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Digital Archive International History Declassified

November 16, 1962

TELEGRAM FROM BRAZILIAN EMBASSY IN HAVANA (BASTIAN PINTO), 6:30 P.M., FRIDAY

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation

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    Pinto discusses the current situation in Cuba and feels certain that Cuba depends more and more on Soviet economic help, but that Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications.
    "Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:30 p.m., Friday," November 16, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembre de 1.962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115383
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13680

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA

ON/16/17/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT

DNU/DEA/DAS/DAC/DOr/DAf/600.(24h)

Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa.

389 – FRIDAY – 1830hs – I am very thankful for telegram no 180, in which was retransmitted to me the telegram of the Embassy in Moscow. From what it is possible to observe in Cuba, I agree entirely with the considerations and conclusions of Ambassador Vasco Tristão Leitão da Cunha. Also, in his direct relations with Cuba, Khrushchev has shown an attitude [that is] pacificating and open to compromise. I have pointed out to Your Excellency that this country depends each time more on Soviet economic help; but Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications; for this and perhaps for to be convinced that the USSR will not leave to help it, Fidel Castro [timbra] to show his independence and even arrogance. It is each time more ostensible the Cuban [frieza] for with Mikoyan that, in the last days, which are not mentioned in the newspapers; however his presence here, for fifteen days, is evidently proof of Soviet goodwill. The Cuban intransigence, similar to the Chinese line (although there has not been here direct political influence from China), contributed without doubt for making difficult the conciliatory position of Khrushchev and, to what seems, is leading the Russians to admit, at least in part, the basic Cuban line expressed in the program of Five Points. Some foreign observers here judge, however, that the USSR will have in the near future to modify radically its policy for [dealing] with this country. In this isolation and before the surprising reiterations of the Cuban Government it is each time more difficult to make forecasts and even precise observations, but all of these observers are convinced that the United States will not yield its intention to overthrow Fidel Castro; it is also […] and is certainly influences his attitude.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO