EAST GERMAN REPORT ON THE ELEVENTH INTERKIT MEETING IN POLAND, JUNE 1980CITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationReport from the East German representatives on the 11th Interkit meeting held in Poland. This was the first meeting attended by the Vietnamese."East German Report on the Eleventh Interkit Meeting in Poland, June 1980," June, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Foundation Archives of Parties and Mass Organisations of the GDR in the Federal Archives (SAPMO-BA) DY 30, IV B 2/20/593. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113307
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About the 11th Internal China Meeting of Delegations from Central Committees of BCP, SED, PCC, MPRP, PUWP, CPSU, CPC, HSWP, and VWP
The eleventh internal China meeting took place from 11 to 13 June 1980 in Mierki [Marki] (PR Poland).
For the first time the VWP was officially represented at such a meeting, after it had already participated in two operative working meetings on the Chinese question by representatives of the fraternal parties.
The meeting adopted a protocol transcript (Appendix #1 [not included]), recommendations for propagandistic and scientific work, and the analytical material “China on the Eve of the XII CCP Party Congress.”
At the meeting the proposal by the Vietnamese comrades was approved to also invite representatives from the CC of the Laotian Revolutionary People's Party in the future to internal meetings on the Chinese question.
In the context of the meeting in Mierki there also was an exchange of opinions by heads of delegations on some current issues of international developments.
At the meeting the following characteristic elements of China's current phase of domestic and foreign policy were analyzed, under special consideration of the upcoming XII CCP Party Congress.
1. The Chinese leadership has turned to an alliance with the imperialist states as a strategy for the long haul.
Most significant is a comprehensive expansion of relations with the U.S. that recently have seen increasing military cooperation. After the United States it is Japan that has become the most important country in Chinese foreign policy considerations. Not only is Japan China's largest trading partner; Chinese leadership also makes efforts to use Japan in order to achieve its own dominant position in the Asian region. Among the Western European imperialist countries the Chinese leaders are viewing primarily the FRG as a promising partner in the struggle against the Soviet Union and the fraternal countries. China's modernization program is based on a rapid expansion of economic relations with all imperialist states.
At the same time, our meeting also noted the contradictions regarding relations between Chinese leadership and imperialism; and it underlined the need to exploit these contradictions from the side of the fraternal countries.
2. A certain domestic regime consolidation has created new material foundations and opportunities to realize China's hegemonic course.
Strongly pressured by objective realities, chauvinistic-pragmatic forces have prevailed in China's leadership. They introduced steps to adapt the mechanism of political power to requirements for the “Four Modernizations,” and thus to the perfection of this mechanism, to the regulation of the economy, and to the forced development of military-economic potential with the assistance of imperialism. All that objectively impacted the current situation in the country in a stabilizing fashion.
Yet this stabilization is neither deep nor permanent. The decisive cause for the political crises and upheavals in society has not been eliminated. The current leadership was not even able to implement its political line within the party itself. Conflicts within the leadership about the course of the “Four Modernizations,” and how to evaluate the results from the “Cultural Revolution” and Mao's ideological legacy, are increasing again. There is a possibility that the political situation in the country might be deeply influenced by ongoing activities of ultra-leftist Maoist forces, or those other forces pushing into the bourgeois direction. In the long term, the course of “Four Modernizations” can turn into a source for new political crises. In such a process the spontaneous ant-Maoist current in the country will further expand and organize itself.
3. Beijing has expanded the frame for its intended united global front against the Soviet Union. It is undertaking efforts to include parties with nationalist or opportunistic positions.
This way Beijing undertakes a new attempt to split the international communist movement and to cover up its policy of open collaboration with imperialism. To the subsequently resulting danger to the communist movement the fraternal parties react with patient and smart cooperation on a principled basis, even toward those parties targeted by Beijing through its splittist activity.
4. Modernization of Maoism has adopted a visibly radical character. This way the current Chinese leadership is carving out for itself new opportunities for ideological collaboration with imperialism and opportunism against Marxism-Leninism and real socialism.
As a result of 20 years of Maoist rule and policy there exists a deep crisis of confidence in China. Among the people and within the party political-ideological indifference is on the rise. Against this background, a dangerous ideological pragmatism represented mainly by Deng Xiaoping and his supporters is growing. Not only do these forces implement under the guideline “Practice as Criterion for Truth” a far-reaching correction of Maoism's ultra-leftist ideology, they also de facto advocate further abandonment of Marxist-Leninist principles. In this context “Sinicized Marxism”, as it was declared as the foundation for the party's actions already at the VII CCP Party Congress of 1945, is raising its head again. This is also where the so-called rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi comes in. It is not the development of socialism's social quality that is important for Deng and his supporters but the material-technological conditions to realize their hegemonic objectives.
5. The splittist policy by Chinese leaders toward the socialist countries today consists of a variation of methods of direct pressure and military threat on one hand, and more refined methods on the other in order to arrive at relations with individual countries except for the USSR. Through the growing Chinese military potential and military cooperation with imperialism the threat of direct military action by China against its socialist neighbors is increasing (USSR, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Laos). Beijing is making assurances that its struggle against the Soviet Union does not necessarily have to impact development of normal bilateral relations with the socialist countries.
In his opening statement PUWP CC Secretary Comrade Jerzy Wasczuk stressed how, in the light of imperialism's current attempts to launch a counter-attack on the positions of socialism, issues and results of our meeting and the arrival at jointly held positions are of special importance.
The CPSU CC delegation leader, Comrade O. B. Rakhmanin, defined in his presentation the current stage of development of Maoism and the Chinese leaders' policy, as well as its subsequent dangers for the global correlation of forces. Due to Beijing's policy the current bilateral relations between the USSR and China are at a stage of confrontation. This makes it impossible for the Soviet Union to surpass its repeated proposals for normalization. For Beijing the USSR is the main enemy. This is not just a verbal statement but a daily dangerous practice.
