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March 16, 1967

Note on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Zvetkov, on 15 March 1967

GDR Embassy to the DPRK

Pyongyang, 16 March 1967

 

 

 

 

N o t e

on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Zvetkov,

on 15 March 1967

 

 

I visited Comrade Zvetkov to receive the promised information about Kim Il Sung visit to Moscow. First I reported to Comrade Zvetkov about two other conversations of [GDR Ambassador] Comrade Brie with [Cuban Ambassador] Vigoa and [Vietnamese Ambassador] Hoang Moi.

 

  1. […] [Replacement of Soviet Ambassador Gorchakov through Ambassador Sudarikov due to political and alcohol problems]

 

  1. Comrade Zvetkov made the following statements on the results of Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union in December 1966:

 

    1. Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union was unofficial and the main reason for his travel. The Soviet comrades did not know in advance about the interruption of his stay and Kim Il Sung’s ensuing travel to Romania. He [Zvetkov] is not aware of the actual reasons and results of this visit to Romania.

 

    1. […] [Vietnam]

 

    1. On China

 

Comrade Brezhnev provided Kim Il Sung with an overview of this problem.

 

Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed in his statements on this subject that the KWP considers the so-called Cultural Revolution in China as a massive idiocy with a large impact on the DPRK as well. The DPRK is situated very close to China, and there are many problems to solve for the construction of socialism [in Korea]. Therefore the KWP does not openly criticize the CCP since it just cannot do it. It is imperative for the KWP to think about the future since it is aware of the wickedness of the Chinese.

 

    1. […] [European Security and Non-Proliferation]

  

    1. On Polemics [between USSR and China]

 

Kim Il Sung stated the KWP does not deem it necessary to conduct open polemics. Actually, the KWP is against this.

 

Comrade Brezhnev explained the CPSU had kept quiet for two years but the CCP did not abort polemics. Thus the CPSU was forced to refute those accusations and explain its own positions. Yet it did so without any insults. Kim Il Sung explained the KWP had stopped criticizing the CPSU a long time ago and will not change that.

 

    1. On the Conference [of communist and workers parties]

 

Kim Il Sung expressed his very negative opinion on the proposals made at the Party Congresses in Hungary and Bulgaria. Comrade Brezhnev referred to the fact that already 60 fraternal parties had agreed to participate in such a conference.

 

Kim Il Sung replied the Korean comrades think conditions have not yet matured for such a conference. The Chinese party and some others will not participate. Thus it is warranted to understand the position of the KWP. Currently the CCP has its own group in about 60 countries. Maybe it would use this opportunity to convene a separate conference. This way unity will not be achieved at all. To the contrary, the divide will become deeper. For these reasons, the KWP will “neither participate with you, nor with the Chinese”.

 

    1. […] [Japan]

 

8. Relations Soviet Union - DPRK

 

Comrade Zvetkov stated that both sides expressed the positive development of relations and were pleased with the results of the talks.

 

9. On Economic Questions

 

Kim Il Sung also presented some general requests about the further supply of Soviet aid. There was agreement in principle and a decision to talk about this in detail at a later opportunity.

 

 

  1. On the Visit of a Government Delegation headed by Kim Il Sung to the Soviet Union between 13 February and 4 March 1967

 

As a result of the talks between Kim Il Sung and Brezhnev [in December 1966], the KWP had decided to sent a government delegation to the Soviet Union headed by Kim Il Sung to discuss economic questions in more detail. The Korean side stated its following wishes:

 

[…] [long list of concrete aid projects]

 

Jarck

Acting Ambassador

 

A note on Kim Il Sung's concern about the possible impact of "Cultural Revolution" in China on North Korea and his stance on the Sino-Soviet debate.


Document Information

Source

PolA AA, MfAA, G-A 364. Translated by Bernd Schaefer.

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