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The Short Version of the Negotiations Between CPSU and CCP Delegations (September 1960)

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The Short Version of the Negotiations Between CPSU and CCP Delegations (September 1960)

CPSU Delegation: Suslov (leader), Kozlov, Kuusinen, Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il'ichev, Konstantinov, Grishin, Chervonenko


The first talk took place on 17 September 1960 from 1300 to 1500....

In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping asked, as he said, the essential question: What does the CC CPSU and the Soviet government want to do with Soviet-Chinese friendship? ... Only after the clarification of this essential question made up of many facts, can one ascertain which assumptions are necessary for us to solve our disagreements...

[Second Session : 19 September 1960]

First of all com. [Frol] Kozlov explained that we have always assumed that truly fraternal relations corresponding to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism must be established between our parties, states and people...

Secondly, Comrade Kozlov noted that as causes of the serious disagreements that supposedly have long existed between the two CCs, the Chinese comrades' letter mentions events that are related to Soviet-Polish relations as well as the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956. These questions were resolved long ago between the CC CPSU and the CCs of the Polish party and Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. We have [reached] unanimity with these parties in our evaluations of the events of fall 1956.

We do not hide that at that time the Chinese comrades really did give us advice, but this advice was completely different from that now cited in the Chinese comrades' letter. Comrade Kozlov rebuts the Chinese comrades' claim and then asks : why do you now wish to return to the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. We think that this is not done for the sake of clarifying the evaluation of these events. One sees, however, that such a questioning can only stoke nationalistic moods in Poland and Hungary in order to undermine the tight fraternal and heartfelt relations of the USSR and the CPSU with Poland and Hungary.

[Third Session : 20 September 1960]

The next accusation by Deng: We are also very puzzled by the following fact. Following his meeting with Comrade Khrushchev and several other leading figures in the USSR, Comrade Ho Chi Minh made a stop-over in Beijing on his way home and reported the following news: During the conversation with him and other Vietnamese, Comrade Khrushchev stated that enormous efforts were being spent in China to restore the gravesite of Genghis-khan and that this smelled of "yellow peril." The creation of Genghis-khan's empire involved three countries-Mongolia, our autonomous territory, and Soviet Buriatia. Whereas it is usually stated in your country that it was primarily the Europeans who had to suffer from the attack by Genghis-khan, it was actually the Chinese who suffered the most from the attack.

Ponomarev: One should strike his grave, not celebrate him.

Pospelov: Why do they celebrate him as a progressive figure? Many nations had to suffer under his attack.
Peng Zhen: How could we interfere in the internal affairs of the Mongolians who want to restore the gravesite of their ancestors? You, for example, like Peter I. You intended to erect a monument in Port Arthur to three Russian generals-Kuropatkin, Alekseev, and Makarov, who had led an aggression against China.

Pospelov: This was never the case with Kuropatkin and Alekseev, only with Makarov; because Kuropatkin and Alekseev had betrayed the interests of Russia.

Peng Zhen: And now concerning the question of the Korean War.

Then the entire conversation with Khrushchev on June 22 was repeated and the attempt was made to whitewash Mao Zedong of any guilt. Mao Zedong reportedly stated at the beginning of the Korean War: "If the enemy transgresses the 38th parallel, China—since it is not up to the Soviet Union to send troops for the protection of North Korea—is prepared to protect the common interests of the socialist countries, to send its own volunteers."

Following further discussion of the topic Deng declared: in explaining all of these facts we would like to ask the Soviet comrades to rethink whether all that they have done with respect to their enemies and with respect to their friends was appropriate. We have no doubt that overall you are taking a stand against imperialism.

Ponomarev: We, however, had the impression that all our deeds were also directed to support American imperialism.

Deng: But why then did Comrade Khrushchev speak with such esteem about Eisenhower?

Suslov: One cannot mix up matters of principle with the diplomacy of the struggle.

Deng: Comrade Suslov, do not jump to conclusions too easily. You are not used to listening to others. Under such conditions it is difficult for us to finish our discussion. There is no state of equality. We would like to ask you, however, on whom you can count when difficulties will arise? On Eisenhower, on Nehru or the likes, or on a fraternal socialist country, on China?

Kozlov: There is no such question for us.

Deng: It would be perfect if such questions did not exist. But in reality such facts exist, and they cause concern.

Kozlov: Then you yourself want a decline in our relations. You yourself are pushing this line. We state that there is no such question, but you maintain that it exists nevertheless. We declare in the name of our country, in the name of our people that we will defend you in case of an attack with all means [available to us]; but you doubt this.

Deng: I ask you that your actions meet your recent statements.

Suslov: This statement is offensive to us.

Deng: I declare in the name of our party, in the name of the entire Chinese people, and fully aware of the responsibility, that regardless of all these circumstances and the attacks on the Chinese people, the People's Republic of China and our party will take the side of the socialist countries in
Suslov: Did we not act this way when there was a difficult situation in the GDR in 1955 [1953?], did we not take full responsibility when we dealt a blow to the counterrevolution in Hungary?

Deng: But during the Chinese-Indian border conflict you did not act that way.

Suslov: But you were not threatened by a dangerous aggressor.

Deng: You unilaterally withdrew your experts from China, you transferred the ideological differences to the sphere of international-state relations, and I do not agree that India did not threaten China. You declared that you took a neutral position in the question of the Sino-Indian conflict. It is news to us that a fraternal socialist country can take a neutral position in the conflict with bourgeois India with regard to another socialist country.

In his further remarks, Deng spoke about the disagreements which had occurred in the relations between China and the USSR, among other things about the negotiations of the supreme command of the Far Eastern military district on joint air defense on 4 February 1955 and those on air defense between the military districts of the USSR and China on 27 September 1955. 

Deng stated in conclusion: As is well known, an extremely unequal treaty existed according to which China did not have the right to permit representatives of third countries to enter two provinces of the PRC. These two provinces are our territories. Is it your business whether we permit the entry of persons from third countries or not? These questions were discussed with Comrade Mikoyan during his trip to the PRC, and it was resolved. We appreciate that you resolved these questions.

Suslov: And why do you now raise these long-resolved questions once again? What is your point?

Deng: Unfortunately, the proposals with regard to the construction of a joint fleet, a long-wave radio station, and negotiations on a basis of equality [sic?] came from Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Mao Zedong back then had asked Comrade Khrushchev: What should we do when you raise these issues, should we act according to your proposals or according to our thoughts. If we act as you wish, we would have to cede our entire coast to you, as was the case with Port Arthur [Lushunkou] and Dalnii [Dalian]. Comrade Khrushchev responded: You cannot act like that. Where would you go? Comrade Mao Zedong then stated: We will go into the mountains as partisans.

Suslov: We think this is a joke.

Deng: This was not a joke. This was a very serious conversation. It must be stated that following this conversation, you stopped delivering to us technical documentation and equipment for the construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, while the CC CPSU communicated to the CC CCP on 20 June 1959 that the USSR would terminate the deliveries of technical documentation and necessary materials for the production of atomic weapons...

With regard to the Chinese-Soviet border incidents, Deng stated: on this question, we will communicate our response through diplomatic channels, and therefore we will not take a position at this point....

Deng: ...I take advantage of the opportunity to ask you to transmit our greetings to your Party and to com. Khrushchev. At the same time, please transmit the following wish: since last September com. Khrushchev has personally attacked our country and Party many times causing us alarm. As the leader of the Soviet party and the Soviet state, com. Khrushchev exercises powerful influence over world affairs. Therefore, we ask you with all our hearts and sincerity to deliver this message [to Khrushchev], asking him to pay attention to it.
With great satisfaction, we ascertain that both sides consider this meeting useful and are of the opinion that this is a contribution towards gradually overcoming our differences...

From the Diary of S.V. CHERVONENKO

TOP SECRET

12 October 1961

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