The Soviet comrades made the main contribution to the meeting, both during preparations as well as during the final editing process of the materials adopted.
The head of the PWV delegation based his statement on the Chinese aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and its impact on all aspects of social life in China and on the Beijing leadership's policy.
Southeast Asia remains the main direction of Beijing's expansionist policy. A new military aggression against the SRV, as well as military actions against Laos, cannot be excluded. He stated that the reactionary policy by China's rulers has resulted in a destabilization of the country's political life.
The head of the PCC delegation noted that the Cuban CC was not able to discuss a thorough positioning on prepared meeting materials since it received them too late. She advocated a closer coordination by fraternal parties of their policy toward the PR China. She also demanded a more exact collective analysis of what can be understood of Maoism today, in particular as an ideology.
The head of the CCP delegation spoke out directly against positions advocating an option of influencing the positions of Beijing's leaders by maintaining a minimal level of party relations with the CCP and expanding bilateral state relations. Our fraternal parties ought to make it clear to the Beijing leadership that we are unwilling to follow either the Romanian or the Yugoslav path regarding establishment of relations with the PR China.
He noted how imperialism and Beijing' leaders meet in their objectives to create conflict spots near the borders of the countries of real socialism.
The Chinese leadership would not succeed in consolidating and stabilizing the situation in...
The HSWP delegation leader assessed further activation of China's role in the communist world movement and international democratic organizations to be expected, and it would create another front of conflict. He demanded closer coordination on these matters.
The MPRP delegate dealt extensively with national problems confronting Mongolia by the policy of the Beijing leadership concerning Inner Mongolia.
The head of the BCP delegation underlined the need to unmask through respective propaganda the unity in action between imperialism and Maoism. On the other hand he also proposed to devote major attention to scientific work to research contradictions between imperialism and Maoism.
The statement by the PUWP representative outlined how China's economic situation is far from a state of stability.
Following the suggestions by Comrade Hermann Axen, our delegation was represented through the delivery a general statement, working in the editing commission, and by talks with representatives of the fraternal parties. In particular the following issues were emphasized:
- It is necessary to conduct a thorough and sober analysis of the situation in China and the ongoing changes there. Based on that, our delegation stressed the prevailing tendency of temporary stabilization of the domestic situation before a background of still unresolved problems in society, and subsequently in continuing intensive conflicts.
- When confronting Beijing's course, it is important to always eye the overall policy of our community. The statement by the SED delegation made clear how it is indispensable to solve these questions: What opportunities of active countervailing against Beijing's foreign policy course do we have? Regarding impact on China's domestic developments: Do the fraternal parties actually have such impact, and how can they put it to use? In the wake of a changed domestic situation and the dominant position of capitalist countries on the Chinese market we must take into consideration the political aspect of our economic relations with China. We have to conduct deliberations as to how the currently shrunk percentage of trade between CMEA countries and China can be at least maintained.
- In close correlation with this question, we have to discuss our approach to communist parties that are taking positions of deviation from basic [Marxist-Leninist] positions on a couple of issues and are establishing contacts with Beijing with increasing quantity. Due to objections by the SED, the term “Euro-Asiatic opportunism” was deleted from the drafts prepared. Instead there was an orientation toward continuing patient and principled work with the communist and workers parties on the Chinese question.
- Together with the emphasis on growing danger to peace and social progress by an alliance China-United States-Japan (in which Western Europe and particular the FRG are increasingly going to be included), we must also analyze and define problems and contradictions existing between these different forces. We have to exploit those in our policy of countervailing in both comprehensive and targeted fashion.
- Our delegation stressed that scientific-theoretical work in our countries on current China policy must primarily focus on changes in China, including on respective aspects in policy and ideology of Chinese leaders since the death of Mao Zedong.
In the editing commission our delegation submitted a number of proposals for amendments. The majority of them were accepted for both the protocol transcript and the analytic material. They pertained to an emphasis on relative stabilization, to the term of Euro-Asiatic opportunism, and to partial deletion of a phrase on differentiation policy in the protocol transcript (Appendix #2 [not included]).
Not in every case the meeting succeeded to reach consensus on amendments for protocol transcript and analytic material, like for instance regarding Chinese policy of differentiation toward the socialist countries (see Appendix #2 [not included]). Our proposals to present deeper evidence for characterizing the economic situation in China (Thesis #10), as well as to use the economic situation as a starting point in the passages on domestic policy, were not accepted.
In its recommendations for propagandistic activity the meeting listed, among other things, the following points:
- Portraying the dangers for peace stemming from Beijing's parallel actions with U.S. aggressive circles and the imperialist countries, as well as their extension of mutual military relations;
- Decisive support of positions held by Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, and Mongolia—all of which are subject to threats and attempts of blackmail by the Beijing leadership;
- Unmasking of Beijing's dangerous subversive actions, as well as of the American-Chinese conspiracy toward the countries in Southeast, South, and West Asia, in particular concerning Afghanistan and Kampuchea;
- Unmasking of Beijing's hegemonism and its practical effects toward developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement;
- Criticism of Maoism's latest modification that is still based on great-power chauvinism, anti-Sovietism, and hostility toward global socialism.
Concerning future scientific research, the necessity was emphasized for perfecting the coordination on the most important problems of China's current situation, and for continuing Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of Chinese events, and of the causes for the current course of the CCP leadership. This pertains to the following main areas:
- Character, main phases, and perspectives of social evolution in the PR China, in particular since Mao's death;
- China and its role in the world.
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