January 20, 1972
Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

Citation:

Summary:
Updates concerning Park Chung Hee's New Years speech on peaceful unification, Red Cross negotiations, and ROK refusal of dual admission of the Koreas into the UN, and the 14th preliminary North-South Red Cross negotiations.

Credits:
This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation.

Original Language:
English

Contents:
- Scan of Original Document
Dear Mr. K.,

Confidential No. 14

at N-TH of the Conference held on 11 January 1972, President Park Chung had made an interesting reference to the question of the non-membership of the United Nations of the divided countries into the United Nations. This includes the full embargo on the nuclear energy of the non-members of the United Nations. Perhaps the proposal he made will be of interest to you.

I acknowledge receipt of confidential letters No. 49 to 55. I have taken note of their contents and enclosures.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

"Korea cannot be seen in the same light as Germany.
Mr. Ahmet H. Ozbudun
"Principal Secretary of universality of the United Nations, which UNCURK recently cited in the past regarding the issue of division of Seoul, Korea, this principle was virtually scrapped when Nationalist China was expelled from the United Nations at the time of the admission of Communist China last year.

"Besides, it is unthinkable that south and north Korea be admitted to the United Nations simultaneously, because it is against the explicit wish of the people of Korea, longing for the reunification of their homeland. This is the basis of the Kutakovskiy government.

Mr. Muller

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
14 January 1972

THE ROK PRESIDENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE ADMISSION OF DIVIDED COUNTRIES INTO THE UNITED NATIONS

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

At his New Year's Press Conference held on 11 January 1972, President Park Chung Hee made an interesting reference to the question of the simultaneous admission of the Divided Countries into the United Nations. The following which constitute full excerpts on the matter as referred to in the press conference, might be of interest in the immediate future:

"We anticipate that the simultaneous admission of divided nations into the United Nations will be talked of in the future. We must reiterate our position in this respect. First, Korea differs from other divided nations such as Germany, Vietnam and China in historical background, in the circumstances under which it was divided, and in the present situation. It would be utterly unrealistic to try to settle the problems of these divided nations in a package, ignoring these special characteristics. Germany, for instance, was divided under entirely different conditions from those of Korea, and the two halves of Germany have never clashed in arms. Communist east Germany even today has no intention to communize or unify west Germany by force.

"Korea cannot be seen in the same light as Germany.

"As to the principle of universality of the United Nations, which was frequently cited in the past regarding the issues of divided nations, this principle was virtually scrapped when Nationalist China was ousted from the United Nations at the time of the admission of Communist China last year.

"Besides, it is unthinkable that south and north Korea be admitted to the United Nations simultaneously, because it is against the explicit will of the people of Korea, longing for the unification of their fatherland. This is the basic position of our government.

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
"Some of us seem to look upon the settlement of the Korean issue in the manner of east and west Germany, which seek simultaneous admission to the United Nations. But as I said before, Germany differs from Korea in the circumstances under which it was divided, in developments since, and the present situation.

"Though west Germany is reported today to agree on simultaneous admission to the United Nations with east Germany, it is not without conditions. As I understand, the west German government has set 21 conditions for simultaneous admission, some of which are highly interesting to us. One of them demands the mutual renunciation of use or threat of arms. In spite of the obvious absence of any intention on either side in the past to attack the other, west Germany is thus attempting to secure an explicit promise against the use or threat of arms.

"Another condition seeks a mutual declaration to renounce civil war and still another demands the renunciation of any acts impairing peaceful coexistence. But all these three conditions are the same in essence. The stipulation against the use of arms or violence is thus repeated in all these conditions only in different form. If these conditions are met, west Germany will go to the United Nations with east Germany. Not without conditions, as some of us seem to think mistakenly.

"We should know that, even if south and north Korea approach as close as the two parts of Germany have come to each other, there are many peaks to be negotiated in the path of a united Korea.

"In principle, I believe, the foreign policy of a nation must be based on national strength stemming from solid domestic structure and national consensus enabling the nation to meet any situation positively and with elasticity. Our diplomacy in the future will be executed and promoted under this principle."

I should like to refer to this highly significant matter in my future letters, as may be warranted.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL No. 50

14 January 1971

THE PRESIDENT'S NEW YEAR'S PRESS CONFERENCE

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

Attached herewith is a pamphlet entitled "Year of Total Security", which contains the official text, just received from the Blue House, of President Park Chung Hee's New Year's Press Conference of 11 January 1972. (This was a 2.5 hour affair broadcast nationally on TV and Radio Networks.)

