September 15, 1978
'Congressional consultations on Pakistan,' State Department cable 235372 to US Embassy Vienna

Citation:

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112842

Summary:

Plans for meetings with Congress members to discuss resuming aid to Pakistan. Talking points include the cancellation of the French reprocessing plant deal and the importance of Pakistan's position in the Middle East. Also includes discussion of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, technical capabilities, and the United States' efforts to block their nuclear development.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY).

Original Language:

English

Contents:

- Scan of Original Document
SECRET

RELEASING IN FULL

PAGE 01

STATE 235372

ORIGIN NODIS-S0

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

COPY 5 OF 15 COPIES

DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:MHORN:MBLOW:DOM

APPROVED BY P:DNESOM

T/O: JNYE

OES: MGUHIN

INR: RGAULUCCI

L: RSLDOAN

PM/NPP: GSUCHAN

NSC: TTHORNTON

EUR/WE: MLISSFELT

EA: RSULLIVAN - S/S-O:RCASTRODAL

DECAPTIONED

O R 152346Z SEP 78 ZFFS

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: AMBASSAD: VIENNA IMMEDIATE

INFO: AMBASSAD: PARIS

AMBASSAD: ISLAMABAD

WHITE HOUSE 0000

SECRET

STATE 235372

NODIS

USIAEA, FOR AMB, SMITH FROM NEWSOM

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1

TAGS: IAEA, TECH, AU, FR, PK

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON PAKISTAN

1. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS ALL

ASPECTS OF US-PAK RELATIONS AND HAVE DECIDED TO PROCEED

WITH CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS DESPITE FRENCH INABILITY

to give us official assurances of cancellation. ART HUMMEL,
SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT O HOMME

DATE/CASE ID: 28 DEC 2010  201000057
SECRET

PAGE 92

STATE 235372

JOE NYE AND I PLAN TO MEET WITH GLENN AND ZABLOCKI EARLY NEXT WEEK. AFTER THESE MEETINGS WE WILL HOPEFULLY BE IN A POSITION TO SCHEDULE FURTHER MEETINGS ON THE HILL.

2. THURSDAY MORNING (SEPT 14) I MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL THE CONCERNED OFFICES TO REVIEW TALKING POINTS FOR THE GLENN/ZABLOCKI MEETINGS. ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS COULD BE USED FOR THE GLENN/ZABLOCKI MEETINGS. A MODIFIED VERSION OF THESE TALKING POINTS WOULD BE USED FOR MEETINGS WITH OTHER SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN. PLEASE REVIEW THESE POINTS AND LET ME HAVE YOUR COMMENTS BY OPENING OF BUSINESS MONDAY (SEPT 18). (Comment attached)

TALKING POINTS FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH GLENN AND ZABLOCKI

-- WE'VE BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY FOR WELL OVER A YEAR WITH BOTH THE FRENCH AND PAKISTANIS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT.

-- I AM NOW HAPPY TO REPORT ON A SUBSTANTIAL STEP FORWARD TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING PAKISTAN FROM ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. WE ARE NOW SATISFIED THAT THE FRENCH WILL NOT GO FORWARD WITH THEIR CONTRACT AND THAT NO SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT FOR THE PLANT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TRANSFERRED.

-- WE BELIEVE OUR LOW-PROFILE IN WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT (DURING THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS) HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OUR ABILITY TO COOPERATE WITH THEM ON OTHER IMPORTANT NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. IT COULD SEVERELY EMBARRASS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IF WE WERE SEEN SECRET.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

PAGE 03  STATE 235372

TO BE TAKING CREDIT FOR WHAT IS THEIR DECISION.

-- (IF ASKED ABOUT ASSURANCES: FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL
REASONS NEITHER THE FRENCH NOR PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS
WISH TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT OF CANCELLATION, AND WE
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN TERMS OF OUR
RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES TO TRY TO HAVE THEM DO SO.)

-- WE HAVE COME TO DISCUSS WITH YOU HOW WE CAN NOW GO
FORWARD TO RESTORE A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN IS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY AND
THAT WE HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE REGION. THE
SITUATION IN IRAN IS WORRISSOME AND AFGHANISTAN CONSTIT-
UTES A SERIOUS DEStABILIZING FACTOR. INTERNALLY
PAKISTAN IS A DEEPLY TROUBLED LAND. THE BHUTTO PROBLEM
HANGS LIKE A SHADOW OVER THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE.
PAKISTAN FEELS THREATENED BOTH FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT.
A DISINTEGRATING OR RADICALIZED PAKISTAN COULD DIRECTLY
THREATEN OUR MAJOR INTERESTS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

-- PAKISTAN SEES HERSELF SURROUNDED BY UNFRIENDLY OR
UNSTABLE STATES, AND IS LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE WILL
AND ABILITY OF THE US, OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND
CENTO TO PROVIDE SECURITY DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOTH OUR NON-PROLIFERATION
INTERESTS AND OUR BROADER REGIONAL CONCERNS, WE BELIEVE
IT IMPORTANT TO MOVE FORWARD TO RESTORE MORE NORMAL
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN NOW THAT THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF
THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT IS BEHIND US. WE BELIEVE
THAT A RESUMPTION OF AID AND LIMITED MILITARY SALES
COULD GIVE US SOME INFLUENCE ON GOP POLICIES,
AND PERHAPS RELIEVE SOME OF THE TENSION AND SENSE OF
SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

PAGE 44     STATE 235372

ISOLATION WHICH GIVE PAKISTAN GREATER INCENTIVE TO MOVE COVERTLY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

-- AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, CANCELLATION OF THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. NEVERTHELESS, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE ON THE REPROCESSING PLANT DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PAKISTAN AS A POTENTIAL PROLIFERATOR. I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR THINKING AS WE LOOK BEYOND THIS IMPORTANT MILESTONE.

