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Digital Archive International History Declassified

December 13, 1981

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING OF THE CONSULTATIVE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

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    This is an extensive meeting dealing with the situation unfolding in Poland following Jarulzelski’s declaration of martial law in December 1981.
    "Stenographic transcript of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party," December 13, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Chancellery, file no. 101/1981, ff.2-15 and also no.3259, 30.12.1981. CWIHP Document Reader, vol.2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112069
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    https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112069

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of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party

13 December 1981

Participants in the meeting : comrades Nicolae Ceausescu, Iosif Banc, Emil Bobu, Cornel Burtica, Virgil Cazacu, Elena Ceausescu, Lina Ciobanu, Nicolae Constantin, Constantin Dascalescu, Ion Dinca, Janos Fazekas, Ludovic Fazekas, Cornelia Filipas, Alexandrina Gainusa, Petre Lupu, Paul Niculescu, Gheorghe Oprea, Gheorghe Pana, Ion Patan, Dumitru Popescu, Gheorghe Radulescu, Aneta Spornic, Ilie Verdet, Stefan Andrei, Emilian Dobrescu, Nicolae Giosan, Suzana Gâdea, Ion Ionita, Ana Muresan, Constantin Olteanu, Cornel Onescu, Ioan Ursu, Richard Winter.

Invitees to the meeting: comrades Marin Enache, George Homostean, Tudor Postelnicu, Eugen Florescu.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu :
Comrades, I wanted to hold this meeting; cde. Stefan Bârlea, read these texts.

Cde. Stefan Bârlea :
The AFP agency transmits:


General Wojciech Jaruzelski announced that on Saturday evening, at 23.00 GMT, 24.00 local time, a state of war was proclaimed in Poland. He also announced that the leaders of the extremist “Solidarity” [trade union], as well as other members of illegal organizations had been arrested and would be court-martialed.


General Jaruzelski pointed out, in a statement read during the news bulletin at 6.00, broadcast on national radio, that this measure had been adopted by the Military Council of National Salvation. Other “persons responsible for the errors committed in the ‘70s were arrested as well: the former First Secretary Edward Gierek, the former Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz, as well as Zdzislaw Grudzien, Jerzy Lukaszewicz, Jan Szdylak, and T. Wrzaszczyk”; former members of the Political Bureau, had also been arrested and would be court-martialed.


The forces of order occupied at 4.00 GMT, 5.00 local time, the Warsaw branch of the “Solidarity” independent trade union, and arrested one of its leaders, Krzystof Sliwinski, the leader of the international section of the trade union in Warsaw. Tens of vehicles with militiamen, army vehicles, and ordinary vehicles, crammed with military in uniforms, are patrolling the streets of the capital. All the telephone and telex links were suddenly cut at 23.00, local time
The AFP press agency further transmitted on Sunday, in an broadcast message, that General Jaruzelski had declared that Poland should solve the crisis with its own forces, apparently excluding in this way an appeal for a Soviet intervention. “We are a sovereign country. We have to emerge from this crisis by our own means”, said the Polish prime minister. Addressing Poland's “allies and friends”, he insisted that the “Polish-Soviet alliance will remain the crucial element” of Warsaw's policy. General Jaruzelski also addressed international public opinion, asking it to have understanding [for the situation], and added: “Our action does not threaten anybody”.


General Jaruzelski asked the soldiers to be faithful to their oath, declaring: “Our country's fate depends on your attitude”. He also asked the militia “to defend the country against the enemy”, and the workers “to give up their imprescriptible right to strike in order to allow the country to emerge from the crisis.”


In a dramatic appeal addressed to the men and women of Poland, whom he named his brothers and sisters, General Jaruzelki asked that no drop of Polish blood should be shed, and every effort be made to avoid civil war.


General Jaruzelski's message, read in a grave and sad tone, was pre-ceded and followed by the national anthem. The Polish national broadcasting station did not give any further information and is now broadcasting music by Chopin.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
This is just about all the information we have so far. Have you anything else?

