Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

March 19, 1975

MILITARY EXERCISE SOYUZ-75 INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION NO. 1

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation

CITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
  • Citation

    get citation

    As part of the Soyuz-75 exercise, this document provides intelligence on Western forces and an evaluation of the current military situation.
    "Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Intelligence Information No. 1," March 19, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Institute of National Remembrance (IPN-BU). Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114493
  • share document

    https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114493

VIEW DOCUMENT IN

English HTML

Secret

Copy Nº 2

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps;

Polish handwriting across the page]

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF [filled in by hand:] 4TH ARMY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION Nº 1

THE CP OF THE MARITIME FRONT [IS IN] A FOREST 20 km

west of PERLEBERG

1100 19 March

Map [1:] 500,000 [date of issue missing]

Assessment of the enemy

1. Upon carrying out the main mobilization measures and the operational deployment of the armed forces, at 0600 17 March the NATO countries unleashed a war against the member countries of the Warsaw Pact with a simultaneous strike of ground forces, aviation, and navy.

In two days, without having success using conventional weapons and under the blows of the "Easterners", they were forced to make a fighting retreat of 15-70 km deep in FRG territory.

In connection with the unsuccessful outcome of the border engagements for the "Westerners'", at 0600 19 March the enemy switched to the mass use of nuclear weapons against front troops and rear targets, launching 207 nuclear strikes with a total yield of 13,402 kt and also detonated 11 groups of nuclear mines with a total yield of 27 kt.

The main forces [entered by hand: of the SGA] in the Maritime Front's zone are formed in two echelons:

- in the first: the 10th AK, the 1st AK of the "Browns" and the 1st AK of the "Blues", a total of 9 divisions. The 10th AK is formed in two echelons, the 1st AK of the "Browns" and the 1st AK of the Blues" are formed in one echelon.

- in the second echelon of the SGA the 1st AK of the "Orange" [has] a total of three divisions.

Operational reserves: the 14th and 15th td's of the "Browns", the 3rd pd of the "Blues", the pd of the "Orange", the pd of the "Browns" and two pd of the "Violets", a total of 7 divisions at a distance of 150-400 km

In addition, about 500,000 soldiers in the military of FRG territorial defense units ought to be considered to be in the front's zone to the depth of the immediate objective.

The enemy has the troops of one mpd and six territorial defense infantry battalions in the Danish Straits.

Taking into account the two days of war and the consequences of our nuclear strikes, enemy losses comprise:

- personnel 103,000

- tank                320

- means of delivering nuclear weapons 34

- [field] guns and mortars       250

- anti-tank equipment        220

- aircraft       354

among them 88 nuclear weapons platforms

In the front's zone the enemy has:

- 19 divisions including three tank [divisions],

- 120 means of using nuclear weapons,

- 2150 [field] guns and mortars,

- 2640 tanks

- 1815 items of anti-tank equipment

2. The operations of SGA ground forces are being supported by the aircraft of the 2nd OTAK  and also the aircraft of the Danish Straits and Western Baltic:

The tactical air forces of the FRG are 275 aircraft, the Netherlands - 113, Great Britain - 167, Denmark - 71 , and also about 21 carrier aircraft might operate against troops of the front, a total of 620 aircraft, including 146 nuclear weapons platforms.

Considering the above combat readiness ratio, about 560 aircraft might be used, including 100 nuclear weapons platforms.

These enemy aircraft might perform about 1100 sorties a day.

Enemy aircraft are operating at low altitudes up to the line TOMASZÓW MAZOWIECKI, CIECHANOW, OLSZTYN.

The entire zone of enemy combat operations is protected by a two-tiered NIKE and HAWK SAM fire system. The most strongly protected areas are: KIEL, SCHLESWIG, MARNE STADE, PA[P]ENBURG, and NIENBURG.

The easiest sectors to overcome the enemy air defense system are: HAMBURG, [MANRE], and BURGDORF-OSNABRUCK.

3. The maritime flank of the NATO forces is supported by the FRG and Danish navies in the Baltic Sea, a total of 150 ships, of which 80 are special-purpose.

4. The radio and radiotechnical situation

About 700 of the most important radio nets and links are in the command and control system.

The weapons control system has about 1100 radars, including 500 used in the air defense system.

In the intelligence and electronic countermeasures system there are:

-  the 120th  COMINT and ELINT battalion of the 1st AK (FRG),

-  the 71st Luftwaffe COMINT and ELINT regiment (FRG),

-  the 51st Air Reconnaissance Squadron (FRG),

-  the 13th COMINT, ELINT, and electronic countermeasures regiment of the 1st AK (UK), and

- the COMINT and ELINT battalion (G [Netherlands]).

The above units, apart from losses, have retained their combat effectiveness and can reconnoiter up to 600 radio nets in the zone of operations of the Maritime Front, and also create interference for:

- 120 HF nets and links,

- 80 VHF nets and links,

- 30 radiorelay links, and

- 30 radar systems.

Each of them has been augmented by a radio and radar cover aircraft during aircraft flights of groups of 10 or more.

5. The possible nature of enemy actions

Using the result of nuclear strikes delay the offensive of the troops of the Maritime Front with the operations of first operational echelon troops and [using] the subsequent commitment of the second echelon of the SGA consisting of five divisions (the 10th AK of the "Orange" and two divisions of the "Browns" from the region of SULINGEN, VERDEN-BREMEN in the direction of BREMEN, MAGDEBURG with the objective of restoring the position on the border. The commitment of the second echelon is possible during the second half of 20 March. Develop an offensive in the direction of Berlin with the approach of deep operational reserves. The commitment of these reserves is possible on 22-23 March. The commitment of the second echelon and these reserves will be supported by the mass use of nuclear weapons and means of radioelectronic warfare.

6. CONCLUSIONS

1. Although the first operational echelon of the enemy has suffered considerable losses he will henceforth be able to hold the lines he occupies.

2. His strongest grouping is in the center of the zone of the front and the second echelon consisting of the 14th and 15th pd of the "Browns" and the 1st AK of the "Orange".

3. In the next 5-6 days the enemy might further strengthen his forces in the direction of the operations of the front by mobilizing two divisions on FRG territory, moving one division by sea (the 2nd DMP [Marine Division]), and the enemy might move up to three brigades of marines to the Jutland sector (the 24th regiment of the "Blues", a marine brigade of the "Blues", and a marine brigade of the "Orange").

CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE   CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE

/signature/ MARITIME FRONT

/signature/

Colonel Eh. ZAYKO               General-Lieutenant S. ANTOS

Six copies made.

Copy Nº 1 - 3rd Army

Copy Nº 2 - 4th Army

Copy Nº 3 - 7th Army

Copy Nº 4 - 9th Army

Copy Nº 5 - 3rd Air Army

Copy Nº 6 - to file

[handwritten:] Nº 0137