving more and more towards distorting and modifying this policy. Choe Yong-geon [Choe Yong Gon] speech from 8 September 1963 at the 15th anniversary of the DPRK's foundation was stating: “It is the consequent course of our Republic's foreign policy to develop friendly relationships of cooperation, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, with all those countries that respect the freedom and independence of our people”. This way, in particular the imperialists states are excluded but also a couple of neutral non-aligned states as well. A special emphasis on development of relations with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is excluding Europe and Australia.

The KWP leadership states the “modern revisionists” claim the policy of “peaceful coexistence” and “active coexistence” is the “only way” to avoid a new world war and to maintain and secure the peace (Brochure “On the Current Situation”). This demonstrates that [the KWP leaders] does not agree with the alternative of war or peaceful coexistence. As evident in their publications, they especially do not recognize the great importance of economic competition between socialism and capitalism. This also pertains to issues of underlying class aspects concerning the peaceful coexistence; and peaceful coexistence as the most important form of class struggle. Reasons behind these qualifications lie in their emphasis on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, where economic competition and class struggle are playing no role. In daily work with the masses, publications, official speeches on lower levels, as well as internally, the policy of peaceful coexistence gets hardly noticed; or it becomes even distorted (“nice-sounding slogan of coexistence”). In spring of 1962 a series of articles was published in “Nodong Sinmun” where Lenin quotes taken out of context were used against peaceful coexistence and general and comprehensive disarmament. Those were quotes dealing with the need to arm the people and liberation through armed force, et cetera. Passages from Lenin advocating peaceful solutions in his same writings were ignored. The KWP position on peaceful coexistence can also be derived from its attitude towards disarmament.

3. Disarmament

In official documents the DPRK supported demands for general and comprehensive disarmament. In his government declaration of 22 October 1962 Kim Il Sung still stated: “The DPRK government is supporting all proposals and measures of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries aimed at general disarmament, the ban of production and testing of nuclear weapons, and the regulation of international conflicts by way of negotiations”. In the context of articles by the KWP leadership against the Moscow Treaty as well, there were demands for disarmament, and especially for the ban of all nuclear tests as well as for banning production, storage, and proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the rejection of the Moscow Treaty, in combination with the approval of the PRC government’s proposal to convene a meeting of leaders from all countries in the world to discuss the issue of a comprehensive ban and the destruction of nuclear weapons, demonstrates how the Korean leadership pursues a policy of “all or nothing” on this issue. It must be seen as particularly deficient that the DPRK took no initiatives to come up with concrete proposals for disarmament or the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Far East. It is noteworthy that in daily propaganda the issue of disarmament is playing a subordinate role only.

4. Cult of Personality

In 1956 the [KWP] August Plenum had stated: “The KWP Central Committee declares its complete solidarity with the decision of the CPSU Central Committee 'On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and its Consequences'. It welcomes from the bottom of its heart the eminent successes the CPSU achieved in its principled struggle for overcoming the consequences of the cult of personality.”

However, in the assessment of the XXII [CPSU] Party Congress [in 1961] the cult of personality and the activity of the anti-party group were commented as follows: “This Party Congress extensively discussed issues of emerging CPSU inner-party affairs like Stalin's cult of personality and the anti-party faction members. […] We are always of the opinion that no party is entitled to meddle in any way with the internal affairs of the fraternal parties. […] This is why the issues of Stalin and the members of the anti-party group in the CPSU are of no concern to our party. Therefore they cannot become a matter of discussion for our party.”

An article from “Nodong Sinmun” stated on 28 October 1963: “It is absolutely unacceptable that the so-called movement 'against the cult of personality' is forced upon the other parties; and that under this flag interferences occur into the internal matters of fraternal countries and fraternal states, as well that actions are taken to overthrow the party leadership of these countries.”  The current use of Stalin quotes and the publication of the CCP article “On the Stalin Question” proves how the DPRK is now following a completely opposite course. Although the 1956 August Plenum stated that in the DPRK “there was a cult or personality to a certain extent” which got expressed through “excessive praise of the role and merits of individual people”, there was no follow-up in terms of corrections. To the contrary, the cult of Kim Il Sung was continued most massively and with very damaging consequences. The reasons behind those features as well are deviations from positions of Marxism-Leninism.