Cde. Tudor Postelnicu :
Comrade General Secretary, I want to report to you that the Polish ambassador told us that – apart from what he let us know immediately – there was no longer any radio, and asked us to receive only the communiqués transmitted by „Radio Warsaw”, and that today he will receive instructions as to the way he is to act further.


In addition to what the other press agencies transmitted, the press agency “France Press” confirmed that the Soviet TV interrupted its normal transmission and officially broadcast the proclamation of the „state of war” in Poland. There is some uncertainty, however, as the press agencies announced a “state of war”, an “exceptional state”, or a “state of emergency”.


There are no other issues aside from the officially announced ones.

Cde. Constantin Olteanu :
Comrade General Secretary, allow me to report to you. Besides the news already broadcast, it was also announced that in some voivodates (regions), in the central institutions, the main functions had been taken over by military commissaries. Moreover, it was announced as well that the American Secretary of State, [Alexander] Haig, Jr., who was touring several countries, interrupted his visits and contacted the foreign ministers of Britain, the Federal Republic Germany, and France to consult with them about the stance to take in regard to the events in Poland.


It was also announced that the town of Gdansk was completely isolated, and could not be accessed by any means of communication (telephone and others).

Cde. Stefan Bârlea :
A declaration of the “TASS” agency was received, reading as follows:


Speaking on the radio in the morning of 13 December, Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Defense of the Polish People's Republic, announced that because of the anarchy menacing the country, and of the irresponsible actions of the extremist forces of the “Solidarity” trade union, which openly strive to seize power, through a decree of the State Council of the Polish People's Republic, on 13 December, 00.00 hrs, a state of war has been declared in the country.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
This is what they declared, “State of war”!

Cde. Stefan Bârlea :
It is further announced: the Military Council for National Salvation was set up,and commissaries empowered to control the activity of the state administration organs – from the ministries up to the villages – were appointed. These commissaries also have the right to remove from their positions the persons who do not discharge their duties appropriately.


It was decided that the extremist leaders of “Solidarity” , as well as the members of the illegal antisocialist organizations, should be taken into custody. A group of persons bearing the responsibility for the social-political and economic crisis in Poland, among which Edward Gierek, Piotr Jaroszewicz, Zdzislaw Grudzien, Jan Szydlak, and others, was also taken into custody.


Wojciech Jaruzelski pointed out that the party and the government act consistently for the creation of the National Agreement Front, for the union of all of the patriotic forces of the people in the name of Poland's salvation.
He requested that social calm be established in the country, that normal functioning of national economy begin, and trust in and respect for the state organs of power be re-established.


Wojciech Jaruzelski called for the party to close ranks since it is the leading force in society, which consistently advocates the consolidation and further development of socialism in Poland.


He emphasized that the Polish people highly appreciated the friendship with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, as well as their brotherly help. Poland, Wojciech Jaruzelski said, will remain an indestructible part of the socialist community.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Until we see what else is going to happen – actually, I wanted to discuss this issue at the meeting on Tuesday of the Consultative Political Committee – I would like us to read some assessments I made in regard to Poland in my discussions with Serghei Kraigher, Lionel Jospin, and Bettino Craxi.


The material is not ready yet (actually, I wanted to go over it once more), it was edited as it had been taken down in the relevant stenographic transcripts, but I am interested in our agreeing on a point of view.

Cde. Stefan Bârlea :
The issues related to the situation in Poland are very complicated indeed. It is difficult to say how things got this far. The causes underlying this situation are many and complex as they are also partly linked with Poland's history and traditions, with the actual fact that – in one form or another – this history and these traditions have not been taken into account.


The economic issues were nothing more than a pretext since the situation in Poland was good enough from an economic point of view. Obviously, a series of mistakes was actually made in this field in Poland, but – on the other hand – very good results were obtained in socialist development and, in general, in the economy. Over the last year the situation has not improved, but – on the contrary – it has worsened. One cannot say that there is a protest against socialist construction and the forms of socialist construction in Poland. I would rather say that the Polish United Workers' Party was responsible for certain misrepresentations of socialist principles, including the principles of the organization of the party, and this amounts to moving away from the working class to a certain extent, something that is apparent from the past structure of party organs, of the party itself, which neglected to take the measures necessary for the strengthening of the organizational force of the working class. The result was that a number of elements joined the party, who were intellectual, with a petty bourgeois mentality, in fact alien to the working class, which caused the appearance of lack of unity, conception, and clear orientation in the party.


