Skip to content

July 18, 1949

Cable, Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong

关于中共中央代表团与联共(布)中央斯大林会谈情况给中央的电报

( 一九四九年七月十八日)

 

中央、毛主席:

(一)在我们将书面报告[1]及若干材料送给联共中央斯大林以后,午真[2]晚十时联共政治局在克里姆林宫开会,我们[3]及柯瓦洛夫[4]参加,师哲[5]翻译。到斯大林、莫洛托夫、马林可夫、贝利亚、米高扬、卡甘诺维赤、布尔加宁、什维尔尼克[6],另列席索柯洛夫斯基[7],参谋总长,海军元帅。首由斯大林说明几个政治局委员已去休养,另有几个军人参加,因中国代表团报告中提到一些军事问题。斯大林首先问我们:海军中有无自己的军官?空军中有无自己的飞行员?各省有无省政府?各省政府及东北等区域的政府是否服从将来的中央政府?将来中央政府是否有权力批准与撤换各省及各区域政府的主要人员?以毛泽东为中央政府主席,主席是否等于总统?主席与内阁的关系怎样?又问什么是官僚资本?买办资本是否包括在官僚资本之内?当我们答复了上述各项问题之后,斯大林即展开对于中国民族资产阶级的说明,并答解我们在报告中所提出的各项问题,最后在我们请求之下对目前国际形势亦有所说明。其他同志发言甚少,会议十分严肃。会后,斯大林并问我们生活是否舒适,由所有到会人员和我们一起看电影,斯大林亲自选择四个影片放映,并在放映时亲自向我们加以若干解释。

(二)在会议中组织了一个借款条约的共同起草委员会,联共方面由米高扬及柯瓦洛夫参加,中共方面由我们三人[8]参加,并决定借款条约由高岗同志代表东北政府签字,因这样对联共在手续上较为适合,便于联共将条约提交最高苏维埃批准,早日付款。[9]关于斯大林对我们在报告中所提出及当时口头提出的各项问题之答复,综合报告如下:

A.关于中共对中国民族资产阶级的问题

斯大林说:你们与民族资产阶级合作并吸收他们参加政府的观点,是正确的。中国的民族资产阶级与东欧各国及德国的资产阶级不一样,那些国家的资产阶级在战争中与希特勒合作,自己污辱了自己,后又与希特勒一起撤退,只留下他们的企业,因而在反希特勒胜利后,那些国家所要处理的,只是他们的企业,而不是他们本人。但中国的民族资产阶级则不同,他们在对日作战时未投降日本,后来又未与日一起撤退,日本投降后其中一部分虽在蒋介石支持下企图与美国建立关系,想取得美国援助,但中美通商航海条约[10]订立,对中国资产阶级不独在经济上而且在航运上是极不利的,这是对中国资产阶级很大的打击,于是中国资产阶级反对美国和蒋介石。蒋介石与美国的关系,不同于中国资产阶级与美国的关系。中共利用中国资产阶级的反美情绪,与他们建立比较长期合作的政策,是正确的。为了使中国民族资产阶级站在反对帝国主义的阵营内——这是需要的,就要制订一种对资产阶级也有利的政策,例如关税保护政策,使帝国主义廉价的商品不能在中国倾销,对民族资产阶级是有利的,使青年的国家工业也可逐渐发展起来,这是两利的。俄国十月革命时没收了几乎全部的私人资本家的企业,故实行了对外贸易的垄断政策,在中国,目前实行对外贸易的垄断是很困难的,而应实行关税保护政策。

劳资间的矛盾,是客观存在的,罢工会要发生,我们暂时不要扩大劳资斗争,但工人斗争可能使我们与资产阶级的合作发生困难,为了使工人斗争不致破坏我们与资产阶级的合作,应当要资本家与工人订立合同,在合同上使工人利益得到保障,要说服资本家变为文明的照顾工人利益的资本家,使我们与资产阶级的合作能比较长期的继续。