5. Positions Concerning the CPSU and the Soviet Union

Still one year ago, the KWP leadership referred at certain occasions to the socialist camp with the Soviet Union and the PR China at its top. Today [the KWP leadership] not only negates the policy of CPSU and Soviet Union, it also attacks the latter stridently. The anti-Soviet propaganda reaches from distortions and slander to willful ignorance and accusations. At the occasion of the 46th Anniversary of the October Revolution speeches were given to party members and the population where the central lesson from the October Revolution was defined as a struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism and against modern revisionism. Increasingly attacked were the CPSU leadership and Comrade Khrushchev in person. However, Stalin's role in fighting the enemies of the party was particularly praised. The KWP leadership directed its attacks against the following:

a) Slander and demagoguery against the leading role of the CPSU and the Soviet Union:

“In the past the Soviet Union was the singular base for world revolution. Today the ranks of the socialist camp consist of 13 countries. Together with the Soviet Union, all socialist states are today playing a vanguard role in the international revolutionary movement.” […] “If the leadership from this or that party just emphasizes its own country as a great power of gigantic economic strength and acts accordingly while ignoring the other fraternal parties and fraternal countries – then the socialist camp gets weakened, its unity is undermined, and grave damage is inflicted upon the international communist movement. Recently some people have acted as if there is nothing regrettable to expel some countries from the socialist camp. This is a concrete manifestation of those wrong concepts, according to which a certain country due to its special status can do everything it wants while the other countries are not supposed to play any major role.” […] “Giving the current conditions that communist and workers parties have overall gained in strength, there is no room for a uniform leadership from whatever center; there is also no need for such any more.”

(“Nodong Sinmun",” 28 October 1963).

This KWP policy directed against the leading role of the CPSU is also objectively directed against the CCP leadership claim. “Some are portraying the party congress of a country as the beginning of a 'new phase' in the international communist movement. They propagate policies and decisions of one party as a 'joint platform' of the international communist movement and impose them on the other fraternal parties.” Broad coverage is devoted to accusations about an alleged interference into the internal matters of the KWP: “Some people demand this way that decisions and documents from one singular party have to covered by all means in press and radio of fraternal countries. Yes, there is even more: They attempt to monitor how the history of this party is studied in the fraternal countries, how the language of this country is taught, to what extent movies of this country are shown. […] This kind of actions are nothing else than an expression of superpower chauvinism.”

(“Nodong Sinmun”, 28 October 1963).

b) Slander and demagoguery against Comrade Khrushchev:

“Some people … are deeply wallowing in the swamp of revisionism.” […] “Today some people protect more actively the Tito clique, gradually create chaos within the socialist camp, and enter on a dangerous path which splits that camp. This means they agree with the maneuvers by imperialism and the Tito clique who want to destroy the socialist camp.” “The socialist camp cannot become the victim of the craziness of a certain individual person.” (“Nodong Sinmun”, 28 October 1963).

c) Slander and demagoguery against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries:

The vocabulary of the KWP calls the leadership of communist parties in European socialist countries (except Albania) “modern revisionists” against one has to pursue unrelenting struggle. “The KWP has now drawn a clear dividing line between the Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists. Now the main task consists in destroying modern revisionism and annihilating this political direction. Before this has not been accomplished, there is no point in convening a conference of communist and workers parties. Victory over revisionism will only be achieved by following the course represented by CCP and KWP.” (from information by the Cuban ambassador about his meeting with Kim Il Sung).

