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Digital Archive International History Declassified

January 21, 1974

SECRET TELEGRAM NO. 901 - FROM MOSCOW TO WARSAW

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    Nowak reports on how the Chinese are using anti-Soviet propaganda at home and abroad to undermine Soviet influence and encourage possible coups. He notes that this is especially seen in Sino-Japanese relations and recent visits by Japanese politicians to China.
    "Secret Telegram No. 901 - From Moscow to Warsaw," January 21, 1974, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw (AMSZ), z-Depesze, Moskwa 1974. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113673
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Secret Telegram No. 901
From Moscow to Warsaw, January 21, 1974

Szyszko

From Kowalczyk's conversation with the Deputy Director in the Far Eastern Department of Foreign Ministry – Dubrovsky

1. Recently, the Soviets have been increasingly following China's international activities. Its nature is becoming brutally anti-Soviet. [Chinese] are increasingly trying to involve various elements and centers in the capitalist countries, as well as those of the Third World. This is taking place in the U.S., Japan, and the FRG. The Chinese are reactivating the activities of pro-Chinese groupings in the communist and workers' movement (the latest example is the FRG). The main task of these groupings is to currently strengthen socialist elements in these countries and to bring about an internal coup, while at the same time to undermine the position of the Soviet Union and the CPSU. According to Dubrovsy, the Chinese are outright assuring the governments in some of these capitalist countries that these Maoist groupings will be loyal to the authorities and are not directed against them. The Chinese often invite the representatives of these groupings to Beijing for training and instructional purposes. Given the above, the Soviets formed special teams of China specialists in many countries last year (for example, there are 4 people in the U.S. and Japan). These persons are in charge of examining exclusively Chinese influences in a country, bilateral relations, and are trying through official channels to counter these Chinese steps which are directed against the USSR.

2. [Dubrovsky said that] [Masayoshi] Ohira's visit in China and [Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei] Tanaka's visit in Southeast Asia are examples of China's using other countries for its own purposes.

Ohira's visit is a reflection of yet another progress in Sino-Japanese relations. One of this visit's concrete results is the establishment of airline communication between Beijing and Tokyo. Until now, the Japanese were not going for a broader cooperation with China, especially due to its interest in Taiwan. Now, the Chinese are willing to also make some concessions (which were made during Kissinger's latest visit) regarding Taiwan and also apply them to their relations with Japan. The raw materials offered to Ohira by China should have no bearing on the hitherto Japan's interest in Soviet raw materials.

China's stance regarding Tanaka's visit is also characteristic. China did not only not comment on the visit, but also refrained from any propaganda against countries which were visited by Tanaka. The point here was also not to thwart the Japanese expansion in this region and to push out the Soviet interests from that area, as well as to demonstrate China's readiness to build its own relations with other countries. As we can see from the course of the visit, the Chinese position was of no help to Tanaka.

/-/ Nowak

[Received by Foreign Minister Olszowski and the highest official with the Foreign Ministry and the CC PUWP International Department].