October 12, 1976
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF, DIRECTOR OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT, TO DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 'NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'
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get citationAs this report indicates, the recommendations made in the 1974 post-mortem of the Indian nuclear test failure had little impact. The authors identified a basic disconnect between “national level users”—-the top policymakers-—and those who “set analytical and collection priorities in the intelligence community.” The latter were not sure how high a priority that the policymakers had given to nuclear proliferation intelligence. Moreover, a study for the Defense Department produced by MIT chemistry professor (and future DCI) John Deutch questioned whether the intelligence community “is adequately focused and tasked on proliferation matters.” This would be a recurring problem for the CIA and other intelligence agencies."Intelligence Community Staff, Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, to Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, 'Nuclear Proliferation and the Intelligence Community'," October 12, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CIA Records Search Tool [CREST], National Archives Library, College Park, MD. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #4. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113915