B.关于人民民主专政问题

斯大林说:你们实行人民民主专政的政体,是对的。你们引述斯大林在1926年所说的中国未来的革命政权是偏重于反对帝国主义的政权[11],也是对的。在我们答复中央政府的主席团及主席团与内阁关系(即主席团是集体的总统,内阁服从主席团,为中央政府的执行机关)问题之后,斯大林说:这个制度可能对于目前的中国是很适当的。在我们答复各区域(例如东北)及各省政府服从中央政府,中央政府有权力批准和撤换各区域及各省选举的政府负责人之后,斯大林说:你们目前不实行过分的中央集权的观点,是对的。其意就是说,在地方政府服从中央政府的条件之下,不要实行过分的中央集权。但斯大林很注意地方政府和中央政府分裂现象之可能发生。又,我们在报告中没有提到买办资产阶级,斯大林问到买办资本是否包括在官僚资本之内,似乎很注意不要把买办资产阶级与民族资产阶级混淆起采。

C.关于外交问题

斯大林认为我们在报告中所说的几项外交原则,是对的。这些原则就是与各帝国主义国家斗争,与苏联及各新民主国家合作,利用各资本主义国家的矛盾,发展中国与各国特别与苏联及东欧各国的通商贸易。对于各帝国主义国家在中国的投资及企业,斯大林说:可以用劳动法,要各外国企业严格实行劳动法的办法和他们斗争。目前不要没收各帝国主义的在华经济事业,其他办法也不忙采取,等一等再看。关于是否要争取各帝国主义国家早日承认中国新政府问题,斯大林说:你们不要急于要求各帝国主义国家承认,以便加以观察,了解情况,看他们表现如何。你们有很好的法宝,就是帝国主义要和你们做买卖。帝国主义国家的经济危机已经开始了。我想列强很快就会要承认你们的,你们可以先和他们做好买卖,再谈承认问题。

D.关于中苏关系问题

斯大林说:中国政府一成立,苏联立即就承认你们。关于中苏条约[12],他说:在与毛泽东交换电报中已有过声明,说这个条约是不平等的,因那时与国民党打交道,不能不如此。美国在日驻兵很多,蒋介石又勾结美国,苏联在旅顺驻兵是抵制美蒋武装力量的自由行动,保护苏联,同时也保护中国革命的利益。当时联共中央内部已有决定,即在对日和约订立、美国从日本撤兵后,苏联可以考虑即从旅顺撤兵。如果中共认为要苏联从旅顺立即撤兵,以便中共在政治上有更多的回旋余地,苏联军队现在就可以从旅大撤退。斯大林认为,我们在报告中所提出的处理中苏条约的三个方案(全部继承或重新签订或声明等一时期重新签订),都用不着,等毛泽东来莫斯科时解决这个问题。关于中国与东欧各国的关系,斯大林说,你们可以与东欧各国谈判,苏联可以帮助,但最好你们直接谈判。并说:捷克以及波兰、匈牙利、罗马尼亚都可以供给你们商品,帮助你们,你们可以勇敢地和他们谈判。关于联共与中共关系问题,斯大林说:你们在报告中说中共服从联共决定,这使我们觉得奇怪,一个国家的党服从另一个国家的党,这是从来没有过的,而且是不许可的。两党都要向自己的人民负责,有问题互相商量,有困难互相帮助,谈不到哪一个服从哪一个。密切两党的联系,是对的,今天在政治局会议上就是一种联系。关于毛泽东来莫斯科问题,斯大林说:中国政府成立,两国关系建立后,毛即可以来,如毛还不便来,苏联可派代表团到中国去。

E.其他问题

1、关于新疆问题,斯大林说:因为在新疆无着陆场,空运军队到新疆,还无办法,至于派战斗机帮助打马家骑兵[13],那很简单,可派一个团四五十架飞机,开始由苏联飞行员驾驶,以后由中国飞行员驾驶。在看电影时,斯大林说:在二次大战中骑兵作用不大,因骑兵怕飞机,目标很大,很易被打散。

