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Digital Archive International History Declassified

July 08, 1963


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    "Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, Moscow, 5-20 July 1963 ," July 08, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO Barch JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 (in Russian). Obtained by Vladislav Zubok and translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.
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8 July

Deng Xiaoping. By law, obviously, Com. [Comrade] Grishin should not object to our working?

Grishin. Today is a work day. I don't know what Liu Ningyi thinks.

Kang Sheng. Liu Ningyi is silent, which means that he agrees.

Deng Xiaoping. Well as for today, perhaps I should speak?

Suslov. Please, [go ahead]...

Speech by the CCP delegation head Com. Deng Xiaoping.

Deng Xiaoping. First of all, I want to announce that our delegation at the request of the CC of our party came to this meeting in Moscow of representatives of the CCP and USSR with the sincere intention of removing discord and strengthening unity...

...It can be said with all candor that a whole series of disagreements of a fundamental character which exist today in the international communist movement, started at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

In the past we never spoke about this openly, because we were taking into account the situation you were in. We only mentioned that the disagreements which have arisen in the past few years in the international Communist movement were provoked by the violation of the Declaration of 1957 by comrades from several fraternal parties... We have always considered and still consider that the 20th Congress of the CPSU put forward positions on the issues of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition which went against Marxism-Leninism. Especially serious are two issues: the issue of the so called "peaceful transition" and the issue of the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin under the pretext of the so called "struggle with the cult of personality"...

Here I want just briefly to say the following: a criticism of some errors by Stalin is necessary; taking off the lid, so to speak, and ending superstition is a good thing. However this criticism must be correct both from the point of view of principles and from the point of view of methods.

Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the facts demonstrate that the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin is a serious step undertaken by the leading comrades from the CPSU with the aim of laying out the path to the revision of Marxism-Leninism on a whole series of issues... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin, the wave of an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked around the whole world...

The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.

We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the CPSU took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them to itself by means of coercion and even tried to resort to military force. We consider that such a method is not only evidence of great-power chauvinism in relation to fraternal countries and to fraternal parties, but also evidence of adventurism.

Following this, the counterrevolutionary mutiny in Hungary took place. The Hungarian events by their character differ from the events in Poland. In resolving the issues associated with the events in Poland, which were issues of an internal order [vnutrennego poriadka], between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the comrades in the CPSU resorted to coercive methods, even trying to resort to military force.

And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary? The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and to us. I do not want to dwell on them greatly... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meetings of an internal sort [vnutrennego poryadka], the leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a moderate form more than once. In his statement comrade Suslov said that we kept quiet for 7 years. There are no grounds for [saying] that.

In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of the form of transition, that is peaceful transition, the leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known to you.

Back in April 1956, Com. Mao Zedong stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Com. Mikoian and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassador Com. Iudin.

Com. Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to think that "Stalin's errors and contributions are divided into equal halves;" "whatever happened, all the same Stalin's contributions are greater than his errors. One must evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 percent, and his mistakes30 percent. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around [vsestoronnaya] assessment."... In October 1956, Com. Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discussion with Com. Ponamarev, who was then a member of the CPSU delegation present at the eighth Congress of our [CCP] party. In discussion with Com. Ponomarev, Com. Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the CPSU: first, "no preliminary consultation was carried out with fraternal parties"; secondly, "an all-around historical analysis was completely lacking" in relation to Stalin; thirdly, the leading comrades from the CPSU "lacked self-criticism". These are the three points which Com. Zhou Enlai talked about.

On 23 October 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again talked with Com. Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Com. Mao Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, but that in relation to critical methods we hold to another opinion, and also have a different opinion about some other issues. Com. Mao Zedong also said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet [podniav kamen' brosit' ego sebe na nogi].

On 30 November 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again received Com. Iudin and in a conversation with him said that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin's leadership was correct and that one must not treat one's comrade like an enemy.

On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.

Both Com. Mao Zedong on the 29 October 1957, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, in a conversation with Com. Iudin, and Com. Zhou Enlai during the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961, in a conversation with Com. Khrushchev, stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin.

