



## **July 27, 1958**

# **Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng**

### **Citation:**

“Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng,” July 27, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China), vol. 7 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992), 326-327.  
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117011>

### **Summary:**

Mao Zedong decides to deploy the planned bombardment of the nationalist-controlled Jinmen Island in the Taiwan Strait.

### **Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation.

### **Original Language:**

Chinese

### **Contents:**

- English Translation
- Scan of Original Document

[...]

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

[I] could not sleep [last night], but thought about it again. It seems more appropriate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen for several days. While holding our operations, [we will] observe the situational development there. We will not attack whether or not the other side relieves a garrison. Until they launch a provocative attack, [we will] then respond with a counterattack. The solution of the problem in the Middle East takes time. Since we have time, why should we be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack plans now, but one day we will put it into implementation. If the other side invades Zhang[zhou], Shan[tou], Fuzhou, and Hangzhou, a best scenario [for us to take action] would emerge. How do you think about this idea? Could you have a discussion about this with other comrades? It is extremely beneficial [for our decision-making] with politics in command and going through repeated deliberations. To make a plan too quickly usually results in an unthoughtful consideration. I did such things quite often and sometimes had unavoidable miscalculations. What is your opinion? Even if the other side attacks us, [we still] can wait for a couple of days for a clear calculation, and then start our counterattack. Can all of the above points be accounted as working out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy in battles a thousand miles away, and having some certainty of success that we will be ever-victorious? We must persist in the principle of fighting no battle we are not sure of winning. If you agree [with the above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and ask him to think about it very carefully. Let me know his opinion.

Have a peaceful morning!

Mao Zedong

10:00 a.m., 27 July [1958]

[...]

# 关于把握打金门时机给 彭德怀、黄克诚<sup>[1]</sup>的信

(一九五八年七月二十七日)

德怀、克诚同志：

睡不着觉，想了一下。打金门停止若干天似较适宜。目前不打，看一看形势。彼方换防不打，不换防也不打。等彼方无理进攻，再行反攻。中东解决，要有时间，我们是有时间的，何必急呢？暂时不打，总有打之一日。彼方如攻漳、汕、福州、杭州，那就最妙了。这个主意，你看如何？找几个同志议一议如何？政治挂帅，反复推搞〈敲〉，极为有益。一鼓作气，往往想得不周，我就往往如此，有时难免失算。你意如何？如彼来攻，等几天，考虑明白，再作攻击。以上种种，是不是算得运筹帷幄之中，制敌千里之外，我战则克，较有把握呢？不打无把握之仗这个原则，必须坚持。如你同意，将此信电告叶飞<sup>[2]</sup>，过细考虑一下，以其意见见告。

晨安！

毛泽东

七月廿七日上午十时

根据手稿刊印。已编入《毛泽东  
军事文选》(内部本)。

## 注 释

〔1〕 彭德怀，当时任中共中央军委委员、国务院副总理兼国防部部长，主持军委日常工作。黄克诚，当时任中共中央军委秘书长、国防部副部长。

〔2〕 叶飞，当时任中共福建省委书记、中国人民解放军福州军区政治委员。