2、关于大连问题,斯大林说:可要东北与大连苏联同志商量解决。大连政权应与东北政权统一。在各国未承认中国政府、对日和约未订立以前,大连港口应为中苏两国所利用。

3、我们曾要求在莫斯科办一中国大学,收学生一千人以下,为中国训练建设与管理人才,斯大林说:这是好事,有困难,但可以办。

4、斯大林自己提出从外蒙[14]库伦建筑铁路到张家口(因安得列夫[15]在西柏坡时有人提出此议)问题,他说:这是好事,可以办。我们问:可否建立一条铁路由陕西经新疆到苏联?斯说:太长,不如先建立油管要便宜三倍。斯大林又说:你们如果有茶叶、桐油、大米、钨砂、猪鬃及其他植物油,我们都需要。并说:你们要扩大棉田,提高棉产,为此,你们要逐渐使用农业机器,才好提高棉产。

5、斯大林说:可以帮我们在旅顺办一海军学校,并帮我们建立海防。斯大林又问我们,苏联是否可派电影团到我们前线帮我们拍照?他们在电影技术上可帮我们。我们答复可以,并说曾有一电影团到林彪[16]司令部。斯说:因他们在那里搞得不好,我们撤回来了。我们说请再派去,可以把关系搞好。斯说:他们拍照影片的内容,可完全依照你们的意见办。

()关于国际形势,在我们提出问题后,斯大林答复如下:对目前国际形势的估计,主要一点,就是会不会爆发战争?从国际间的各种条件看,即从经济条件,从美国对战争的准备(帝国主义对战争尚未准备好)来看,现在与苏联进行战争,对帝国主义者是不利的,照历史发展的正常规律说,目前不应该有战争。但历史上有冒险家,有精神失常的人,所以爆发战争的可能性仍是有的。我们对此有准备。目前帝国主义进攻苏联的力量不足,他们正在进行准备,他们并用原子弹来恐吓,但我们也在准备,我们比他们准备得更快些。

有的冒险家、精神失常的人宣传说:苏联军队要在美国登陆;另外一些人也就相信这种说法,所以可能产生冒险家的。例如美国的国防部长福来斯特尔,他虽然死去,也还可能产生这种人的,发生战争的可能性,是不能除外的。

们问:苏联与英美之间目前存在的各项重要问题是否可能获得妥协的解决?斯大林答复说:这是很难的。若干次要问题可能解决,而重要的问题则很难解决。待以后再看。

们现在对反动派是进行着孤立他们的政策,用各种群众团体、各种会议,在各国、同样也在美国,进行揭露和宣传斗争,其作用很大,以后还要继续这样作。

今天美国政府及其政策,是使问题不能得到解决的。

美国有些人想与苏联搞好关系,但他们不当权。美国将来如有新的政府、新的政策,也许美苏关系可以改善的。

马歇尔计划[17]经破产,美国在德国的影响已缩小,自己污辱了自己,战争的可能性在那里已缩小。

如果帝国主义要打,就打,他们使用原子弹,我们也使用原子弹。

美国人自己并不想打仗,总想用别人的手替他们打仗,他们也公开地这样说,但愿意替美国流血打仗的人并不多。

总之,我们既不怕和平,也不怕战争。

 

 [18]

 

根据刘少奇审定原件刊

 

[1]这里指中共中央代表团主任刘少奇一九四九年七月四日给联共()中央斯大林的书面报告。见本书第1-17

[2]午真,即七月十一日

[3]指刘少奇和中共中央代表团成员东北局书记高岗、中央委员王稼祥(已内定为新中国驻苏联大使)

[4]柯瓦洛夫,亦译柯瓦略夫、柯瓦廖夫,当时为来中国帮助工作的苏联专家组负责人

[5]师哲,当时任中共中央俄文编译局局长、中共中央代表团翻译

[6]莫洛托夫,指维亚切斯拉夫·米哈伊洛维奇·莫洛托大,当时为联共()中央政治局委员、苏联部长会议第一副主席。马林可夫,通常译为马林科夫,指格奥尔基·马克西米利安诺维奇·马林科夫,当时为联共()中央政治局委员、苏联部长会议副主席。贝利亚,指拉夫连季·巴夫洛维奇·贝利亚,当时为联共()中央政治局委员、苏联部长会议副主席兼内务部部长。米高扬,指阿纳斯塔斯·伊万诺维奇·米高扬,当时为联共()中央政治局委员、苏联部长会议副主席兼对外贸易部部长。卡甘诺维赤,亦译卡冈诺维奇,指拉扎尔·莫伊塞耶维奇·冈诺维奇,当时为联共()中央政治局委员、苏联部长会议副主席。布尔加宁,指尼古拉·亚历山德罗维奇·尔加宁,时为联共()中央政治局委员、苏联武装力量部部长、苏联部长会议副主席。什维尔尼克,指尼克拉·米海洛维奇·维尔尼克,当时为联共()中央政治局候补委员、苏联最高苏维埃主席团主席