It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi, heading the delegation of the CCP, arrived in Moscow for negotiations, during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Polandmistakes of great-power chauvinism which took place during Stalin's leadership as well... From that very time, you, considering that your internal problems have already been resolved, started to direct the cutting edge [ostrie] of your action against Marxism-Leninism against fraternal parties defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and began to engage in activities directed against the CCP, against the PRC, and this activity is of a serious character.

What has been done by you over this period? Let us cite some of the facts, so as to make things clear.

From April to July of 1958 the CPSU put to China the issue of the creation of a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet, trying thereby to bring China under its military control. But we guessed your intentions and you were not able to attain your goals.

Following that you started both in statements and in actions to carry out anti-Chinese activities in an intensified manner. You continually spoke out attacking the internal policies of the CCP, in particular on the people's commune.

By way of example one can refer to the conversation by Com. Khrushchev with the American Congressman [Hubert] Humphrey in December 1958 and to the speech by Com. Khrushchev in a Polish agricultural cooperative in July 1959.

In June 1959 you unilaterally annulled the agreement on rendering help to China in developing a nuclear industry and in producing atom bombs.

Following this, on 9 September 1959, TASS made an announcement about the incident on the Chinese-Indian border and displayed bias in favor of the Indian reaction, making the disagreements between China and the Soviet Union clear to the whole world for the first time.

In November of that year Com. Khrushchev openly accused China of having acted "stupidly" and "regrettably" in a conversation with a correspondent of the Indian daily "New Age."

At the last meeting at Camp David which was held in September 1959, Com. Khrushchev began to preach to the whole world of a "world without arms, without armies, without wars", (look good in all sorts of different ways) made the leader of American imperialism, considered peaceful coexistence the task of all tasks, and propagandized the idea that, supposedly, the American-Soviet friendship decides the fate of humanity. All of this practically signified a sermon to the effect that the nature of imperialism had already changed, that Marxism-Leninism was already obsolete.

During this very period you started to propagandize the so called "spirit of Camp David" everywhere. Incidentally, Eisenhower did not recognize the existence of any "spirit of Camp David".

During this very period you, counting on some "spirit of Camp David," clutched at the straw extended by Eisenhower and began mounting attacks upon China in your statements without restraint.

On 30 September 1959, in his speech at a banquet held by us on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the PRC, Com. Khrushchev stated that one must not test the firmness of a capitalist power with force.

On 6 October 1959 in his speech in Vladivostok, Com. Khrushchev stated that allegedly we were looking for war, like cocks for a fight [kak petukhi k drake].

On 31 October 1959 in his report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Com. Khrushchev said that some, similarly to Trotskii, want "neither war nor peace."

On 1 December 1959 in his speech at the 7th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Com. Khrushchev demanded "a checking of watches." In that same speech he stated that "if the leadership of this or that country becomes conceited, then that can play into the hands of the enemy."

In February 1960 during the meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the participating countries of the Warsaw Pact, Com. Khrushchev spoke rudely using an expression like "old galoshes." Meanwhile, the CC CPSU in its oral presentation to the CC CCP accused China of committing such mistakes as a "narrowly-nationalist approach," and of acting on "narrowly-nationalist interests," in relation to the issues of the Indian-Chinese border.

The sense of all these statements and speeches is understood by you and by us, and also by our enemies... In such circumstances we could not remain silent any longer. We published three articles"Long live Leninism!" and others, in which we defended Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration, and exposed some revisionist and opportunist views to criticism. But in these three articles, we as before directed the brunt of our struggle for the most part against imperialism and Yugoslavian revisionism without open criticism of comrades from the CPSU.

Following this, such events occurred as the intrusion of the American "U-2" plane into the USSR's airspace, the collapse of the meeting of the heads of government of the four powers in Paris and the collapse of the entirely non-existent so-called "spirit of Camp-David." All of this proved the error of the views of our comrades from the CPSU and the correctness of our views...

In June 1960 in Bucharest, the leadership of the CPSU mounted a sudden attack on the CCP, disseminated the Informational Note of the CC of the CPSU which contains an all-around attack on the CCP, and organized a campaign by a whole group of fraternal parties against us...