Although I reported on portions thereof, by topic, in several of my letters this week, I believe that the pamphlet makes useful reading on an entity. It also sheds light on the President's overall thinking.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
CONFIDENTIAL  N.5

14 January 1972

THE ROK PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ON THE RED CROSS NEGOTIATION

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

On 10 January 1972, in a statement, the President of the ROK stressed that "We must positively support and participate in significant Korean National Red Cross activities by carrying into Red Cross endeavours on humanitarian causes and on national aspiration to achieve peaceful unification". He expressed the hope that the north-south Red Cross meeting would serve as "an initial step towards a much cherished (goal of) peaceful unification."

On 11 January, the President, in a New Year's press conference, declared the following:

"The South-North Red Cross Talks have commenced during last year. Our Government and people have extended their full support to this. The purpose of the talks is to alleviate, from a humanitarian viewpoint, the sufferings of 10 million members of separated families. Although there have been more than ten preliminary meetings held so far, a full-dress talk has not commenced to this date. However, we would exert our efforts for the success of the talks, with patience and sincerity, and with a hope that the talks, if they become successful, would lead to national unification."

On 3 January, in an interview with the NHK of Japan, ROK Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil said that the Government would make efforts to develop the current south-north Korea Red Cross talks into a dialogue for the unification of Korea by shifting the present humanitarian talks to a political stage.

On 8 January, in an interview with the Associated Press, the Prime Minister stressed that the national emergency in the ROK would not affect the Red Cross talks. He said: "The ROK would do its best to carry the little dialogue we have opened with the north to a successful conclusion. We hope with all sincerity that it will eventually lead to the peaceful reunification of the entire nation. However, he said that no significant talks might be expected in the near future."
My own impression remains that both the AOK and the DPJK must exert more strenuous and sincere effort sooner even to have the preliminary talks graduated into the contemplated formal negotiations.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
CONFIDENTIAL: No. 52

14 January 1972

ROK PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF INVITATION OF THE ROK AND THE DPRK TO THE UNGA DEBATE ON KOREA AT THE 27TH SESSION

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

In his 11 January 1972 press conference for the New Year, President Park Chung Hee made reference to the ROK stand on the question of invitation, to representatives of the ROK and the DPRK, to participate in the discussion of the Korean question possibly at the next session of the General Assembly as follows:

"As to its relations with the United Nations, the government sees a full possibility that the Communist bloc will propose at the U.N. General Assembly this year again, as it did in the past, the simultaneous invitation of south and north Korea to attend the Korea debate.

"The position of our government in this respect is clear. As I said in a statement on August 15, 1970, north Korea must renounce its ambition of armed communisation-unification. When and if the north Korean Communists expressly renounce the use of arms, we are willing to meet them for conversation at any time and any place. Otherwise, even if we sit at the United Nations with north Korea, the talks will result in nothing but a waste of time."

The foregoing is a clear, if not definitive, indication that, as in past years, the ROK will favour the matter of invitation to the DPRK on a conditional basis only, namely if P'yongyang unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question.

While the stance on "conditional" invitation has prevailed without much difficulty in the past, evidently it would be not so easy to obtain requisite majority for such invitation if and when the Korean question is discussed at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
I believe it is useful for me to refer to this topic and its ramifications in future correspondence in due course, when warranted.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Üzbüyük
Principal Secretary
THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE ROK FOREIGN POLICY IN 1972

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The following contains information on the statement of the ROK Foreign Minister on his Government's foreign policy in 1972.

In his New Year's message on 4 January, Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik said that the Ministry had designated 1972 as "the year of renovation in diplomacy" for the national security. Minister Kim said that the Government would further strengthen its diplomatic activities toward the United States and Japan as nucleus for the ROK diplomacy for the national security. He said that the Government would launch a flexible diplomacy towards the United Nations.

Minister Kim stated that efforts would be exerted to explore a new area of relations with non-hostile Communist nations, including East European countries, for the practical interests of the ROK. He said that the Government would gradually seek relations with some of the African and Central and South American states with whom the ROK has no diplomatic relations at the present time. These moves, the Minister said, were aimed to isolate north Korea from the world community. He said further that technical cooperation with non-aligned nations would be intensified this year to enlist their support for Korea's peaceful unification. To this end, the Government was planning to send, around March, special missions to the non-aligned nations to block the expected Communist proposals on the withdrawal of the UN troops, the dissolution of UNCURK and the simultaneous invitation of south and north Korea to participate in the UN discussion on Korea this year.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet E. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
14TH PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE NORTH-SOUTH RED CROSS SOCIETIES

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

On 10 January 1972, the North-South Korean Red Cross Societies held their 14th preliminary meeting without recording any progress on the agenda of the prospective full-dress negotiations.

