JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE, “QUESTIONS REGARDING NORTHERN LIMIT LINE"
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The U.S. Departments of State and Defense analyze North Korea's claims relating to the Northern Limit Line and the origins of the NLL."Joint State/Defense Message, “Questions Regarding Northern Limit Line"," December 21, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff, Box 36, Korean Northwest Islands (Working File). Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114021 - Share
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[…] SUBJ[ECT]: Questions Regarding Northern Limit Line REF[RENCE]: {A} Seoul 8450 [{B} Seoul 8512] { } Seoul 8574 { } Seoul 8575 Joint State/Defense Message {A} We reject the DPRK’s assertion that Paragraph 13 {B} of the Armistice Agreement establishes Paengyong-Do, Taechong-Do, Sochong-Do, Yonpyong-Do and U-Do as within DPRK coastal waters. Paragraph 13{B} does not address the question of “territorial waters”. The only reference to waters in Paragraph 13{B} is in connection with the requirement of withdrawal of military forces of both sides from “the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side”. There is no attempt to delineate such “coastal” waters or to refer to them for any other purpose. It should also be noted that the provincial boundary line mentioned in Paragraph 13{B} serves only as a convenient means of describing which islands are under the military control of which side, and does not purport to divide waters. This limited purpose of the line is made clear in the text of Map 3, Volume 2 of the Armisitce Agreement, which indicates that the seaward extension of the provincial line drawn on the map is solely to indicate the control of coastal islands on the west coast of Korea. this line has no other significance and none shall be attached thereto. The central importance of Paragraph 13{B} to the present controversy, is, of course, the fact that it specifically place the above islands under the military control of CINCUNC [Commander in Chief, United Nations Command]. {B} Paragraphp 13{B} which places the islands under United States Nations Command “military control” must be read in conjunction with Paragraph 15, which requires the naval forces of both sides to “respect the waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the other side.” It seems clear, contrary to the assertions of the KPA [Korean People’s Army], that the term “land area of Korea” as used in Article 15 includes offshore islands as well as the mainland. Absent some special understanding to the contrary, which the KPA does not to our knowledge assert, the ordinary meaning of the term “land area” would not appear more restrictive than the term “coast”, which for purposes of defining mairtime jurisdiction would include islands as well as mainland territory. For example, both under customary international law and the pertinent conventions {1958 Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf}, islands are taken into account in determining the boundary of a country’s territorial sea and contiguous zone, as well as the boundary of its continental shelf. Also, islands far offshore have their own territorial sea and contiguous zone. {C} The DPRK is, therefore, obligated under Paragraph 15 to respect the waters contiguous to the above-named islands. Since the Agreement does not provide any formula for resolution of the boundary between the overlapping contiguous waters of the two sides, such resolution must be found by reference to the general principles of international law used in the drawing of maritime boundaries. Such principles dictate the drawing of a median line equidistant between the coast {including [illegible] islands} and the islands. This principle of equidistance has served as the basis [illegible] customary international law and in the above [illegible] conventions to determine virtually ally maritime [illegible], such as the boundaries of the territorial[illegible] contiguous zone and the continental shelf [illegible] both opposite and adjacent states. {A} The U.S. does not recognize territorial sea claims beyond three miles and protests such claims. Consequently we should not recognize the North Korean claimed twelve mile territorial sea limit. We should, however, continue to respect DPRK claimed twelve mile “contiguous waters” limit in areas where it does not relate to access to islands and where ROK territorial waters do not overlap in accordance with current rules and authorities issued to U.S. Forces. {B} As far as we can tell, NLL [Northern Limit Line] is unilateral line and is not RPT [repeat] not recognized by North Korea as a dividing line between the “contiguous waters” of the islands and those of the North Korean coast for purposes of the Armistice Agreement. On this assumption we believe patrol limit line should reflect median line as described above rather than NLL. {C} The UNC should take no position as to the territorial waters claims of either North Korea or the ROK. With respect to UNC claims regarding “contiguous waters” under Article 15, see Para[graph] 3 above.
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