December 04, 1973
Joint State/Defense Message, “Korean Northwest Coastal Situation"

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Summary:
The U.S. Departments of Defense and State offer instructions about how to respond to the Northern Limit Line Dispute, including measures to restrain South Korea.

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJECT: KOREAN NORTHWEST COASTAL SITUATION
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WE ARE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION IN RESPONSE TO POSITION TAKEN BY NORTH KOREA IN DECEMBER 1 MAC MEETING.

A. DIPLOMATIC-POLITICAL MEASURES:

1. YOU ARE TO INFORM ROKG THAT WE AGREE TO CALL MAC MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR REAFFIRMATION OF OUR POSITION AND REJECTION OF NORTH KOREAN CLAIMS CONCERNING ACCESS TO FIVE ISLANDS UNDER UNC CONTROL. ACCORDINGLY, YOU ARE TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO REQUEST THE MEETING IMMEDIATELY. GUIDANCE FOR POSITION WE INTEND TO TAKE NOW BEING DRAFTED AND WILL BE FURNISHED ASAP.

2. SIMULTANEOUSLY, YOU ARE TO URGE THAT THE ROK UTILIZE THE HOT LINE FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES AND, ASSUMING MAC MEETING DOES NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE DECEMBER 5 PRELIMINARY MEETING OF SNCC, YOU ARE TO RECOMMEND THAT
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ROK ALSO RAISE SUBJECT IN THAT FORUM. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND NATURE OF ROK OBJECTIONS TO UTILIZING HOT LINE, YOU SHOULD REMIND THEM THAT, CONSISTENT WITH PLEDGES IN JULY 4, 1972 COMMUNIQUE, THIS CHANNEL WAS ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH HOSTILE INCIDENTS AND TO OUR KNOWLEDGE IT HAS BEEN USED FOR RELATED OCCURRENCES SUCH AS DMZ CROSSINGS AS WELL AS FIRINGS. IN HOT LINE DISCUSSION WITH THE NORTH, WE SUGGEST ROKG POINT OUT THEIR INTENTION IS NOT TO DEBATE THE ISSUE WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED IN MAC MEETING, BUT RATHER TO MAKE CLEAR THE ROKG INTENDS NO PROVOCATIVE INITIATIVES AND EXPECTS NORTH TO BE SIMILARLY RESPONSIBLE, AND TO CONTINUE COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY TO THESE ISLANDS AS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE IN THE PAST. NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE IN HOT LINE CONVERSATION MAY SHED LIGHT ON THEIR MOTIVATIONS AND PROVIDE VALUABLE INFORMATION TO US CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS AND TIMING. INITIATIVES BY SOUTH TO USE THIS CHANNEL MAY ALSO PROVE USEFUL SUBSEQUENTLY IN DEVELOPING THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR ROKG IN HER EFFORTS TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE SITUATION ON PENINSULA.

3. YOU MAY ALSO INFORM PRESIDENT PARK IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT WE INTEND TO APPROACH THE PRC AND SOVIETS, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, TO INFORM THEM WE HAVE NOTED THE INCREASED NORTH KOREAN PATROLS NEAR THESE ISLANDS AND THE UNPRECEDENTED CLAIM MADE AT THE RECENT MAC MEETING. WE CAN NOT ACCEPT THIS NORTH KOREAN INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND INTEND TO PROTECT OUR LONG-STANDING RIGHTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT TO THESE ISLANDS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE INTEND TO STRESS COMMON INTEREST IN AVOIDING PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AND POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION. GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS CHANNEL, WE EXPECT ROKG TO HOLD ESPECIALLY CLOSE OUR INTENTIONS TO MAKE THESE APPROACHES.

4. WE INTEND TO BRIEF THE JAPANESE CONCERNING ACTIONS WE PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH EXCEPTION OF APPROACH TO USSR AND PRC AND MAY DO SIMILARLY WITH OTHER POWERS WHO HAVE CLOSE INVOLVEMENT WITH KOREAN QUESTION.

B. MILITARY ACTION. WE CONCUR IN BASIC POSTURE AND GENERAL GUIDANCE SET FORTH IN REFTEL B. FOLLOWING IS MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:

1. IT IS OUR GENERAL POSTURE THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WISH TO SEE OR PROVOKE MILITARY INCIDENTS OVER THESE ISSUES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT INTEND TO ACCEPT INTERFERENCE WITH ESTABLISHED RIGHTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT TO THESE ISLANDS.