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Digital Archive International History Declassified

November 02, 1962


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    A report from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union about Soviet-Cuban relations in the build-up of US-Cuban tensions. According to this Chinese document, the Soviet's involvement is one of hopeful reconciliation in the Cuban problem.
    "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'The Soviet Union Continued a Reconciliatory Approach to the Cuban Problem'," November 02, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 111-00601-07, 11-12. Translated by Zhang Qian.
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Foreign Ministry,

The Soviet Union continued a reconciliatory and submissive approach to the situation in Cuba:

In external propaganda, [the Soviet Union] strove to defend and boast about its policy. [It] published one after another cables from individual pacifists in the world to [Nikita] Khrushchev, extolling his achievement of saving peace and humanity.’

Until now the government still hasn’t publicly expressed its support for the five conditions stipulated in Cuba’s statement [of 28 October].

The Soviet Union] did not dare report the real situation of the negotiation between [UN Secretary-General] U Thant and [Fidel] Castro. It merely commented that the contact [between U Thant and Castro] is beneficial. It did not mention at all that no agreement was reached.

On the US blockade and aerial surveillance of Cuba, and [the US] clamoring for enlarging the scope of embargo, [the Soviet Union] only reported objectively but dared not condemn. Some Soviet media even argued that these measures of American imperialism were [the result of] the proposals from American militant groups, whereas the White House was comparatively cautious. They even said something like that the US was in a contest between rationality and militant groups.

[The Soviet Union] avoided reporting our country’s important editorials and speeches in support of Cuba. Instead, [it] adopted an approach of raping the people’s will: under the title of “the entire world supporting and thanking the wise policy of the Soviet Union,” it published the news on rallies in support of Cuba [being organized] in many places of our country.

[It] did not at all report any news on the Cuban people actively preparing to strike back at the American imperialist invasion; regarding [Fidel] Castro’s speech, [it] reported just the nice words on the Soviet Union, instead of the parts which defended revolution and opposed American imperialist invasion.

Although the Soviet Union strove to decorate the picture as the measures of the Soviet Union had taken effect and saved [the world] from the Cuban crisis, the situation was developing in the opposite direction. The US assumed their [old] attitude, which is now more arrogant, and the process [aiming at] invading Cuba was accelerated. Cuba then became even more resolute, opposing firmly the Soviet Union’s selling its sovereignty. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union was very worried, which was why [Anastas] Mikoyan left ahead of schedule for Havana to mediate.

Judging from the fact that Mikoyan stopped in New York in the middle of his rush to Havana, the mission of Mikoyan’s trip is to suppress Cuba along with the US [The plan might be:] first, make some contacts with the US; [then,] further the demonstration of the good will from the Soviet Union; request that the US honor its own promise; and afterwards, compel Cuba to abandon some demands and to cooperate with the US.

However, in order to consolidate the first victory of its aggression on Cuba, the US will not give much capital to the Soviet Union. On the contrary, [the US] will probably exploit this opportunity and throw more pressure on the Soviet Union, compelling it to make ever bigger concessions and meanwhile exaggerating the conflict between the Soviet Union and Cuba, while Cuba will not yield, in which case Mikoyan will hardly complete his mission. To let the Soviet Union break the deadlock, Khrushchev is very likely to propose another advanced meeting with Kennedy.

Embassy in the Soviet Union

2 November 1962