January 06, 1955
Cable from Peng Di, 'Third Intelligence Report on the Insider Situation of the Bogor Conference'

Citation:
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115504

Summary:
Report on the Bogor Conference, the nomination of countries to attend the Asian-African Conference and the issue of whether or not to invite China.

Credits:
This document was made possible with support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Leon Levy Foundation.

Original Language:
Chinese

Contents:
- English Translation
Third Intelligence Report on the Insider Situation of the Bogor Conference

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Xinhua News Agency:

(1) Prior to the conference Indonesia asked seventeen countries for their opinions regarding the convocation of the Afro-Asian conference; Iraq and Libya both clearly expressed that if China was invited then they would not attend. Other countries all agreed to the [convocation] of the Afro-Asian conference but were indifferent towards inviting China. Ten days prior to the convocation of the Bogor conference, Egypt, representing the Arab League, expressed: If the Afro-Asian conference is to be held with a position of conciliation then do not invite China because [China] belongs to the Soviet bloc.

(2) One day prior to the Bogor conference, the American ambassador in Indonesia met the Indonesian foreign ministry head secretary Abdulgani to ask about Indonesia's stance regarding the issue of the eleven American spies and whether or not the Bogor conference would discuss that issue. Abdulgani said that the Indonesian government has not yet studied the entire truth; as for whether or not the Bogor conference would discuss [this issue] it will be decided by the five prime ministers. The American ambassador believes that the United Nations General Assembly has not yet decided if the General Secretary will go to Beijing soon; the General Secretary's trip to Beijing this time is going too far.

(3) Whether or not to invite China is this conference's central issue. Prior [to the event], India sent Du-de-lai [sic] with a personal letter from Nehru to the Indonesian government, the main points are: “Regardless of what happens, China must attend the Afro-Asian conference, otherwise the conference will be meaningless.” This is a signal to the Indonesian government to make prior preparations. When Nehru came, he specially brought Menon along, because Menon has credibility and experience within the United Nations. After the prime ministers of India, Burma and Pakistan reached [Indonesia] on the 27th, they exchanged preliminary opinions in Bogor with the prime minister of Indonesia. The Indian and Burmese opinion are very different from the Pakistani opinion; Indonesia still maintains independent [views]. India and Burma discussed measures and decided to first discuss at the Bogor conference, the objective, the date of the [Afro-Asian] conference and then discuss what countries to invite. This suggestion was brought forth by Menon and was agreed to by everyone. After the objective was confirmed, the Indonesian prime minister said: Now we can bring forth what countries to invite according to the objective of the conference; India nominated Central Africa, Gold Coast, etc; the prime minister of Pakistan nominated Turkey, Iraq, Taiwan; India nominated China; Pakistan asked which China? Nehru said that there is only one China. Everyone nominated countries chaotically. A member of the Indonesian delegation [Indonesian ambassador to India] accidentally mentioned outer Mongolia and the conference recorded it down, but actually only prime ministers have the authority to make nominations. The prime minister of Burma is very angry that Pakistan nominated Taiwan; he believes it is unreasonable, and stated that if Taiwan is invited then Burma will not only not attend the Afro-Asian conference but will also be unwilling to participate as one of the convoking countries of the Afro-
Asian conference. [The prime minister of Burma] also said that: If today’s meeting passes the [motion of] inviting Taiwan, then Burma will immediately leave the conference. [He] said it so sternly that the entire conference became solemnly quiet for a while, and then everyone looked at the prime minister of Pakistan; the prime minister of Pakistan was very troubled, and had to say: “I came here not to argue, although I nominated Taiwan but I will respect the opinion of the majority.” After the meeting, according to what the Burmese charge d’affaires Mian-shin [sic] told me, he was very moved and he did not think that U Nu would be so resolute. He said: U Nu’s impression towards China is extremely good, although India and Indonesia both support China as well, but they do not match U Nu’s resolution and courage in speech; therefore the issue of whether or not to invite China was resolved very quickly. After the nomination list was composed, votes were taken, and when [nominating] Taiwan was touched upon, even Ceylon opposed. Later, when voting on [nominating] China, even Ceylon agreed. The prime minister of Pakistan could not resolutely oppose to [inviting China]. At the conference Ceylon was watching the direction of the wind, and their performance this time was a lot better than the prime minister of Pakistan. Regarding the issue of American spies, he also agreed to give up [on the issue] and not bring it up during the conference.

(4) The conflict outside the conference was also very intense. Many foreign guests stay at Salawan in Bogor, among them are Australian diplomats and many foreign journalists. These foreigners and journalists of the Indonesian opposition party worked together to conduct bribery and bribed an Indonesian policeman in order to collect intelligence. Among the female journalists, some used honey trap tactics to seduce Indonesian journalists. Some of these situations have been hurriedly written in textual material for Comrade Fang Ming to bring back to headquarters; [material] can be consulted.

(5) The above report number 105 that was sent back was an error on behalf of the Indonesians; they accidentally made public the internal situation; special report.

Peng Di

6 January 1955