On 16 July 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally decided to withdraw between 28 July and 1 September over 1,300 Soviet specialists working in China. Over 900 specialists were recalled from [extended] business trips and contracts and agreements were broken...

On 25 August 1962, the Soviet government informed China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind China by the hands and feet through an agreement with the USA.

After India started a major attack on the border regions of China in October 1962, the Soviet Union began to supply India with even larger quantities of military materiel, to do its utmost to give [India] an economic blood transfusion, to support Nehru by political means, and to spur him on to the struggle against China.

Your position on the issues of the Indian-Chinese border conflict received praise from the USA. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Averell] Harriman, said: "I consider that the maintenance of relations that are as friendly as possible between India and Moscow serves its own interests well and also serves our interests well." Harriman made this statement on 9 December 1962. Further, on 18 December 1962 in conversation with a Japanese correspondent, Harriman also stated that the USA wanted to see the Soviet Union help India in the matter of supporting its defense capabilities.

On the issue of Chinese-Indian relations you went too far. With all [bad] intention, you spoke out together with Kennedy and Nehru against China. Where then did the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which existed under Lenin and Stalin, go?

In October 1962 there was a crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea. During these events we consider that you committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba you indulged in adventurism, and then, showing confusion in the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitulated.

People understandably [zakonno] ask why you began to ship missiles to Cuba. In this regard we have our own experience. Judging by our experience, your actions in this regard remind us in their character of your efforts to develop a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet in China. For Cuba's defense no missiles are necessary at all. And so, in shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under your control.

You failed to consult with fraternal countries on such an important issue. You daily speak about the danger of thermonuclear war. But in the given case you rashly played with nuclear weapons.

You justify your actions by saying that you wanted to obtain some sort of "promise" from the USA, and you say that you truly received such a "promise."

But what are the facts? The facts are that under threat from the United States you were obliged to remove your missiles. By all sorts of means you tried to convince Cuba to agree to so-called "international inspection," which encroaches upon their sovereignty and constitutes interference in their internal affairs. Besides that, you also conduct propaganda among the peoples of the world, convincing them to believe in some sort of promise by Kennedy, and thereby you adorn [priukrashivaete] American imperialism.

In his letters to Kennedy of the 27 and 28 October 1962, Com. Khrushchev wrote: "You are working toward the preservation of peace" and "I express my satisfaction and recognition of your manifestation of a sense of moderation and an understanding of the responsibility which now rests on you for the preservation of peace in the whole world."

But the question remains did the USA in the end give some sort of promise? Let us look at [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk's statement of 11 January 1963. Rusk stated: "To whatever extent President Kennedy took on obligations not to encroach on Cuba at the moment of the Cuban crisis, these obligations have not come into force." He further said: "In general no such obligations exist."...

At the Congresses of these parties another strange phenomenon was observed: on the one hand at these Congresses they attacked the CCP and completely removed the Albanian Workers' Party, and on the other hand, they forcibly dragged the Titoist clique in Yugoslavia into the ranks of the international communist movement and tried to rehabilitate that clique. In addition, at the Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, there was noise, whistling, and stamping right at the time when our representative subjected Yugoslav revisionism to criticism on the basis of the Moscow Declaration by citing the Moscow Declaration verbatim.

What do the facts we have cited above, which took place after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, testify to? These facts testify to the fact that comrades from the CPSU have taken further steps to create a split in the ranks of the international communist movement, and, moreover, have done so in an increasingly sharp, increasingly extreme form, in an increasingly organized [way], on an increasingly large scale, trying, come what may, to crush others.

I would like to note that using such methods is a habitual affair for you. You began using such methods as far back as the Bucharest conference. During the bilateral meeting between the representatives of our two parties in 1960, I said that it was fortunate that Com. Peng Zhen went to the Bucharest meeting; he weighs approximately 80 kilograms, and for that reason he endured; if I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I could not have endured. After that it was just as well that Com. Wu Xiuquan, who weighs more than 70 kilograms, went to the GDR, and was able to endure. Frankly speaking, such methods do not help matters. You cannot prove by such methods that you are in the right; you cannot prove that the truth is on your side. Quite the opposite; the use of such methods is an insult to the glorious Marxist-Leninist party.