Concurrently, one cannot ignore the existence of forces that have never put up with socialism, first and foremost on that score being the Catholic Church, actually the originator of the movement which eventually materialized in the “Solidarity” trade union. The action began with religious services. Even the Con-gress of “Solidarity” began with a religious service in a cathedral.


There have been antisocialist forces in Poland for a long time now. These forces organized themselves, but the Polish party and state did not take any measures against these forces, they tolerated them.
Great concessions were made to the Catholic Church, whose role in Poland is downright reactionary. By electing as Pope a Pole, the activity of [these reactionary elements] of the Catholic Church was strongly stimulated.


In a way, the Polish leadership encouraged such states of affairs and even thought that half of Vatican came to belong to Poland when a Polish citizen was elected Pope.


In our view, it was these factors taken together that caused the events that took place, and are still taking place. “Solidarity” is in fact the result of all of these factors and, first of all, of the Catholic Church, which had a decisive role [in its creation] and under whose aegis it began its activity. This shows clearly that [“Solidarity”] is not a workers', class, organization, but a Catholic one combined with a lot of antisocialist elements which, because of the mistakes made by the party, could influence part of the working class in Poland.
In fact, if we analyze what was said at the Congress of “Solidarity”, we see that in the first place there are mainly political issues, including those connected with national sentiment, which has always been very strong with the Poles.


In the whole postwar period, the Polish party and state have neglected the Poles' national sentiment. Instead of the Polish party and government being the exponent of the national sentiment – understood correctly, not in a narrow nationalistic sense, but as a socialist and democratic sentiment of the people – they neglected this sentiment, which was exploited by the Catholic Church, by reactionary circles in Poland. The Catholic Church arrogated the right to be the exponent of the Poles' national sentiment. It is necessary, therefore, that the Polish party and state pay appropriate attention to the sentiments and issues of national, cultural, and historical character, and become – they, the party and the government – the exponent of these preoccupations, of these sentiments, and take this weapon from the hands of the Catholics and of “Solidarity”.


I have said all this so that the special character of the situation in Poland can be fully understood. Obviously, what I have said cannot justify the state of affairs [in Poland], but they highlight the very fact that certain features of socialist society, of the traditions, were disregarded, and the history and the traditions of the Polish people were not taken into consideration.


Starting from this situation, we take the view that it is necessary, first and foremost, that the party focus its attention on the working class, that its ranks in the working class be strengthened, and a policy based on the working class, on the peasantry be adopted.


Little has been done in this direction so far. A number of steps were taken to get closer to the workers, but – in my opinion – this is not enough. To tell you what we think, and this is not to be published, we take the view that for Poland, and not only for Poland, the leader of the party in the present circumstances should have been an activist from the ranks of the workers.


I must tell you that even at the meeting we had in December last year we insisted that it was necessary to rely on the working class and that the party must become, at the same time, the exponent of the national sentiment of the people.


Naturally, we thought and continue to think that the issues must be solved by the Poles themselves, that the situation must not reach the stage where an intervention from outside ought to take place. [Such an intervention] would complicate the situation even more both in Poland and internationally. We are of the opinion that the Poles are in a position to solve the situation on their own, and we firmly declare for [the Poles] to be allowed to solve the situation by themselves. It is not less true, however, that – through the agency of certain elements – fairly strong support was lent from the outside to give rise to the existing situation, to the development of “Solidarity”. I contend, however, that the activity from the outside does not at all justify what happened in Poland. The Polish leadership is to blame for it. But, at the present time, the issue arises of not encouraging in any way whatsoever, and of not supporting – from the outside – the elements who question the socialist construction and the alliances Poland has because this means to push [things] towards an internal confrontation which can also have very serious consequences.


