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Digital Archive International History Declassified

September 17, 1963

REPORT FROM JI PENGFEI ON LIU SHAOQI’S CONVERSATION WITH KIM IL SUNG

This document was made possible with support from the MacArthur Foundation

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    A Chinese report regarding an exchange of views between Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Premier Kim Il Sung's on international situation and anti-revisionism on 16 September, 1963.
    "Report from Ji Pengfei on Liu Shaoqi’s Conversation with Kim Il Sung," September 17, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 203-00566-02, 137-138. Obtained by Shen Zhihua and translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles Kraus. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116543
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Brief Report on the Meeting between Liu Shaoqi and Kim Il Sung (Two)

[To] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee:

On the morning of 17 September [1963], the two sides held discussions which lasted three and a half hours. Based on Chairman Liu [Shaoqi’s] discussion of the international situation and anti-revisionism on 16 [September], Premier Kim [Il Sung] discussed the views of [North] Korea. There were primarily four aspects to this:

(1) Kim said that the Korean [Workers’] Party is not afraid of the split within the international communist movement. He listed in a comprehensive manner how, since Khrushchev came to power, [he] has exerted pressure on, interfered with, and subverted the Korean [Workers’] Party. This explains how, in reality, the Korean [Workers’] Party split with Khrushchev on ideology long ago. The Korean [Workers’] Party has consistently been vigilant [against Khrushchev] and has not discussed its innermost thoughts and feelings [with him]. The Korean [Workers’] Party is willing to overthrow Khrushchev. However, [North] Korea is a small country and by themselves, they do not have enough weight [to attack Khrushchev]. [But] the Chinese [Communist] Party is a big party, and if we [China] experience a fall out with Khrushchev, then the [North] Korean party will stand resolutely with China.

(2) Kim indicated that the Korean [Workers’] Party is prepared to join the [Sino-Soviet] debate, and is unwilling to stand in the secondary line. [The Koreans] have already organized “talented scholars” to prepare some articles on “the function of the socialist camp,” “the meaning of the Asia-Africa-Latin America liberation movement,” and the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” He said while the quality might not be as good as ours, as long as their articles are correct [then they fulfill their objectives]. He emphasized that [lower quality articles] will provide the image that their direct participation in the conflict is natural and not forced or pressured. He said only through this method can we instill initiative within Party members, the people, and members of the South Korean intelligentsia.

(3) Regarding the issue of pointing at names, Chairman Liu said that if [the North Koreans] join the debate then [the Soviets] will point them out. Kim said: “If he criticizes us, then we will criticize back. Ultimately there is only one path. We cannot run, nor do we want to run.” He expressed that the Korean [Workers’] Party is not afraid of being called out. He said that if large countries such as China can hold their own and small countries such as Albania can hold their own, why can the Korean [Workers’] Party not hold its own?

(4) Kim said they [the Korean Workers’ Party] believe that convening a conference of leftist parties from Asia is a positive and necessary development. He also expressed that Korean [Workers’] Party will conduct more work with other parties. If there are words which the Chinese should not say, the [North] Korean party will say these words [on China’s behalf].

Chairman Liu mainly discussed the views of fraternal parties towards mediating Sino-Soviet differences and the process of [how] our Party came to understand Khrushchev. Both sides decided to continue the meeting on 18 September [1963]

Ji Pengfei

18 September [1963]