Ponomarev. And Com. Grishin weighs 70 kg. After all, this started before Bucharest, in Beijing. That was the start of and the reason for the Bucharest Conference.

Deng Xiaoping. I understand you.

Peng Zhen. Wait. You will have [your] time; you will be able to say as much as you want then. We are ready to hear you out...

Deng Xiaoping. I have already taken 5 hours in my statement, and on that I end it. Are we going to continue the session today, or will we continue it tomorrow?

Suslov. We propose a break until the day after tomorrow, at 10 AM. We must acquaint ourselves with your statement.

Deng Xiaoping. We agree. Who will speak the day after tomorrow, you or we?

Suslov. By the order it will be our turn.

Andropov. By the principle: we, you, we, you.

Deng Xiaoping. That is Com. Andropov's invention [izobretenie]...

July 10

Suslov. Again, as in 1960, you are putting in motion the practice, which has already been condemned by communist parties, of personal attacks on Com. N.S. Khrushchev. Such a practice in the past did not provoke anything but indignation in any true communist, and will do the same now.

Com. N.S. Khrushchev is our recognized leader. Reflecting the collective will of the CC CPSU, he has gained unlimited authority for himself in our party, in the country, in the whole world through his selfless devotion to Marxism-Leninism and through his truly titanic struggle to build communism in the USSR, to preserve peace in the whole world in defense of the interests of all working people...

For obviously demagogic ends you are trying to connect the decisions of the 20th Congress with the well-known events in Poland and also with the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary in 1956... We do not plan to examine these issues anew. We will simply note the complete groundlessness of your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th Congress led to the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by materials of the fraternal parties, comes from the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin's actions: elements of unequal rights in the relations between socialist countries which took place during that period by the fault of Stalin. How could the 20th Congress, which abolished these elements of unequal rights and fully restored the principle of respecting national sovereignty, be reason for dissatisfaction on the part of the Hungarian people?

You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that allegedly the Soviet Union committed errors, and that by your interference you almost managed to save the situation.

This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the feet of the CPSU and a more than strange pretension [pretenziia] on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with thousands of its sons' lives in order to preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary; did it not come to the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its difficult hour?...

Throughout the whole period of existence of the PRC, the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government invariably gave help to China in creating and strengthening the defense of the country. The 24 defense enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the basis for the creation of corresponding branches of Chinese industry. Another 33 defense enterprises are being built. At one time, 60 infantry divisions were equipped with arms and military-technical property supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 the modernization of the Chinese army with more modern types of armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical and technological documentation by which China was able to organize the production of MIG-17, MIG-l9, MIG-21-F, and TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, "air-to-air," "ground-to-air," "ground-to-ground," "air-to-ground," and "ship-to-ground" missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and cutters of various types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC develop the basis for a nuclear industry...

Several words on the issue you raised about the so-called "joint construction of a naval fleet." Com. Deng Xiaoping stated that apparently our party tried to stick China with the joint construction of a naval fleet and that by doing so we allegedly encroached upon the sovereignty of the PRC. Com. Deng Xiaoping, after all you were present at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and Com. Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. Have you really forgotten the following statement made by Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation. "Never have we at the CC of the CPSU even had the thought of jointly building a fleet. You know my point of view. During Stalin's reign I was against the "joint companies [smeshannye obshchestva]." Later, N.S. Khrushchev announced: "We considered it necessary to talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we neither thought about or considered it necessary to construct a joint factory or a joint fleet." In response to this Com. Mao Zedong stated that: "If it is so, then all the dark clouds have dispersed." There is no issue, but you have brought it up again today. What do you need it for?...

We would also like to remind our forgetful Chinese comrades about some facts and about the assistance the USSR has given to the economic development of the PRC. Do not the 198 modern industrial enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the scientific-research institutes which it set up, and the technical cadres trained in the USSR, bear witness to the commitment by the CPSU to fraternal friendship with People's China? Up until 1959 almost a half of all the cast iron was produced, more than half of all the steel was smelted, and more than half of the rolled iron was made in the metallurgical enterprises constructed in China with help from the USSR. Such new branches of industry as the automobile, the tractor, and the aviation industry have been developed in China with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave the PRC 21 thousand sets of scientific-technical documentation, including more than 1400 plans of whole enterprises...

Deng Xiaoping. Perhaps tomorrow we rest for a day? The day after tomorrow we will speak according to his principle. (He turns to Com. Andropov).

Suslov. Fine, until ten o'clock, yes?

Deng Xiaoping. Fine, we agree...

July 12

Deng Xiaoping. Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the People's Socialist Party of Cuba at one time fell to attacking the armed struggle led by Com. Fidel Castro, calling it "putschism," "adventurism," and "terrorism." It accused Com. Castro of the fact that the armed struggle led by him was a "total mistake" [sploshnaya oshibka], "caused by a petty-bourgeois nature, and that its leaders do not rely on the masses." It even openly demanded of Com. Castro that he renounce "putschistic activities," and "the erroneous path of armed struggle, leading to a rupture with the people."

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Algerian communist party from 1957 fully renounced armed struggle and, moreover, began to propagandize the "danger" of national-liberationist war, advocating the attainment of independence through compromise, and in doing so fully wasted its place in the political life of the country.

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Communist party of Iraq renounced the correct line, which it at one time had implemented, and began dreaming about the realization of a peaceful transition in Iraq. This led revolution in Iraq to serious failures and to defeat. During the counterrevolutionary coup of 8 February 1963 the Communist party of Iraq found itself in a condition of complete unpreparedness and suffered heavy losses...

July 13

Suslov. Com. Ponomarev will speak today for our delegation.

Speech by the representative of the CPSU Com. B. N. Ponomarev:

Comrades, yesterday we heard the second address by the head of the Chinese delegation. Our delegation cannot hide the fact that we came out of the meeting feeling deep sorrow and distress. Of course, this was not because the address allegedly contained criticism, which is what Deng Xiaoping had in mind when he talked about "bitter, but necessary medicine." We communists are steadfast people, and more than once have come across not only groundless criticism, but also malicious slander.

No, that was not what left us with a bitter taste. The second address by Com. Deng Xiaoping confirmed our worst fears, formed toward the end of his first speech. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the delegation of the CC of the CCP came here not to find agreement and to eliminate our differences. Your design, evidently, is different - to bring a whole load of dirt [privezti...tselyi voz griazi] to Moscow, to dump it on us, to do everything, not shying away from any tactics [ne stesniaias' v sredstvakh], to defame the policies of the CPSU and thereby further worsen the relations between our two parties and countries...

Ponomarev. Fabrication Number 4. You fabricated an undoubted falsehood to the effect that the USSR did not aid the Algerian people's war of liberation. Here are the facts. In the most decisive period of the war, from 1960-1962, we supplied free to the People's Liberation Army of Algeria 25 thousand rifles, 21 thousand machine guns and sub-machine guns, 1300 howitzers, cannons and mortars, many tens of thousands of pistols and other weapons. Over 5 million rubles' worth of clothes, provisions and medical supplies were supplied to Algeria by Soviet social organizations alone. Hundreds of wounded from the Algerian Liberation Army were saved and treated in the Soviet Union. Soviet wheat, sugar, butter, conserves, condensed milk, etc., streamed into Algeria.

Finally, Fabrication Number 5. You again and again repeat your lying version of Soviet policy towards Poland, Hungary and Cuba. Who are you [to set yourselves up] as judges in these matters, if the party and governmental leaders of these three countries fully, decisively and publicly for the whole world reject your insinuations and declare to you that it is impermissible for representatives of a communist party to try and split the USSR, Poland and Hungary through fabrications? Com. Fidel Castro in speeches in the USSR and on returning [to Cuba] clearly described the internationalist policies of the CPSU. By the way, why didn't you publish these speeches? They would have shown the Chinese people that your position during the Caribbean crisis [Ed. note. This is what the Russians call the Cuban Missile Crisis.] was erroneous and contradicted the interests of the Cuban, Soviet and Chinese peoples...

