June 05, 1951
Ciphered Telegram No. 3410, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

Citation:

Summary:
Telegram from Stalin to Mao encouraging a prolonging of the war and giving advice on the conduct of operations against allied troops.

Original Language:
Russian

Contents:
- English Translation
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3410

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG

I received your telegram of June 4, and also the two directives of Comrade Peng Dehuai.

I also think, as do you, that the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of the Anglo-American troops.

In my telegram I wrote mainly about the fact that it is risky to conduct maneuvers if there are no strong defensive fortifications in the rear, to which the main forces could be quickly withdrawn. Comrade Peng Dehuai writes that he is creating three defensive lines in the rear. If this is done and the defensive lines are truly serious, then the affair will proceed in a better way and the troops will not fall into encirclement.

You complain that you have little artillery, antitank guns and other arms. I communicated to you two months ago that the Poles have retracted their orders and we therefore could make for you additional deliveries of arms in this year, thus increasing the volume of military credit for 1951. Comrade Zhou Enlai welcomed this report of mine and told us that you will soon send new applications. However, there are no new applications from you. Why is this? How is this explained? Again I communicate to you that we could make new deliveries of artillery for you if you want this.

Comrade Peng Dehuai is right that it is necessary to strengthen the operations of partisan detachments in the enemy’s rear. This is absolutely necessary.

Comrade Peng Dehuai writes about the presence of a relatively high fighting spirit among the Anglo-American troops, and about the fact that "serious rightist moods" have appeared among the Chinese troops. In my opinion this is explained by the fact that your local maneuvers with some forward advance but then a falling back, repeated several times, create among your troops the impression of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, but create among the Anglo-American troops the impression of their might. I fear that this situation can undermine the spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will not be possible to crush these unhealthy moods unless you prepare and carry out a serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of three to four enemy divisions. This would lead to a serious turnaround in the moods of the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Anglo-American troops. This, of course, will not be broad and far from being an offensive, will be only a serious short blow against the enemy, but this will be the kind of blow that will sober up the enemy and raise the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. Moreover this would give you the possibility of undertaking then wider and more successful local maneuvers needed to exhaust the enemy.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 297/sh

5 June 1951