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Digital Archive International History Declassified

October 24, 1962

TELEGRAM FROM YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN RIO DE JANEIRO (BARIšIć) TO YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTRY

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    A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."
    "Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry," October 24, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMIP), Belgrade, Serbia, PA (Confidential Archive) 1962, Kuba, folder F-67. Obtained by Svetozar Rajak and Ljubomir Dimić and translated by Radina Vučetić-Mladenović. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115457
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    https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115457

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FPRY

Sending: Rio

Received: 26.X 62. at 08.00

No. 397

Taken into process: teletypewriter

Date: 24.X 1962

Completed: 26.X 62. at 08.30

Telegram

16

D D D

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

There is a general feeling in Brazil that the military blockade of Cuba, for the first time in the history of the Cold War, has brought the USA and the USSR to the very verge of the war because of one LA country, making in that way LA and Brazil the center of the Cold War. The feeling of immediate danger mobilized all circles in order to find a way out. They concluded [that the] values of their former independent policy, especially towards Cuba, enable them to influence more freely and with more authority in seeking peaceful solutions. However, there are differences within Government circles regarding the real intentions of the USA as well as the ways and means for solving the crisis over Cuba. The Ambassador of the US here [Lincoln Gordon] managed quite well to convince that the US option was not the invasion. On Tuesday Kennedy phoned [Brazilian President João] Goulart explaining the reasons for the blockade. He pointed out his intentions and asked for support in which he partly succeeded. American arguments are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin. Therefore Kennedy is asking the support for their plan of keeping the blockade as long as the UNO Commission disarms Cuba. These arguments had an impact on Brazil to give a support to the US resolution in the Council of the OAS [Organization of American States] maintaining reservations about the employment of belligerent powers. Brazil accepts the UNO engagement, sending a Control Commission consisted of neutral people, and expects certain guarantees by the USA about the demilitarization of Cuba. They are of the opinion that through these actions a real guarantee for Cuba could be achieved and at the same time the role of non-aligned countries and Brazil could be affirmed. Although against intervention, Brazil supports American intentions, expecting alleviating of the war dangers and shows the wish to help Kennedy, so only moderate pressure is exerted on him in the UNO without any condemnation or neglecting American interests. They also expect that there is a way out from this crisis, especially about negotiations on Cuba and Berlin and they also believe that the USSR will avoid crossing swords at seas and that it will make Cuba accept the UNO inspection. Because of the pressure of the masses Government representatives make more severe statements against the USA, that is, confrontation with the support to the USA in OAS. Prime Minister [Hermes] Lima made a statement to the unions and students that Cuba had the right to its own socialist regime. Reactionary forces exert pressure asking Lima’s resignation and demand a Parliament session to deal with foreign policy.

Barišić