Andropov. As for you, you long ago ceased any sort of consultation with us. In 1958, the Chinese side did not inform us in a timely fashion about its intentions to carry out the shelling of the coastal islands in the Taiwan straits which was carried out soon after Com. N.S. Khrushchev left Beijing. According to the later admission of Com. Mao Zedong, during Com. N.S. Khrushchev's presence in Beijing the Chinese comrades had already decided on this operation and had prepared it, but you did not consider it necessary to inform the Soviet government about it. Despite this, during a dark hour for the Chinese government, the head of the Soviet government informed the US President Eisenhower that an attack on China would be taken as an attack on the Soviet Union.

Over the last several years the government of the PRC has completely failed to inform the government of the USSR about the Chinese-American negotiations that have been going on since 1955 at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw. Judging by the press reports, over 100 meetings were held there. Since May 1958 you have twice sharply changed your political course on relations with Japan, and, in both cases, despite the Treaty of 1950, you did so without consulting with us...

Kang Sheng. In your criticism of Stalin, you do not take the position of seeking the truth and do not use methods of scientific analysis, but resort to demagogy, slanders and abusive language.

Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin "a murderer," "a criminal," "a bandit," "a gambler," "a despot like Ivan the Terrible," "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia," "a fool," "shit," "an idiot" [ubiitsa, ugolovnik, bandit, igrok, despot tipa Ivana Groznogo, samyi bol'shoi diktator v istorii Rossii, durak, govno, idiot].

All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.

Trying to justify Com. N.S. Khrushchev, in your address of 10 July you stated that allegedly he gave Stalin an "objective and all-around assessment," that allegedly he adhered to the "heart of the matter" [printsipial'noe otnoshenie]. Is this not the same as telling cock-and-bull stories with your eyes shut [nesti nebylitsy s zakrytymi glazami]?

Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred then it shows its enemies?

From your statements it emerges that allegedly the great Soviet people lived for thirty years under the tyranny of "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia." Can it really be that such a great leader who for many years enjoyed the general recognition of the Soviet people really turned out to be "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia?" Can it really be that the experience of the first state in the world to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, which the Soviet people shared with the peoples of the whole world, has been the Soviet people's experience of existence in the conditions of tyranny under some "dictator?"

From what you have said it appears as if the first socialist country in the world was built thanks to the fact that a "fool" headed the leadership. Can it really be that the achievements of the national economy and the development of the latest technology in the Soviet Union during several decades have been attained under the leadership of some sort of "fool?" Can it really be that the basis for the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the Soviet Union has been laid down under the leadership of some sort of "fool"?

From what you have said it appears as if the Supreme Commander of the great Soviet Army turns out to have been some sort of "idiot." Can it really be that the great victory of the Soviet Army during World War II was won under the command of some sort of "idiot"?

From what you have said it appears as if the great CPSU was in the position of having some sort of "bandit" at the head of its leadership for 30 years. Can it really be that the CPSU which for a long time had the love and respect of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world had a "bandit" as its great leader for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the ranks of the international communist movement which grew and became stronger from year to year were under the leadership of some sort of "shit." Can it really be that communists of all countries considered some sort of "shit" to be their flag-bearer for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the great proletarian leader for whom imperialists and reactionaries of different countries felt fierce hatred for a long time has turned out to be all-in-all some sort of "gambler." Can it really be that the Soviet people and the revolutionary peoples of all countries struggling against imperialism and reaction considered their teacher some sort of "gambler"?...

Comrades, you, so to speak, having picked up the stone, have thrown it on your own feet. How can you treat Stalin in such a way? Your actions in this regard not only go counter to historical reality, but also put you in a very awkward position.

In depicting Stalin as such a bad man, you also blacken the entire leadership of the Soviet state and the CPSU; and, at the same time, as comrades who then took part in the leadership of the state and the party, you cannot justify yourselves by saying that you do not carry your portion of responsibility for the "crimes" you talk about.

Let us take, for example, Com. Khrushchev. He heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin's leadership, especially the excesses committed on the issue of counterrevolutionary elements, on Stalin alone while he presented himself as being completely clean. Can this really convince people? If the memory of men is not too short, they will be able to recall that during Stalin's leadership Com. Khrushchev more than once extolled Stalin and the policy he was then carrying out of struggling with counter-revolutionary elements.

