Skip to content

November 10, 1962

Soviet Report on the Opinion of Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin on the US-Cuba Relation After the Crisis

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

TOP SECRET

(when filled)

 

REPORT #58361273 from 2JG.62

from incoming (outgoing) ciphered telegram # 318ov/1600

from 1 November 1962 from New York

 

Sent to comrs. KOZLOV, SUSLOV, PONOMAREV, GROMYKO.

 

In a private conversation Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State GOODWIN remarked that the US government initially planned to carry out an invasion of Cuba in January 1963, but allegedly due to the fast pace of the construction of Soviet launching pads in Cuba and because of the danger that it [Cuba] might become a bargaining chip in relation to West Berlin, the US decided to step up implementation of the campaign against Cuba in the form KENNEDY announced on 22 October. KENNEDY's decision was allegedly facilitated by the outbreak of the Sino-Indian conflict, as a result of which the group of neutral states, particularly India, could not come out in Cuba's defense, and thus the US allegedly could count on "neutralizing" activities of these countries directed at Cuba's support.

 

Regarding the prospects of improvement of US-Cuban relations, GOODWIN remarked that until CASTRO's government is overthrown, the US will be practically unable to give any kind of serious guarantees. The US, in GOODWIN's opinion, currently tries to isolate Cuba even more from Latin American countries, particularly from Mexico and Brazil, and makes attempts to put pressure on these countries to force them into breaking diplomatic relations [with Cuba]. Simultaneously, the USA seeks to expand the trade embargo against Cuba to all NATO countries, and thereby place the entire burden of providing assistance to the CASTRO government on the USSR. The Americans will continue to create military formations from among the Cuban emigres in the US, as well as on the territories of Guatemala and Panama. GOODWIN remarked that a final decision on which method to choose to overthrow the Cuban government will be made later. Depending on specific developments, one might resort to organization of a counter-revolutionary revolt in Cuba, which would be then supported either by an invasion from Florida or by a landing of emigres to Cuba and by their forming a "free government" which would be immediately recognized by the US. GOODWIN also stated that the US has no intentions so far to accept any compromise proposals that come from the Cuban government and seek to improve Cuban-American relations.

 

Ty[pist]: [redacted], from stenogram, ntbk. #3[..]

File#

Ex[ecuted] by [redacted], [redacted]

10 November 1962

 

[Redacted text]

 

 

Report on a private conversation in which Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin said that the US had originally planned to invade Cuba in January 1963, but then accelerated the preparation process during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also stated that Kennedy wanted to take advantage of the Sino-Indian conflict because the group of neutral states including India would not be able to come out in Cuba's defense. Goodwin predicted that the US would not improve relations with Cuba until the Castro government was overthrown.

Author(s):


Document Information

Source

CWIHP archive.

Rights

The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.

To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].

Original Uploaded Date

2012-06-21

Type

Report

Language

Record ID

114530

Donors

Leon Levy Foundation