The ROK side, in reaffirmation of its stand, stressed that the members of separated families could undertake "mutual visits" upon confirmation of their whereabouts. It stated that it was unreasonable for these members to travel "freely" to the north and south without having first confirmed the location of their respective family members. The ROK side added that "free travel" as advocated by its counterpart could be capitalized upon for purposes other than the quest for re-union of families.

The DPRK Red Cross persisted on its original proposal that the matter of "free travel" should be placed in the agenda of the full-dress negotiations. It said that in addition to facilitating the re-union of separated family members, this would be conducive to the peaceful unification of Korea.

The next preliminary meeting is scheduled for 19 January.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Cebudun
Principal Secretary

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
THE MATTER OF KOREAN UNIFICATION

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

At his New Year's press conference of 11 January 1971, President Park Chung Hee was asked to elaborate on his "peaceful unification plan."

The President, in part, said the following:

"As I have stated here, the future of the Korean peninsula and our own destiny are not to be decided by big powers or international trends. We must clearly realize that they rest on nothing but our subjective capabilities and autonomous determination. This master principle will not change, however drastically the international situation may change in the future. Without any change of our subjective capabilities and autonomous determination, our foreign policy will not change; however fluid the international situation may grow.

"The same is true with our unification issue. What is the first step for unification? As I have repeatedly stated, the first requisite is that the north Korean Communists explicitly renounce before the entire world their ambition of armed comminization and unification.

"The only way for us to force north Korea to abandon its war plan is to foster our own potential enough to discourage north Korea by consolidating all our national strength. No words will persuade the Communists to renounce their plan of armed comminization. Strength sufficient to deter their aggression alone will be convincing to them. I believe that an allout national security system on our part will help expedite the peaceful unification we aim at.

"So-called four-power assurance of our security, which was once proposed in some political quarters of our country, is an unrealistic and dangerous concept. My opposition to this proposal, which was a political issue during the Presidential election last April, remains unchanged. It is an illusory concept that must be strictly guarded against.

"As you know, the four nations are the so-called four big powers near us, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Japan. In other words, doesn't this mean that
these four nations can get together with one another to guarantee that no hostilities break out on the Korean peninsula?

"Since these nations differ in their interests, it will be difficult to expect that they would reach a thorough accord. In my view, even if any temporary agreement is reached, we cannot trust it. Nor can we live at ease under such a guarantee, because even if an agreement is reached, what would be the next stage? The four countries will consult with one another to prevent a war on the Korean peninsula. Communist China and the Soviet Union will watch Communist north Korea, while the United States and Japan will exercise a certain control on south Korea so as to prevent any outbreak of war.

"In doing this, the first problem will be that the Communist side will assert that the U.S. and U.N. forces stationed in Korea should be withdrawn from Korea completely, saying that there is no need for U.N. forces to remain in Korea because the four countries guarantee Korea's security. They will also demand that the Korea-U.S. Defence Treaty be abrogated.

"In that case, Communist north Korea must also abrogate its military alliances with Communist China and the Soviet Union.

"If we abrogate our defense treaty with the United States, then all the U.S. troops will return home. Communist north Korea will do away with its military alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union. Then almost a state of vacuum will be brought about. If this happens, will Communist north Korea still abide its promise of peace? The situation is exactly what the north Korean Communists and Kim Il Sung hope to see develop.

"If and when Communist north Korea, with any excuses or reasons, is able to get the U.S. troops pulled out of Korea, doing away with the Korea-U.S. Defense Treaty, Kim Il Sung would surely avail himself of the opportunity to attack the south. It would be a case of our providing just the opportunity which the enemy is trying to seize.
"Those who advocate the four power guarantee might say that if Communist north Korea attacks, the four nations would stop the fighting. Will this be possible in reality?

"It would be most improbable, as shown in the recent Indo-Pakistan situation. Supposedly if Kim Il Sung had provoked a war under a certain pretext the United States will send its troops to Korea to block it, even after all of its troops have been pulled out, and the Korea-U.S. Defense Treaty is no longer effective.