[7]索柯洛夫斯基,指瓦西里·丹尼洛维奇·索科洛夫斯基,当时为苏联武装力量部第一副部长

[8]指刘少奇、高岗、王稼祥

[9]华人民共和国成立后,毛泽东、周恩来访问苏联,一九五〇年二月十四日由中国政府全权代表周恩来和苏联政府全权代表安德烈·亚努阿里耶维奇·维辛斯基在莫斯科共同签署了苏联贷款给中华人民共和国的协定

[10]中美通商航海条约,参见本书第20页注释[12]

[11]见本书第18页注释[5]

[12]这里指一九四五年八月十四日苏联政府与中国国民党政府签订的《中苏友好同盟条约}。参见本书第19页注释[11]

[13]马家骑兵,指国民党军西北军政长官公署长官马步芳的青海兵团和国民党军西北军政长官公署副长官马鸿逵的宁夏兵团中的骑兵部队

[14]外蒙,指蒙古人民共和国

[15]安得列夫,联共()中央政治局委员阿··米高扬的化名。参见本书第18页注释[6]

[16]林彪,当时任中国人民解放军第四野战军兼华中军区司令员

[17]马歇尔计划,即由美国国务卿乔治,马歇尔于一九四七年六月五日在美国哈佛大学所作讲演中提出的《欧洲复兴计划(1948—1952)》,也称欧洲复兴方案。其主要内容是:美国拨款一百七十亿美元援助西欧各国作为复兴战后经济之用,但受援国必须同美国合作行动,购买一定的美国货,尽快撤除关税壁垒,取消或放松外汇限制,接受美国对使用美元的监督,把本国和殖民地出产的战略物资供给美国,设立由美国控制的对等基金,保障美国私人投资和开发的权利,削减同社会主义国家的贸易,放弃国有化政策,实施美国所要求的财经政策,把进步力量排除出政府等。一九四七年七月欧洲十六个国家的代表在巴黎开会,决定接受马歇尔计划。在该计划实施过程中,由于西欧各国矛盾加剧,被迫提前在一九五一年宣告失效,代之以《共同安全计划》

[18]刘高王,指刘少奇、高岗、王稼

A Telegram about the Meeting of Stalin with the Chinese Communist Party's Delegation

(18 July 1949)

 

To the Central Committee [of the CCP] and Chairman Mao Zedong:

 

(I) After we had sent the Soviet Party Center's Stalin a written report and some other materials, on 11 July at 10 p.m. the Soviet Party's Politburo met in the Kremlin. We [Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang] and Kovalev took part with Shi Zhe translating. [Others present were] Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, [Lavrentii] Beria, Mikoyan, [Lazar] Kaganovich, [Nikolai] Bulganin, [Nikolai] Shvernik, [Vasilii] Sokolovskii, intelligence heads, and admirals. First Stalin explained that several of the Politburo members had already left for vacations and that several military men would participate, since the Chinese delegation's report had touched on military issues. Then Stalin asked us: Do you have your own naval officers? Does the air force have its own pilots? Does each province have a provincial government? Is each provincial government and regional government like the northeast obeying the future central government? Does the future central government have the right to approve and dismiss the main personnel of provincial and regional governments? With Mao Zedong as the central government's chairman, is “chairman” the same as “president” [?] What is the nature of the relations between the chairman and the cabinet? He also asked about bureaucratic capital? Would comprador [trans. note—Intermediary between the Chinese government and western powers who became part of the Chinese middle class] capital be included in bureaucratic capital? After we had answered every question, Stalin started to explain about the Chinese national bourgeoisie and answered all the questions we had raised in our report. At the end, at our request, he explained the present international situation. The other comrades spoke very little and the mood was completely serious. After the meeting Stalin asked if we were comfortable and everyone watched four movies that had been picked by Stalin. He gave a running commentary as we watched the movies.