It is necessary for the Poles to search on their own for the required solutions, to reach an understanding between them, insuring however the socialist development, and – obviously – finding forms of democratic leadership, which would meet the requirements of the popular masses, and create not only the sentiment but the actual conditions for the Poles to participate in the leadership. I have the impression that some measures, including the ones connected with self-leadership, have already been taken. However, the Polish party and state should act with more determination, with more firmness, in the directions I have spoken about.


We feel that things are still complex. The state, the party, made too many concessions to the antisocialist forces in Poland, and now they have to reconquer their lost positions.


Of course, to the above-mentioned issues the problems of educational, political, and ideological work should be added, with everything they may imply. We do not think that, under the current circumstances, a national union with the “Solidarity” could offer a good solution. The union should be achieved with the workers and the peasants, not with “Solidarity”.


Naturally, we do not have the time now, and nobody has yet conducted, not even the Poles themselves, an analysis of the way things came to be as they currently are. And it would be difficult for us to do it in their place. As far as we know, these are only some of the aspects. We have always had good relationships with Poland; among other things, in 1939, when Poland was divided between Hitler and Stalin, the Polish army or what was left of it, passed through Romania. Even the current President of the Council of Ministers passed through Romania as a simple officer. But, starting from here, the Poles must be left to solve their problems on their own. They are now trying to accommodate “Solidarity”, but the latter should not be encouraged to head for an internal confrontation because this could lead to a very grave situation.
The problem now is: what is the ideological basis of this “Solidarity” movement?


I was and am an old trade union member. I have been that for fifty years. I know the trade union movements well. The church's intervention in the trade union movement has always had a downright reactionary character. It is difficult for us to accept the idea that, in the present circumstances, the Catholic Church may become a progressive force in the trade union movement when it has never been that. All the more is it not today.


Consequently, starting from the ideological basis of this movement – Walesa has never hidden the fact that [“Solidarity”] is being financed by the Catholic Church and that he has the Pope's blessing – we must see what its character is. It is difficult to speak about [“Solidarity”] as a movement whose real purpose is to improve and make perfect the socialist development. One cannot build socialism by using a cross! This was also the opinion of the first bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries. We must always have in mind the concrete situations and, for this reason, I said that one must take into account the realities in Poland, the powerful influence of the Catholic Church, as well as the fact that “Solidarity” knew how to take advantage of the Poles' national sentiment, something that the PUWP did not do, neglecting this sentiment.
These states of affairs were not understood by the Poles, in the sense of conducting a political, organizational activity; the problem is not taking adminis-trative measures since such issues cannot be solved administratively. They are very complex issues. To evaluate a social movement or other, one must ascertain the stances [the relevant movement] takes and who supports it. Only then will one be able to better understand the character of an action or other of the respective movement.


There are also lots of economic issues to solve in Poland. The fact is obvious that a thoroughly-devised plan of disorganizing economic life in Poland existed. It is not by accident that the present situation was arrived at; as from July last year, systematic actions aimed at disorganizing economic life in Poland have been undertaken. The Party and the government had to give first priority to the resumption of economic activity, the introduction of order and discipline in production as a condition for ensuring the further development of Poland in the socialist mould, along with all the other issues I talked about. In fact, coal produc-tion fell by sixty million tons. If this production were exported at the official price – and there is a high demand for coal – Poland would have enough financial means to pay its foreign debts in three to four years and ensure its economic development.


The problem is that the Poles should start working because without work nobody can ensure what is needed. Besides coal, Poland has other riches as well, it has a good enough industry which can also play an important role.


I would like to mention, only in passing, that at the meeting that took place in Moscow a year ago we said that the situation of Polish agriculture was the result of wrong agrarian policy, encouragement of private property, and neglect of the socialist sector in agriculture. This had a negative impact on economy in general, and on the provisioning of the population with the necessary products.


These are leadership issues: the creation of the democratic framework of participation of masses in the leadership of society; the issue of democratizing the economy and state leadership is also a requirement of socialist development.