"It would be like the case when the Indo-Pakistan war broke out, when the three big nations behind these two nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, got together at the U.N. Security Council meeting merely to exchange verbal accusation. Probably the United States would say something like this: Communist north Korea started the war, so they must return to the original position.

"On the other hand, would the Soviet Union and Communist China admit it was first started by Kim Il Sung?

"Communist north Korea still sticks to its reckless stand that we (the Republic of Korea) started the Korean War (1950-1953), even in the face of universal realization that they started it.

"Their side would say that south Korea started the war, and ours would claim that the north Korean communists started it. During the exchange of verbal accusations victory or defeat would be decided.

"What the north Korean Communists are trying to seize is just this kind of opportunity.

"So I think it is a very dangerous way of thinking that will only result in providing a good chance for the north Korean Communists to achieve their goals.

"To less informed people, it may seem that if the four nations advise the north Korean Communists to stop fighting, it would work out that way. But in international politics, things do not work out that simply. In short, have we something here similar to the Indo-Pakistan situation?

"Therefore, it would be better to see the U.N. forces continue to remain in Korea, although we may face the reduction of these forces, while the U.S. defense commitment to Korea will serve as a main basis of Korean security. These serve as a breakwater to forestall north Korean Communist provocation."
"In conclusion, the proposal involving the four-nation guarantee of Korean security is nothing but a delusion.

"When these four big nations get together behind the scenes they will never reach an agreement as long as their interests differ from one another. This has been confirmed through the Indo-Pakistan war. Today the U.N. forces are in existence, but we have clearly seen that the United Nations was unable to fulfill its functions to resolve the Indo-Pakistan war. If and when the three nations' interests were completely in accord with one another, something favorable might have been worked out.

"But since their interests differ from one another, they end up merely exchanging verbal attacks. In other words, if one presents a resolution, the other will veto it, and vice versa.

"If the communists stage a blitzkrieg in a few days, victory or defeat will be decided while the more powerful nations are exchanging mere words back at the U.N.

"Therefore, under the present circumstances, the immediate and only way of achieving the peaceful unification of Korea will be to prevent war on the peninsula. To do this, it is mandatory to force the north Korean Communists to discard their scheme to communize the country by force. And in order to make them discard this scheme, we must foster our power to restrain a war efficiently even if the Communists provoke combat. Thus we must increasingly strengthen our security system. This is the most we can do to contribute toward peaceful unification at the present stage.

"I make the point clear that my view mentioned above will remain unchanged, no matter what others say.

"Even if such a guarantee is made by five or a dozen nations, instead of only four nations, we must still not rely on it. Though the current talks between the south and north Korean Red Cross Organizations are based on humanitarianism, we are not sure how much sincerity the north Korean side will show in the future. However, on our part, we feel that we must face the talks with endurance and sincerity to the last.

"Today I wish to take this opportunity to make one remark to the nation. That is that the nation should not be too hasty
in respect to the unification issue. Although it is naturally the fervent desire for everyone to see territorial unification as soon as possible, we should not go about the unification issue hastily. I believe it would be a step toward unification when we make constant and faithful efforts to strengthen patiently our security.

"No matter how hastily we act, we still cannot expect to achieve our desire until such a time as our efforts and the outside situation and conditions are mature. ...

"...This does not mean in any way that it will take 700 years, as in the case of the Three Kingdoms. Yet we must not be hasty about it, because we may face a greater despair if and when the international situation or other conditions do not develop as we hope.

"Instead, we should make a step-by-step effort with persistent patience. We must build up our own internal stability by any means, while objective conditions mature. When the objective conditions mature, we must be equipped with abilities to be able to seize the opportunity. Until then, no unification can be achieved.

"The most favorable opportunity for achieving national unification, I believe, was when Korea was liberated from the Japanese colonial rule on Aug. 15, 1945, with the Japanese troops and Japanese people driven out of Korea. But we failed to achieve it then, because we lacked internal stability at that time. We did not have capabilities to seize such conditions as an opportunity. But I am sure that we will have such an opportunity in the future. In order to meet the opportunity, we must start making efforts from now on.

"Moreover, irresponsible and disorderly discussions regarding national unification raised at random will only result in confusing national opinion, and such acts will not be any help toward achieving national unification, but will only do harm, I think."

I presume this will be a pertinent topic in some of my future letters,

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours

Ahmet H. H. Özbudun
Principal Secretary

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan, Chef de Cabinet
United Nations, New York