Another important issue concerns economic relations between the socialist states. Here as well, Korean publications accuse the Soviet Union and other socialist states “to exploit the DPRK” and “to exert pressure on the DPRK”. As a consequence of this pressure of exploitation through price divergences (high prices for machinery exported to the DPRK, low prices for resources imported from the DPRK), the DPRK has to avoid such by building up a national economy just by its own force. “The socialist camp can only become stronger if not just one or two, but all countries together  become developed countries.” Under the banner of “economic cooperation”, some people are said to strive to “destroy the autonomy of the fraternal countries, to control the development of their national economy, to pursue one-sided economic development, and to chain national economies to those of other countries”. Implementation of the concept of “cooperating economies” degrades the economies of every socialist state to an economic appendix of one or two countries. It subordinates national economies to the interests of economic development of just one to two countries.” The “second” country might actually refer to the GDR since, according to the Moscow Declaration, it is supposed to receive special support for solving its tasks vis-à-vis West German imperialism.

More and more the KWP leadership is moving towards denunciation of the huge aid provided to the DPRK by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. This is mainly done by constantly repeating claims the DPRK created everything “through its own force”, without even mentioning the foreign aid. The article from 28 October 1963 even states: “Under the pretext of aid, some are even interfering into the internal matters of fraternal parties and fraternal states with the desire to impose their will on them this way … For their part those people are proud of this aid, which they exploit for political interference and economic pressure. This is not in accordance with proletarian internationalism.”

It is said the DPRK also has to rely on its own force in military matters since the Soviet Union allegedly doesn't fulfill its military agreements with the DPRK. From this they derive you cannot trust the Soviet Union's contractual obligations, in particular with regard to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance from 6 July 1961. The KWP leadership rejects the Soviet Union's nuclear monopoly in the socialist camp. It supports the PR China's and other socialist countries' quest for nuclear weapons. “In order to turn the defense capability of the socialist camp into an unconquerable fortress, one must not just solidify the defense capabilities of whatever individual country but also those of all socialist countries.” […] “Of course, the armed forces and modern technology of a socialist superpower can contain the conquests and military machinations of the imperialists and play a major role in defending the socialist camp – if the party in possession of these armed forces and most recent military technology steadfastly defends Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. However, this means the defense of the socialist camp rests on the arms capabilities of one individual socialist country.” This way [the DPRK] is raising doubts about the military protection of the socialist camp by the Soviet Union.

6. Positions on the Germany and West Berlin Question

In official documents the KWP supports the GDR's struggle against West German imperialism and revanchism, also the struggle for the conclusion of a peace treaty and the solution of the West German problem. However, in many conversations even with leading KWP comrades there is reservation and lack of understanding. To sum it up in a nutshell, the Korean comrades are of the opinion our party [SED] and [GDR] government does not conduct the struggle consequently and tough enough. For instance, politburo member Ri Ju-yeon [Ri Ju Yon] stated we [GDR] command all strategic heights surrounding [West] Berlin. It would be important to use them now before one might lose them. Another question they raise is why a peace treaty has not been signed yet despite the announced deadline. Also, there is no Korean reaction to the option of signing a peace treaty unilaterally with the GDR [by the Soviet Union]. The KWP leadership considers the [GDR] Seven-Point-Program of Reason and Good Will as a “retreat before the enemy”. No leading KWP comrade came out either positively or negatively on the Seven-Point-Program [handwritten comment on margins by GDR Foreign Ministry official: “this stands in contradiction to the preceding sentence”].

A statement by Kang Hwi-won, Chairman of the Pyongyang City Committee and member of the KWP Central Committee, provides a reasoning for this: “Please bear with me when I have to contradict you (to GDR ambassador Becker after he outlined the Seven-Point-Program). We have experiences from the past. We must arm ourselves and fight the adversary with weapons.” Although during conversations some leading KWP comrades are also supportive of our policy of peaceful coexistence in Germany, we must draw the conclusion that the KWP leadership does not support our [GDR] party and government's policy of peaceful coexistence in Germany. There are even indications they also do not agree with the existence of two states in Germany (telegram by Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol] to [GDR Foreign Minister] Dr. [Lothar] Bolz at the occasion of the latter's re-appointment in 1963]. The KWP leaders attempt to apply their one-state-theory [for Korea] to our situation in a dogmatic way. The telegrams talks about the “strengthening of friendship between the peoples of both countries, Korea and Germany”.