Com. Khrushchev constantly praised Stalin, calling him "a close friend and comrade-in-arms of Lenin," "a very great genius, teacher, great leader of humanity," "a great marshal of victories," "a friend of peoples in his simplicity," "one's own father" [rodnoi otets] and so on and so on.

On 6 June 1937 in his report at the 5th party conference of the Moscow oblast', Com. Khrushchev said: "Our party will mercilessly crush the band of betrayers and traitors, will wipe all the Trotskyist-rightist carrion from the face of the earth... The guarantee is the unshakable leadership of our CC, the unshakable leadership of our great leader, Com. Stalin... We will annihilate our enemies without a trace to the last one and will scatter their ashes in the wind."

Later, for example on 8 June 1938, while speaking at the 4th party conference of the Kiev oblast', Com. Khrushchev said: "Yakiry, balitskie, liubchenki, zatomskie" [Ed. note: Famous purge victims] and other bastards wanted to bring Polish nobles [Pol'she pany] to the Ukraine, wanted to bring German fascists, landowners and capitalists here... We have destroyed quite a few enemies, but not all. For that reason one must keep one's eyes open. We must firmly remember the words of Com. Stalin, that as long as capitalist encirclement exists, they will send spies and provocateurs [diversanty] to us...

Frankly speaking, on the issue of criticism and self-criticism you are inferior to Stalin. Having made mistakes, Stalin sometimes still practiced self-criticism. For instance, Stalin gave some mistaken advice relating to the Chinese revolution. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, he recognized his mistakes before Chinese comrades and friends. And how are you acting? You know well that you slough off [svalivaete] all of your mistakes onto others and ascribe all successes to yourself...

Suslov. Our delegation states a decisive protest against the distortion, falsification and slanders made in relation to the leadership of our party and to Com. N.S. Khrushchev, against our party and the decisions of its Congresses.

The delegation of the CPSU also states its protest against the sort of propaganda that has begun in the last few days on Peking radio. We consider that the entire responsibility for these actions rests with the leadership of the CCP...

Deng Xiaoping. Com. Suslov has expressed some sort of protest. If we are talking about protest, then we have an even greater basis for voicing even more protests...

Already two weeks have gone by since our meeting began. At the meeting both sides exchanged their views. Although as of yet it has been difficult to attain a unity of both sides' views right away, still, a frank exposition of views by both sides in this circle where the representatives of the two parties have been meeting is very useful for mutual understanding, for gradually finding a common language, for searching out a way to eliminate disagreements and strengthen cohesion. For that reason we consider that it serves as a good start...our delegation is introducing a proposal temporarily to adjourn the current meeting; the representatives of the CCP and the CPSU, both sides, can continue their meeting at another time. The time and place of the next meeting will be set through a consultation between the Central Committees of our two parties...

Our delegation once again expresses the sincere hope of our party that we and you will not spare our efforts towards an all-around, repeated, and most careful discussion of the disagreements existing between our parties. If a single meeting is not enough for this, it is possible to hold a second meeting, and if two meetings do not suffice, a third can be held...

20 July

Suslov. We will give you an answer tomorrow...

Deng Xiaoping. In conclusion I would like to say a few words.

However great the disagreements between us may be, we hope that we can gradually find the way to eliminate those disagreements, since unity between us is too important.

Despite the fact that in the course of the discussion both our sides have stated more than a few views with which the other side does not agree, and despite the fact that you have said that our words are not pleasant to the ear, and that we have also said that your words are not pleasant to the ear, despite all of this, our current meeting will serve as a good start. Moreover, we have agreed with you to publish a communique on the continuation of our meetings. We consider this a good thing.

We have come to the agreement that it is necessary to continue our meetings and that the time and place of the next meeting will be agreed by the Central Committees of our parties.

Here I would like to express in passing the following hope of ours: if your delegation, if the CC of the CPSU agrees, then we would like to invite the delegation of the CPSU to Beijing for the continuation of the meeting. That issue, of course, could be agreed upon separately.

Suslov. This is also a question for discussion between our Central Committees. Finished [vse]. Will I see you [later] today?

Deng Xiaoping. At six?

Suslov. Yes, at six.


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