 

(II) During the meeting a committee to draft a loan agreement was constituted with Mikoyan and Kovalev participating on the Soviet side and we three on the Chinese side. We decided to have Gao Gang sign the loan agreement in the name of the Northeast Government, since the Soviet side considered this an appropriate procedure. They will now send it to the Supreme Soviet for approval and we can collect the loan at an early date. Below is a summary report of Stalin's oral answers to the questions we asked in our report [to him].

 

a. Regarding the CCP's policy towards the Chinese national bourgeoisie

 

Stalin said: The point of view that considers cooperation between you and the Chinese national bourgeoisie as the way of drawing them into the government is correct. The Chinese national bourgeoisie is not the same as the East European and German bourgeoisie, which cooperated with Hitler during the war, tarnishing itself, and were forced to leave with Hitler. They settled down in their enterprises, so in the period after the defeat of Hitler, all these countries focused on was their enterprises, and not on themselves. But the Chinese national bourgeoisie is different. They did not surrender to Japan during the war. So they didn't have to retreat with the Japanese. After the defeat of Japan, a part of this group supported Jiang Jieshi to get American recognition and support. But the Chinese-American Trade and Shipping Convention was extremely unfair, a big attack on the Chinese national bourgeoisie, which found itself dependent both in trade and in shipping. Therefore, the Chinese national bourgeoisie is against the US and Jiang Jieshi, against the relations between the US and Jiang Jieshi. That the Chinese Communist Party is using this anti-American feeling in order to establish a comparatively long-term cooperative tie with the Chinese national bourgeoisie is a correct policy. It is necessary to get the Chinese national bourgeoisie to stand in the anti-imperialist camp. You should undertake some kind of policy that is good for the national bourgeoisie, such as protective tariffs, preventing any imperialist goods from entering China, profitable for the national capitalists, while also giving infant national industry a chance to develop. This is a second advantage. After the October Revolution in Russia almost all the private capitalist enterprises were confiscated, while a [state] monopoly on foreign trade was introduced. In China, at the present time, it is very difficult to resist a trade monopoly, but we should institute a protective tariff policy.

 

The contradictions between the soviets and the capitalists is an objective [keguan] one, strikes can take place. For now we do not want to broaden the conflict between the soviets and the capitalists, but labor conflict is what might cause us trouble in our cooperation with the bourgeoisie. In order to prevent labor conflict from ruining our cooperation with the bourgeoisie, we should push for an agreement between the bourgeoisie and the workers. This agreement should protect workers' rights and we must persuade the capitalists to become civilized capitalists who take care of their workers. Such an agreement would allow cooperation between the capitalists and us to go on for a while.

 

b. Regarding the matter of people's democratic dictatorship

 

Stalin said: Your implementation of a people's democratic dictatorship system of government is correct. Your citing Stalin's 1926 statement to the effect that “China's future revolutionary sovereignty will emphasize anti-imperialism” is also correct. After we had answered the questions about the central government's Chairman group and the relationship between the Chairman group and the cabinet (to the effect that, the Chairman's group is a collective presidency and the cabinet serves the Chairman's group as the central government's executive organ), Stalin said: It is possible that this system is very suitable to present-day China. When we answered the questions about whether each regional (for example, the northeast) and provincial government obeyed the central government and whether the central government had the right to approve or dismiss each regional or provincial government's choices of leaders, Stalin said: Your present point of view of avoiding excesses in carrying out central collectivism is correct. That is to say, on the condition that the local governments are obeying the central government, it is not necessary to implement excessive central collectivism. But Stalin pays much attention to the possibility of splits between the local and central governments. Furthermore, in the report we had not mentioned the comprador bourgeoisie, so Stalin asked if comprador capital was or was not included in bureaucratic capital. It seems that he is paying great attention not to mix up the comprador bourgeoisie and the [Chinese] national bourgeoisie.

