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Digital Archive International History Declassified

September 05, 1970

TELEGRAM, EMBASSY OF HUNGARY IN NORTH KOREA TO THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation

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    A telegram from the Embassy of Hungary in North Korea recounting Kim Il Sung's views on Japan and China, as expressed during a meeting at the Soviet embassy.
    "Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," September 05, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1970, 54. doboz, 81-52/a, 001331/3/1970. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balázs Szalontai. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116586
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On September 3, the heads of the fraternal embassies held a meeting at the Soviet ambassador’s. The Soviet ambassador provided them with information about the visit that the [Soviet] party and government delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister [Yakov Aleksandrovich] Malik and [Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union] Comrade [Kirill Trofimovich] Mazurov had made to the DPRK. Having received Comrade Malik on August 9, Comrade Kim Il Sung received Comrade Mazurov on August 15 (for a brief protocol visit) and also on [August] 18. [...] During the conversations, Kim Il Sung said the following:

[...] On the Japanese C[ommunist] P[arty]: they maintain good relations with the Japanese CP, but they also have important differences of opinion. The Japanese CP and the Korean Workers’ Party see the militarization of Japan differently. The leaders of the Japanese CP bring such childish arguments up against the [North Korean claims about the] danger of Japan’s militarization that there is no such danger, nor is it possible, because the constitution prohibits it. The Japanese Socialists pay greater attention to this [issue] than the Communists. This is an opportunist error on the part of the JCP.

[...] He repeatedly emphasized that the DPRK was firmly committed to reinforce and develop its contacts with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, no matter whether the Chinese liked that or not.  

We and the Chinese have differences of opinion on several big issues, he said. These are the following:

a) In internal politics [emphasis in the original]: issues such as the contradictions among the people, the people’s communes, the Great Leap Forward, the Hundred Flowers [Movement], and the Cultural Revolution (with regard to the last one, he declared that they disagreed with it, and it would not suit Korea). Nevertheless, we regard them as the internal affairs [of China], and we do not interfere in them.

b) In foreign politics [emphasis in the original]: The DPRK considers the Soviet Union a friendly country that is constructing communism. The Chinese say that the assistance with which the Soviet Union provides the anti-imperialist forces is a hoax and a swindle. They [the North Koreans] disagree with this. [...]

According to the Soviet ambassador, Comrades Malik and Mazurov left the DPRK with an essentially good impression.

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