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Digital Archive International History Declassified

October 27, 1962

TELEGRAM FROM POLISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW (PASZKOWSKI), 27 OCTOBER 1962

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation

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    [First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasili Vasilyevich] Kuznetsov assessed the [UN] resolution of Ghana and the United Arab Republic [Egypt] as kind of a band-aid, but a one that nevertheless is significant. On the other hand, he considers the statement of the Afro-Asian nations as both good and strong.
    "Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Paszkowski), 27 October 1962," October 27, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Szyfrogramy from Moskwa 1962, 6/77 w-83 t-1263. Polish Foreign Ministry Archive (AMSZ), Warsaw. Obtained by James G. Hershberg (George Washington University) and translated by Margaret K. Gnoinska (Troy University). https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115763
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Ciphergram No. 15890

Dispatched from Moscow on 27.10.1962 at 17:00

Received on 27.10.1962 at 18:45

Came into the Deciphering Department on 27.10.1962 at 22:50

To: [Foreign Minister Adam] RAPACKI

From: PASZKOWSKI

Supplement to our [cable] 536.

[First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasili Vasilyevich] Kuznetsov assessed the [UN] resolution of Ghana and the United Arab Republic [Egypt] as kind of a band-aid, but one that nevertheless is significant. On the other hand, he considers the statement of the Afro-Asian nations as both good and strong. He also thinks that the atmosphere in the UN does not favor the United States. The pressure from the neutral nations on the United States is strong. If the consultations do not bring any results, then [UN Secretary General] U Thant is prepared to move the issue regarding the [current] crisis to the General Assembly and to bring about a vote on the resolution [prepared] by the United Arab Republic. U Thant is convinced that many will vote in favor of the resolution, maybe even the majority. According to Kuznetsov, U Thant’s intentions are bringing about some results. The tone of [US Ambassador to UN Adlai] Stevenson’s [statements] has changed somewhat.1 One should not exclude the possibility, however, that [President John F.] Kennedy could move towards making more provocations under the pressure of the most reactionary circles. The United States is looking for strong and convincing reasons that would allow it to directly carry out the invasion of Cuba. At this time, however, it is not that easy to find such reasons. At the same time, Kuznetsov emphasized that the situation continues to be dangerous and that under no circumstances can we relax.

[1] Reference here to Adlai Stevenson’s famous presentation on October 25, 1962 at the United Nations Security Council during which he challenged the Soviet representative Valerian Zorin to admit that the Soviets had installed missiles on Cuba. When Zorin refused to say whether there were Soviet missiles on Cuba, Stevenson said: “I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over,” after which he presented photographs taken by U-2 planes which proved the presence of these missiles in Cuba.