There had been previous misunderstandings about the independent role and great danger of West German imperialism and revanchism. However, now the KWP leadership has moved towards the subordination of struggle against West German imperialism to the struggle against U.S. imperialism. This becomes especially evident in the joint communique signed by Choe Yong-geon and Liu Shaoqi on 23 June 1963. It is stated there: “Concerning the struggle against West German militarism the main focus of this struggle must be directed against U.S. imperialism”.

The just faint support of the GDR's policy by the KWP press in particular is confirming analysis provided above: On some issues the KWP leadership has reservations, leading all the way to the rejection of the Seven-Point-Program.

III. The KWP leadership transfers differences of opinion to bilateral relations

KWP leadership and DPRK government have increasingly steered their foreign relations towards the PR China. Relations with the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the other socialist European countries have been scaled back substantially (except for Albania and to some extent the Romanian People's Republic). The DPRK made major efforts to establish relations with young nation states and achieved some successes in this regard. It also established trade relations with some capitalist states, especially with Japan and England. More recently, the Korean comrades use in conversations the argument that scaling back bilateral relations of the DPRK with some socialist states is necessary in order for the DPRK to be able to meet its full obligations regarding support of the national liberation movement. This way they attempt to save face that the DPRK does not apply ideological differences of opinion to bilateral relationships. This way they de facto admit the reduction in bilateral relations. Its true cause, however, is the KWP leadership's transfer of differences in opinion to bilateral relations. In press reports, especially in the “Nodong Sinmun” article from 28 October 1963, those socialist countries are attacked with slander and insinuations. They are discredited before the Korean people and become themselves accused of scaling back bilateral relations: “Recently some people have expanded ideological issues between the parties to such extent that they gradually worsen bilateral relations. Unilaterally they want to annul agreements between the fraternal parties and lower economic and technological cooperation to almost zero. They expel an ambassador, diplomats, and journalists. Also, they do not hesitate to sever state-to-state relations with a fraternal country. Why do ideological arguments between the fraternal parties have to be transferred to state-to-state relations and aggravate the situation further? How can you deal this way with fraternal countries while you are undertaking efforts to improve bilateral relations with imperialist countries?”

Where does this inserting of differences in opinion into bilateral relations show, as undertaken by the KWP leadership?

1. The scope of relations in political, economic, and cultural regards has been scaled back substantially. Political coverage, as well as support of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, in the Korean press declined dramatically. To the contrary, articles published are directed against the policies of our parties and governments. In the economic field the volume of annual trade agreements has declined constantly. The DPRK becomes less and less ready to export raw materials to the socialist countries. It demands the acceptance of its half-finished and finished products which not yet match proper quality standards. In the cultural field there are almost exclusively just material exchanges left. Exchanges of delegations are extremely rare.

2. The scope and content of acknowledging national holidays of European socialist countries has been reduced. Celebrating those holidays before [Korean] workers through speakers from the respective embassies (e.g. Soviet Union, GDR, and others) is no longer permitted.

3. As a consequence of the differences in opinion, the operating radius of embassy personnel and its freedom of movement in the country was dramatically restricted. Meetings in the Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee and other offices are granted after long periods of waiting only. Due to “turning the entire country into a fortress” the diplomatic corps has to suffer from travel restrictions within the country. All trips outside the capital are subject to obtaining official permission, and in many cases already those permissions were not granted.

4. With the exception of China and Albania, Korean students were recalled to the DPRK from all socialist countries - no matter whether they just had started their studies or were just before their final exam. Also, several students were transferred to the PR China to complete their studies.

5. There exists growing pressure on female citizens from European socialist countries - especially those from the Soviet Union – who are married to Koreans and live in the DPRK. The KWP leadership's policy is directed towards divorcing those marriages and it resorts to the meanest methods (delegation of husbands to work in provinces where it is impossible for wives and children to reside; breaking up mail correspondence when wives return to their countries of origin for vacations; et cetera).

6. Putting pressure on Soviet specialists still remaining in the DPRK. They are required to fill out an extensive questionnaire, provide fingerprints and sign an affidavit that they will act on DPRK instructions only.

7. While almost any delegation from Afro-Asian and Latin American countries is received by Kim Il Sung or another leading comrade from the KWP politburo, the ambassadors [from socialist countries] have ever fewer opportunities to hold meetings with those comrades. For instance, until today Comrade Becker did not receive a green light for an introductory visit with Kim Il Sung.

IV. State of Relations between GDR and DPRK

The scope of relations between GDR and DPRK has been greatly diminished after the VI SED Party Congress [1963]. Due to DPRK attitudes toward our policy we did not receive political support from them any more. Coverage [of the GDR] in DPRK press and radio continuously decreased. Currently it just consists of factual news.

While the extent of trade relations had been quite different in recent years, since 1962 economic relations suffer from declining tendencies:

































ca. 9.0

ca. 10.0

Since the GDR has suspended its aid to the DPRK, the DPRK is no longer ready to provide important precious and non-ferrous metals to the GDR. While in 1963 certain amounts of non-ferrous and precious metals were still exported to the GDR, now DPRK exports of raw material have significantly diminished - although the DPRK has wide-ranging opportunities for imports from the GDR.

Because of the policy of the KWP leadership and DPRK government, there is hardly any exchange of delegations in the cultural sector.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry shows few initiatives for cooperation; the same applies to the DPRK embassy in Berlin. Besides the facts listed under chapter III [of this report], one has to add that our embassy in Pyongyang has hardly any opportunities to travel around the country and talk with or to the workers. Frequently, embassy requests are not fulfilled at all or just in a formal sense. Contacts with the Foreign Ministry and other Korean institutions are difficult and slow to establish, and mostly so due to initiatives of our embassy. Of those female GDR citizens married to Koreans the large majority lives with their children in the GDR (there are 10 altogether of which currently 8 are in the GDR). The DPRK has recalled all their about 70 students in the GDR back to the DPRK.

While the GDR had done everything to strengthen relations, the KWP leadership began to ever growing extent to transfer differences in opinion to bilateral relations between both countries.

V. Conclusions

In its policy towards the DPRK the GDR aims at expanding and solidifying state-to-state relations between both countries. It is imperative to undertake every effort so that the GDR cannot be accused of worsening or restricting relations. Pursuing this course is very complicated since recently DPRK representatives in Korea, as well as in the GDR, have begun to outline positions of their party and government in a provocative manner. They are not reacting to efforts from our site to strengthen and expand bilateral relations.

Priority shall be given to the following tasks:

1. Offensive presentation of the policies of the GDR party and government in both oral and written form vis-a-vis the Korean comrades. Increasing efforts are needed to explain how the comprehensive build-up of socialism in the GDR, and the latter's economic strengthening, represents an important contribution to the struggle against imperialism and for the strength of the global socialist camp. Our struggle for implementation of peaceful coexistence in relations between both German states, as well as the struggle against the nuclear build-up of West German militarism, requires comprehensive support by all socialist fraternal countries. Ultimately this also serves Korea's peaceful reunification.

Efforts are to undertake to solidify and expand economic relations. They have increasingly to be based on the principle of mutual benefit.

In order to strengthen relations we should prepare for signing an additional agreement (maybe treaty on health or plant protection).

2. GDR party and government are supportive of DPRK party and government policy concerning peaceful reunification and other steps taken by the DPRK (e.g. in the context of an United Nations meeting) – as far as those are in accordance with our positions.

3. Delegation of Koreanists to the GDR embassy in Pyongyang in order to qualify them as interpreters. The number of German-Korean interpreters is absolutely insufficient.

4. Requests filed by the DPRK embassy in the GDR ought to be granted as much as possible – while considering DPRK attitudes towards requests from our embassy in Pyongyang.

5. The number of Korean employees in the GDR embassy to the DPRK must be reduced further while guaranteeing the continuation of respective works.

6. Coordination is needed for all GDR institutions concerned with affairs of the DPRK. All GDR organs must follow the instruction to inform and clear with the Korea Section in the Foreign Ministry everything concerning preparation, implementation, and evaluation of measures vis-a-vis the DPRK.



Acting Head of Section


1x Comrade Minister Schwab

1x Central Committee, International Relations Department

1x Information Department

1x Embassy Pyongyang

1x Section Korea