-- THE MOTIVATING FORCE FOR A NUCLEAR OPTION REMAINS UNDIMINISHED -- NAMELY THE FEAR OF INUTA AND PAKISTAN'S DESIRE TO COMPENSATE FOR A PERCEIVED INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. IN RECENT MONTHS, PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE BEEN HEIGHTENED BY THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION WHICH HAS LED TO INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN KABUL. PAKISTAN IS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY INSTABILITY IN IRAN.

-- AWARE OF PAKISTAN'S STRONG MOTIVATION, WE HAVE BEEN MONITORING THE SITUATION VERY CAREFULLY AND, I MIGHT ADD, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THIS WILL FOCUS NOT ONLY ON ANY INDOGENOUS EFFORT AT REPROCESSING, BUT ON OTHER AREAS AS WELL.

-- WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN CAN OBTAIN SENSITIVE ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT. YOU MAY HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT POSSIBLE CHINESE ASSISTANCE BUT WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY THE CHINESE THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION TO DO SO.

WE HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN A STUDY OURSELVES OF PAKISTAN CAPABILITY TO PROCEED WITH THE PLANT ON ITS OWN, AND

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

PAGE 95    STATE 235372

WE DO NOT THINK THEY HAVE THE TECHNICAL SKILLS AND
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY TO COMPLETE THE FRENCH PROJECT
IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- WE RECENTLY OBTAINED SOME EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN IS
LOOKING INTO THE GAS CENTRIFUGE PROCESS WHICH COULD,
OF COURSE, PERMIT THEM TO PRODUCE HIGHLY ENRICHED
URANIUM. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN SHOPPING AROUND FOR
SOME EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN THE CENTRIFUGE
PROCESS.

-- WE ARE STILL ANALYZING THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION,
BUT THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN ANY CENTRIFUGE EFFORT
ARE ENORMOUS AND WE BELIEVE WE CAN CONTROL THIS THROUGH
NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS. WE ARE WORKING WITH
OTHER SUPPLIERS TO RESTRICT PAKISTANI PURCHASES OF
ITEMS WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN A CENTRIFUGE OR OTHER
PROGRAMS.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR
FIELD BEAR CLOSE WATCHING AND WE NEED TO PURSUE POLICIES
WHICH DEAL BOTH WITH PAKISTAN'S MOTIVATION AND WITH ITS
CAPABILITIES TO PURSUE THE NUCLEAR OPTION IF IT SO
CHOSES.

-- WE WILL MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
PAKISTAN THAT OUR SUPPORT -- ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR
OTHERWISE -- IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PAKISTAN
WILL NOT ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. WE WILL,
OF COURSE, EXPLAIN TO THEM ALL RELEVANT LEGISLATION. WE
WILL ALSO SEEK TO AT LEAST MITIGATE PAKISTANI MOTIVATION
BY ATTEMPTING TO MOVE INDIA TO ACCEPTING FULL-SCOPE
SAFEGUARDS AND BY SUPPORTING A SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FREE ZONE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

PAGE 06   STATE 235372

-- IN SUM, WE THINK IT IS IN US NATIONAL INTEREST TO
RESTORE OUR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, A CRITICAL COUNTRY
IN AN UNSTABLE REGION. THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS
SHARE THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF LIMITING NUCLEAR PROLIFERA-
TION. WE THINK WE HAVE A GREATER CHANCE OF DEALING
EFFECTIVELY WITH THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN THE LONG RUN IF
WE NECKT OUR TIES WITH PAKISTAN, AS WE KNOW, IN THE
CASE OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MOTIVATION TOWARD A
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION, SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA, TAIWAN,
SOUTH KOREA, WE HAVE TO CONINUOUSLY WORK ON THE
PROBLEM IN A VARIETY OF WAYS AND THIS WE FULLY INTEND
TO DO.

-- WE THINK THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE COURSE WOULD HEIGHTEN
PAK INSECURITY, GIVE THEM GREATER MOTIVATION TO GO IT
ALONE IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD AND WOULD NOT SERVE OUR
GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE REGION. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED
PAK TALKING POINTS SEEM FINE. IN THIRD PARA I'D STRIKE "DURING THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS". WE HAVE LAID LOW FOR A YEAR. I BRIEFED ZABLOCKI'S COMMITTEE ON NON-PROLIF ISSUES LAST FALL AND ASKED THEM NOT TO ASK ABOUT PAKISTAN. THEY RESPECTED THIS REQUEST. I SUGGEST YOU COMMEND THEM AND SAY HOW HELPFUL THIS CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINT HAS BEEN. SMITH