Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry

[…] The 8-point proposal that the DPRK had made on 8 April 1971 has demonstrably undergone incessant changes up to mid-1972, and in matters of principle, at that there is a qualitative change in the new proposals, namely, that the DPRK—in contrast with its earlier demands—no longer makes the withdrawal of the American troops a precondition of a peaceful settlement (because these [troops] will depart anyway, sooner or later), it does not demand the immediate dissolution of UNCURK [United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea] (because, in any case, the cancellation of the commission’s work can be achieved only in the UN), and it is ready to negotiate with Park Chung Hee and his colleagues (because this is only a transition period, as the influence of the opposition forces is growing in South Korea).

[…] (In the fall of 1971, Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol], [during his visit] in Moscow, proposed to abrogate the Soviet-Korean treaty [of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance]; the Soviet side, of course, could not approve this [idea].)

In the spring of this year, the leaders of South Korea also came forward with new proposals for national unification. The new element of these proposals was that the Republic of Korea attached an important precondition to national unification, namely, that the North should renounce armed [unification] as a solution, and declare that it would not attack the southern part of the country.

[…] In the spirit of “limited withdrawal,” the USA has reduced the strength of the troops it is stationing in South Korea, but at the same time it sent more advanced military equipment there, and supported the South Korean stabilization by [providing the ROK] with economic assistance. This undoubtedly yielded several results: along the Demilitarized Zone, in the first line, the South Korean army has wholly taken over the position of American troops, its military potential has increased, and at the same time living standards have also increased. […] China’s involvement in the efforts aimed at solving the Korean question may also be motivated by the following objective: this way China seeks to demonstrate that there is no need for collective security in Asia—[a conception] initiated by the USSR—since “it is possible to achieve a solution, or at least break the logjam, in some Asian questions without [creating such a collective security system],” only “the superpowers must cease their control over, and interference in, other countries” (quoted from a recent speech of Zhou Enlai).              

[…]

In the press of the developed capitalist countries, but also in the press of the developing countries, one can frequently find statements which hold the Korean agreement up as a model for the DRV and the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam]. The Saigon regime makes particularly great efforts to use this diversionary maneuver in its attempts to disarm the Vietnamese revolutionary forces. […]

Sándor Etre