At the Moscow meeting we also strongly insisted on these issues. The response to “Solidarity”'s actions should be the creation of workers' councils in the enterprises, the participation of the workers in the leadership of economic activity from top to bottom, and from bottom up.
This is our view on the issues in Poland.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
These, as I said before, are excerpts from three stenographic transcripts: the discussions I had with Serghey Kraigher, Lionel Jospin, and Bettino Craxi. Of course, I did not manage to look over the material; I want to finalize it with a view to discussing it at the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee on Tuesday.


I think, comrades, that we have to give guidance on the situation in Poland to our party, too. Naturally, new issues have appeared now, but the general appreciations are these. And, as I was informed, both the French and the Italian socialists appreciated this; they even held talks between them and said that this issue was raised. That is why I insisted on these issues [in my discussions with both the French and the Italian socialists].

Cde. Janos Fazekas :
You acted very well.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
[Bettino] Craxi himself said that the Pope was directly concerned with the situation in Poland and held meetings in Rome with the leaders of the Catholic Church.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Now we have to wait and see how things are going to develop in Poland.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
I spoke on the phone with our ambassador in Warsaw, and he let me know that at 9.00 local time, 10.00 our time, we were convened by cde. Jaru-zelski, who will make a briefing in regard to this issue.


Secondly, [our ambassador] told me that people go for a walk in Warsaw, the situation is normal, there is no fuss there, there is peace and calm.

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
Did you speak [with the ambassador] over the phone?

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
Yes, we have a direct “TO” telephone link with the embassies.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
In fact, they cut only the telephone links between citizens.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
Sincerely speaking, the Poles are accustomed to it, they like it.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
They cannot even live, they do not feel well if they do not have something like…

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Probably they could not catch them because they were not at work.


But let us wait and see what they will let the embassies know on that score.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
And they caught them all, at Gdansk; they were there because they wanted to organize a big demonstration on December 17.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
At any rate, the calm is not real, it is only on the surface.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
Were the “Solidarity” people at Gdansk?

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Of course they were.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
Actually, [the Polish authorities] proposed to catch them in Gdansk, and now they isolate them. Moreover, now they also installed military comissaries there.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
The real problem will emerge tomorrow, when work is resumed; they do not have problems on the streets. At any rate, they began it late…!

Cde. Ilie Verdet :
These problems are not new, they have existed for some time now.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
And not only these issues; in actual fact, everything that has happened in Poland lately contributed to this situation.

Cde. Ilie Verdet :
Of course; it is difficult to say all of these things now, [instead] they pro-ceeded to arrest these people and say that they are guilty.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
It is a political measure.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
In my view, there is also a political settling of accounts between them! They are afraid of a reorganization of the forces, of the party because they lost most of their trust and – as far as the news we have says – the trend existed for the older activists, the Communists, to try to remake the party on healthy bases, and they want to prevent this from happening. This also justifies the measures taken against old activists.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
These measures are known.

Cde. Ilie Verdet :
Our party active should know these issues.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
However, there is no state of war there.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
It is rather a “military state”; perhaps the translation was not good.

Cde. Constantin Olteanu :
Allow me to report, comrade General Secretary. The notions of “state of emergency” and “state of necessity” do not exist in the Polish Constitution, only the “state of war”.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
Consequently, this provides an explanation for the “state of war”!

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Yes, in their Constitution only “state of war” is stipulated. They declared that they “call for the union of the party and building socialism in Poland”. They are entitled to do everything.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
Of course they are! They have even installed military commissaries.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
They have also created the Military Council. The Plenary Session of the Polish United Workers' Party, which has taken place recently, decided to give exceptional powers to the State Council; the decree was approved at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the party.

Cde. Paul Niculescu :
As a matter of fact, at the Plenary Session that took place, [the authorities] also announced they would take firmer, more drastic, and even exceptional measures.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Consequently, that is about all regarding the problems. Let us see what they will have to say further. They do not seem to have thought about asking for help for the time being. Obviously, it all depends on how things evolve. We have to keep track of them!

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
It is clearly apparent from their declaration that they want to solve their problems on their own, and it would be better for them to do so.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
If they asked for help, they would ask for support first of all from their own country.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
Absolutely, and from their army as well.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
At the present moment, the army is the only force there, so they keep it in the forefront.