 

c. Regarding foreign policy issues

 

Stalin considers the foreign policy principles we mentioned in our report to be correct. These principles are the conflict with imperialist countries and cooperation with the Soviet Union and each new democratic country; making use of contradictions within capitalist countries; developing China's trade and commerce with all countries, in particular with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Regarding the investments and enterprises in China of various imperialist countries, Stalin said: You can use the labor laws. Require each foreign enterprise to implement the labor laws strictly as a method for struggling with them. At the present, you don't want to expropriate the Chinese affairs of each imperialism, don't rush [bumang] into taking any other measures, wait a bit and see what happens. As to the question of whether we should strive for all of the imperialist countries to recognize China's new government, Stalin said: You should not rush into demanding recognition from all the imperialist countries, while you increase your observations, grasp the situation, see how they express themselves. You have a really good magic weapon [fabao], which is that imperialism wants to do business [maimai] with you. The imperialist countries' economic crisis has already begun. I think the powers could quickly decide to try and recognize you. You can first do good business with them and then discuss the recognition issue.

 

d. Regarding Chinese-Soviet relations

 

Stalin said: As soon as the Chinese government is established, the Soviet Union will immediately recognize you. Regarding the Sino-Soviet Treaty, he said: There was already a statement about this in the exchange of cables with Mao Zedong, saying that this treaty is unequal, that it can't be otherwise, since the treaty was made with the Guomindang at that time. There are a lot of American soldiers in Japan; Jiang Jieshi is also collaborating with the Americans. The Soviet troops in Port Arthur [Lushun] prevent them having the freedom of action to make use of armed force; they protect the Soviet Union and at the same time, they also protect the interests of the Chinese Revolution. At the present time, the Soviet Communist Party has already decided to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. After the Americans remove their troops from Japan, the Soviet Union can consider withdrawing troops from Lushun. If the Chinese Communist Party considers it necessary that the Soviet troops leave Lushun immediately in order to give the Chinese Communist Party more room to maneuver in the political sphere, the Soviet troops can withdraw from Lushun and Dalian [Luda] right now. Stalin does not consider necessary [yongbuzhao] any of the three preliminary options (inherit the treaty without changes, sign a new treaty or announce that in a while a new treaty will be signed) for handling the Chinese-Soviet treaty that we presented in the report. He said to wait until Mao Zedong comes to Moscow to solve this matter. Regarding China's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, Stalin said: You can negotiate with all the countries of Eastern Europe. We can help you, but it is best if you negotiate directly. Furthermore, he said, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania all can supply you with goods and help you. You can negotiate with them boldly. Regarding the question of relations between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, Stalin said: when you said in the report that the Chinese Communist Party obeys the Soviet Communist Party, we felt strange. There has never been a case of one country's party obeying another country's party, because it is impermissible [buxukede].The two parties are responsible to their own peoples. If there is a problem, we talk about it. If there is a difficulty, we help each other. It's not a matter of one party obeying another. Close party relations is correct. Today's Politburo meeting is such a kind of tie. Regarding Mao Zedong's coming to Moscow, Stalin said: When China's [new] government is established and relations are established between our countries, then Mao can come. If Mao still finds it inconvenient to come, the Soviet Union can send a delegation to China.

 

e. Other matters

 

1. Regarding Xinjiang, Stalin said: because in Xinjiang there are no runways, there is still no way to bring troops in to Xinjiang by air. As for sending fighter aircraft to beat Ma's [Ma Bufang] cavalry, this is very simply done. We can send a detachment of 40-50 aircraft and we'll begin with Soviet pilots and then pass them over to Chinese pilots [as they are trained.] While we were watching films, Stalin said: in the Second World War, cavalry was not of much use, because they feared the airplane, because they were such a big target, very easy to disperse.

 

2. Regarding Dalian, Stalin said: we could let the Northeast [Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party] and the Soviet comrades in Dalian discuss and reach agreement. Dalian's governing regime should be united with the Northeast [Bureau's]. While countries are not recognizing China, before the Japanese Peace Treaty is concluded, Dalian's harbor should only be used by Chinese and Soviets.

 

3. We had asked in the past about opening a Chinese university in Moscow for fewer than 1,000 students to train and build up China's construction and management personnel. Stalin said: this is a good thing. There are difficulties, but we can do it.

