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Digital Archive International History Declassified

October 30, 1962

TELEGRAM FROM POLISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA (JELEń), 30 OCTOBER 1962

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation

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    Jelen continues his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
    "Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 30 October 1962," October 30, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Szyfrogramy from Hawana 1962, 6/77 w-82 t-1264, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive (AMSZ), Warsaw. Obtained by James G. Hershberg (George Washington University) and translated by Margaret K. Gnoinska (Troy University). https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115771
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Ciphergram No. 16053

Dispatched from Havana on 10.30.1962 at 15:00

Received on 10.31.1962 at 13:35

Came into the Deciphering Department on 10.31.1962 at 16:25

To: KRAJEWSKI, EYES ONLY

From: [Ambassador Boleslaw] JELEN1

Politburo

Czesak2

[?]

Milnikiel

[Handwritten text:] Relay this [information], if possible, today, but not at night, to [Foreign] Minister [Adam] Rapacki and [Deputy Foreign Minister Marian] Naszkowski, 31 October

Based on the conversation with [Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr] Alexeyev:

He confirms the fact that there is confusion within the [Cuban] leadership, as well as dissatisfaction with how the decision had been made about the withdrawal of the military installations. One can sense that he [Alexeyev] is seriously depressed. During the talks [with the Cuban leadership], which he had conducted here at the highest levels, it was emphasized to him they [the Cubans] could not trust verbal declarations of Kennedy. The major concern of the [Cuban] leadership is the internal decrease of prestige for Fidel [Castro]. However, Alexeyev counts on the fact that Fidel will understand the situation.

Fidel stubbornly continues to reject even the thought of inspections in Cuba. Alexeyev expresses hope, however, that some kind of a formula will be found [to solve this issue].

The “5 conditions” proposed by the Cuban side are, in the opinion of Alexeyev, a correct and official request for the evacuation of the [US naval base at] Guantanamo. This kind of a request had to be made and the timing was appropriate. Alexeyev understands that Castro is only making a formal request while realizing that fulfilling this request cannot take place at this time.

My observations: Fidel lost a good opportunity, which was proposed by [Brazilian President João] Goulart (see our 437 point 4), because at the same time the concept of having Swedish inspectors had been proposed. What is not good for the Cubans is the fact that General [Indar Jit] Rikhye, who is described by the Prensa Latina in New York as “a military adviser to the Secretary General for UN Military Forces in the Congo,” is to accompany [the UN Secretary] U Thant on his announced visit to Cuba.

They announced Fidel Castro’s speech for 1 November.

[1] Poland’s Ambassador to Cuba (1961-1965).

[2] Józef Czesak, the head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party.