Cde. Paul Niculescu :
Not long ago, a delegation of theirs came here and the people acted as if they were afraid to speak, they were timorous.

Cde. Ludovic Fazekas :
They even said they did not know how they were going to resist.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
These are the issues for now. Let us see how things evolve.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
The comrades will bring along the material communicated by our ambassador right away.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
We must see the official declarations.


It is clearly apparent that things went from bad to worse there. That is why they took firmer measures. They wanted to force things.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
“Solidarity”, you mean.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Of course!

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
They even gave them the chance to organize their press as well, and to disorganize party life.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
They created their own center at Gdansk.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
Now they have bigger difficulties than they would have had if they had began the right way!

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
They took a number of measures, but they discontinued them.

Cde. Janos Fazekas :
Instead of concentrating [their efforts] against the counterblow, they set out to solve other issues.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
However, they sent armed forces there.

Cde. Ludovic Fazekas :
With money from the West.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
And the magazines they issued in thousands of copies.

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
In their party there existed the idea that the situation must be changed, and on the other hand they encouraged the others.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
However, if they do not draw political conclusions, they will not be able to solve these issues. Naturally, they will manage to establish order, but if they do not draw political conclusions regarding their position and their political-educational activity, they will not accomplish anything because, in fact, the greatest part of their party active agreed with [the existence of] “Solidarity”. They thought that by means of “Solidarity” they would have the Soviets draw conclusions and affirm their position. But this issue cannot be solved this way!


If they do not draw conclusions, a number of years will pass as these are issues of essence that the Polish society has not solved. And, as I have already said, the Catholic Church uses [these issues] against the party. Actually, it was not the party that represented Poland, but the Catholic Church.

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
Catholicism in Poland is very powerful. They will have issues that are com-plicated enough.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
They will take measures; they will close the factories and the schools and they will not have problems. As a matter of fact, all this issue is very much con- nected with history.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
At any rate, they made mistakes!

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
They neglected the Poles' national sentiment, which is very powerful, but which – in exchange – was exploited by the Catholic Church.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
Very much!

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
When you discuss with them, they say “no”, and in public they say otherwise. In fact, Poland was occupied several times, and there were lots of pro-blems.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
Four times.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
And these issues are certain to preoccupy [the Poles]. Moreover, they have the other problem: the border, and the ten million Poles who went abroad…

Cde. Janos Fazekas :
Fourteen million.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
…in their majority, to the United States of America; they have a powerful influence over all of the country.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
They should have carried out very intense ideological work.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Of course, but certain issues must be clarified. Actually, all of the issues regarding national independence and the other issues must be the party's issues, issues of state policy. If you let the Catholic Church deal with them, you will achieve nothing. That is why the Catholic Church has this autonomy. In fact, [Poland] is the country, where Catholic influence is the strongest; the situation in Poland with the Catholic Church and the Pope is somewhat similar to the situation in Iran with Islamism and Khomeini.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :


The most active Catholics are the Poles.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
And the most reactionary! In Italy the situation is different; the Italian Catholics have a more progressive position in various respects, but in Poland [the Catholics] took downright reactionary stances.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
Comrade Ceausescu, the briefing of the ambassadors by General Wojciech Jaruzelski is already over; our ambassador returned [to the embassy] and now he is drawing up his note. As soon as he finishes it, he will send it over.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
I want it brought here immediately!
Naturally, the positive thing is that they want to solve this issue by themselves. It is bad that this has happened now; they should have done it in the summer of 1980, it was then that they should have established order. If they called for help from abroad, they would alienate the popular masses.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
As a matter of fact, they manifest total hostility to the Germans as well. They tried to make some military exchanges and they had problems.

Cde. Paul Niculescu :
And to the Russians, too.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
However, the only ones who remain are the Russians, but this will cause problems.

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
Internationally.

Cde. Paul Niculescu :
First of all, internal problems.

Cde. Ilie Verdet :
And will bring grist to the others' mill.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
The Hungarians are not willing to go along. For example, recently, at the ordinary meeting of the Military Committee of the Ministers of Defense of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, the Hungarians refused to sign an Appeal.

Cde. Paul Niculescu :
What Appeal?

Cde. Ilie Verdet :
This fact is known.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
We discussed it within the framework of the Permanent Bureau of the Executive Political Committee; the comrades do not know it.
The Soviets wanted to introduce, in the general communiqué of this meeting, an appreciation [of the situation in] Poland, asserting that – since the security of socialist countries was in fact endangered – it was necessary to intervene [in Poland] so that security could be guaranteed. In fact, they wanted the intervention to be approved. Naturally, the other delegates agreed. We were against [the intervention], and the Hungarians said they had to ask what the opinion of their authorities at home was on that score.


It goes without saying that we told them we did not accept [the introduction of this clause] in the communiqué, and it was not accepted. They wanted then to issue a separate communiqué. The Hungarians then said that if the Romanian comrades did not sign as well, they would not sign either.

Cde. Paul Niculescu :
Great!

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
It is true that there the Soviet delegate mentioned what had happened [in Hungary], then the Hungarian delegate asked what he was to understand from this [reference] – he also hit the table with his fist – and said that ‘you hurt the feelings of the Hungarian people”, and other such things.

Cde. Constantin Olteanu :
The Hungarian delegate also declared that, by virtue of what the Hun-garians had learned from the events in 1956, they refused to sign this declaration.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
At any rate, foreign intervention has not been approved.

Cde. Petre Lupu :
Who would accept it? The Poles already have enough problems, they do not need another one.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Naturally, the Bulgarians can send a company or a battalion, but the Czechoslovaks cannot. Practically, only the Soviets remain. The East Germans do not want to send troops.

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
We should also issue these communiqués in the press.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Have we issued any news so far?

Cde. Eugen Florescu :
To date, comrade General Secretary, we have not issued anything.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
What we were supposed to issue this morning, at 6.00. We can issue a news item now.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Let us also issue a news item on the radio and on TV. We must broadcast this part “that they took measures” as well, and everything they say here.

Cde. Cornel Burtica :
Let us issue a news item of the Polish press agency.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
We must say that, speaking on the radio and on TV, General Jaruzelski broadcast the following official communiqué, and we issue this part. Comrade Popescu should see it, too.

Cde. Elena Ceausescu :
Let us see what our ambassador transmits from the meeting he had, what communications he received.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Naturally. We must wait a little more. Has their agency transmitted anything?

Cde. Stefan Bârlea :
The “PAP” agency has not transmitted anything.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
We will see what happens later.
In fact, all this problem in Poland is also a direct result of the contradictions between the Americans and the Soviets.

Cde. Gheorghe Radulescu :
That is correct. You are right, this is the main issue.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
The Americans want to use the “Polish issue” to cause trouble to the Soviets. They are interested. They even admit that they want to cause trouble, “to maintain this state of affairs”.


Some more information has come from Poland now. Actually, it is the same information we received this morning.

Cde. Stefan Andrei :
They said that only a radio station and a TV station would broadcast.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Am I to understand that we have not broadcast anything so far?

Cde. Eugen Florescu :
Yes.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
When is the first broadcast to take place?

Cde. Eugen Florescu :
At 13.00 hrs; in accordance with what you said, we will broadcast only a short news item about Jaruzelski's declaration.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :
Consequently, it was only this morning that they made an announcement about the measures they had taken last night. They first took the measures, and afterwards announced them.


Cde Constantin Olteanu:
May I report, Comrade General Secretary, that foreign press agencies started to broadcast last night; we got the first news from 2:30 a.m.


Cde Tudor Postelnicu:
"AFP".


Cde Janos Fazekas:
In fact, "Solidarity" gave a first report by December 17, when they were going to carry out a coup.

Cde Paul Niculescu :
They beat them to it.

Cde Nicolae Ceausescu:
They gave them a lot of time, they armed and organized themselves. Measures should have been taken much earlier.


For the time being, comrades, we do not take any measures. Sure, take the necessary measures and let us attend to our own business.


And we will see what might happen. Now, the meeting is over.

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