 

4. Stalin himself raised the question of building a railway from Outer Mongolia's Hulun [Buir] area to Zhangjiakou (because someone raised this idea during Andreev's visit to Xibaipo). He said, this is a good thing, we can do it. We asked: Can we build a railway from Shaanxi through Xinjiang to the Soviet Union? S[talin] said: It's too long. It's not as good as first building an oil pipeline that would cost less than a third of the railroad. Stalin also said: If you have tea, tung oil, husked rice, tungsten ore, pig bristles and other plant oils, we need them all. Furthermore, he said, you should expand the land area under cotton cultivation and raise cotton production. In order to do this, you should gradually make use of agricultural machinery. It would be very good to increase cotton production.

 

5. Stalin said: [They can] help us to set up a naval school at Lushun and help us to build maritime defense. Stalin asked us if a Soviet film crew could visit our frontlines and help us to make a film. They [the Soviets] could help us with film technology. We answered that this was possible and said that a film crew had visited Lin Biao's headquarters in the past. Stalin said: because they did a bad job of it there, we withdrew them. We say we want to shoot a film again. It could be good for our relations. Stalin said: We can make the film's contents completely according to your suggestions.

 

(III) Regarding the international situation, after we raised the issue, Stalin replied as follows:

 

There is a main point for estimating the contemporary international situation and this is whether or not a war can break out. By looking at all manner of international and economic conditions and [deducing] from America's preparations for war (imperialism is always preparing well for war), we can see that at present it is disadvantageous [buli] for imperialism to make war on the Soviet Union. According to regular patterns of historical development, there should not be a war at the moment, but there are adventurers and lunatics [jingshen shichang] in history, so there is still a possibility of war breaking out. We are ready for this. They are even using the nuclear bomb to intimidate [konghe] us, but we are also preparing. We are preparing a bit more quickly than they are.

 

Some adventurers and lunatics propagandize and say: The Soviet Union wants to attack the US. Others believe this kind of talk, which gives ground for the emergence of adventurers. For example, if the US Secretary of Defense [James] Forrestal, although he is dead, can still produce these kinds of people, then the possibility of war [neng chuwai] is always with us. [Trans. note— Forrestal's apparent suicide on 22 May seems to have attracted Stalin's attention.]

 

We asked: can a compromise agreement be reached on the various problems that separate you and the British and Americans? Stalin answered: It is very difficult. It is possible to resolve individual issues, but the most important matter is very hard to resolve. Let's wait a bit and see.

 

[Stalin continued regarding] our present policy of isolating the reactionary party, making use of mass methods and meetings, while in many countries, including America, continuing a propaganda battle, is very effective and should be continued.

 

Today the American government is forcing non-resolution of the problems with its policies. There are some people in the US who want to have good relations with the Soviet Union, but they are not in power. In the future, if the Americans have a new government and a new policy, it is possible that US-Soviet relations will get better.

 

The Marshall Plan is already bankrupt. American influence in Germany is already very small.

 

If imperialism wants to attack, let them attack; if they use nuclear weapons, we will also use nuclear weapons.

 

The Americans, of course, are not planning to attack themselves, since they always think of how to use other people's hands to attack for them. They even said so publicly, but there are not so many people willing to spill blood for America.

 

In general, neither do we fear peace, nor do we fear war.

 

Liu [Shaoqi]

Gao [Gang]

Wang Jiaxiang]

 

Printed from an original revised and approved by Liu Shaoqi.

 

[…]

 

A committee to write up a preliminary draft for a loan from the USSR to China is created. Stalin meets with a delegation of the CCP and answers several of their questions, including: the CCP's policy towards the Chinese national bourgeoisie, the matter of people's democratic dictatorship, Chinese foreign policy issues, Sino-Soviet relations, Xinjiang, Dalian, a Chinese University in Moscow, a railway from outer Mongolia to Zhangjiakou, and a naval school. Stalin and the CCP delegation also discussed the possibility of a war breaking out between the USSR and the US.



Document Information

Source

Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao (Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC), vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 30-37. Translated by David Wolff.

Rights

The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.

To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].

Original Uploaded Date

2011-11-20

Type

Cable

Language

Record ID

113439