February 16, 1972
Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

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Summary:
Update concerning 18th preliminary Red Cross negotiation, Japan-DPRK relationship intensification, and the reassignment of ROK Vietnam troops to the DMZ.

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Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

CONFIDENTIAL

11 February 1972

The representatives of the ICRC and the Red Cross Movement Organizations held their 18th preliminary meeting on 16 February.

The ICRC proposed that the two parties should adjust and arrange the order of agenda items by specifically classifying them in accordance with their "organic relations" since there was no basic difference in the two proposals as presented respectively by the two parties at the previous meeting.

I acknowledge receipt of your confidential letters No. 71, 72 and 73.

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

Mr. Ahmet E. Cebudun
Principal Secretary
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Yongdongpo
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Seoul
Korea
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York
THE 18TH PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE ROK AND THE DPRK RED CROSS ORGANIZATIONS

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The representatives of the ROK and the DPRK Red Cross Organizations held their 18th preliminary meeting on 10 February.

The ROK Red Cross proposed that the two parties should adjust and arrange the order of agenda items by specifically classifying them in accordance with their "organic relations" since there was no basic difference in the new proposals as presented respectively by the two parties at the previous meeting.

It said that judging from a comparison of the two proposals: First, the proposed agenda item 1 of the north Korean Red Cross, namely "the question of searching for the members of dispersed families and relatives" had the identical implication of its proposed agenda item 1, namely "the question of ascertaining the fate and whereabouts of the members of dispersed families and relatives, and the transmission of information thereon". Second, the north side's proposal of "arrangements for their free visits" and the south side's "facilitating free travel for the purpose of mutual visits" had no difference of meaning objectively. Third, the north side's concept of the "exchange of correspondence" and the south side's agenda item 2 were identical. Fourth, the north side's concept of "the question of reuniting the members of the dispersed families", was identical to the south side's previous proposal, which the north had accepted. And, the south side's agenda item 6, "other humanitarian questions to be settled", was exactly the same as its counterpart's, which the south side had accepted.

The ROK Red Cross said that the two parties had approached a stage where they could agree on the new agenda.

However, the DPRK Red Cross said that the south side's proposal was intricate and had no intrinsic meaning of freedom. Moreover, the proposal was restrictive since it used the word "facilitating". The

Mr. G. V. Narasimhan
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DPRK side further said that an agenda should merely give a clear and basic direction for the formal meetings, and urged the south side to accept its revised agenda, which it said was more logical and comprehensive.

The ROK Red Cross countered that the projects of any Red Cross organization were based on the principle of freedom, and that there was no need for Red Cross organizations to repeat the word "freedom" in every project they undertook. It also said that the agenda items should be put into separate and independent clauses when the contents and objects of the projects differed. It urged the DPRK Red Cross to accept its new proposal which was reasonable and realistic.

The two parties agreed to hold their 19th preliminary meeting on 17 February. After the meeting, the two sides met informally for about an hour. This get-together was reportedly held in cordial spirits.

Subsequently, the ROK Red Cross Spokesman Mr. Chung Choo Hyon said that there had not been any substantial change in the attitude of the north Red Cross, and that it was attempting to delay the progress of the meeting by making an issue of the principle of freedom which had already been clearly defined in the proposal put forth by his side.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The itemized information below concerns new developments in Japan-North Korea relations:

On 8 February, members of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet have formed what they call the "Japan-North Korea Parliamentary Association."

The association is reportedly designed to promote exchange of persons with north Korea.

* * *

On 8 February, trade union leaders of Japan formed the "Japan-North Korea Solitary and Liaison Conference for Exchange of Workers" in order to promote friendship and worker's exchange with north Korea.

* * *

On 9 February, the Office of Tokyo Governor Ryokichi Minobe announced that the Governor had sent official invitations to five north Korean officials to visit Japan sometime after June 1972. These included Mr. Lee Sang Son, Mayor of Pyongyang, and Mr. Kang Ryang Uk, Chairman of north Korea's External Cultural Liaison Council. These were in reciprocation of that extended to Governor Minobe by the north Korean authorities for his visit to Pyongyang in October 1971.

* * *

Meanwhile, Justice Minister Maseo said that it would be difficult for the Government to approve a visit to Japan by north Korean officials. He cited the standing government policy to limit personnel exchanges between Japan and north Korea to sportsmen and scholars.

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On 9 February, Representatives of the Choryon (an organization of pro-north Korean residents in Japan) asked Japanese Justice Minister Shigesaburo Maceo for re-entry permits for a group of 13 pro-north Korean residents who were planning to attend celebrations in Pyongyang marking the 60th birthday of north Korean Premier Kim Il Sung on 15 April 1972. The group was reportedly planning to depart Japan on 20 March and return on 20 June 1972.

* * *

On 9 February, it was reported that a cargo-liner service between Japan and north Korea would be inaugurated late this month in Japan. A Japanese cargo-liner was scheduled to depart from Nagasaki, Kyushu, Japan to Nampo (formerly Chinnampo), north Korea, around the end of this month; service would continue thereafter, on 20-day intervals.

* * *

Attempts to establish Japan-north Korea contacts would probably continue in the foreseeable future notwithstanding the seemingly disapproving attitude of the Government of Japan. Moreover, protests on the part of the Seoul Government that have been heretofore launched with Tokyo, might be intensified despite the ROK's extreme reluctance to avoid any frictions at this crucial time when Japan's support is so much needed — particularly at the next session of the UNGA.

... My comments aside, the attached text might prove of interest to you.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
A comment on Japan-DPRK trade

Following are excerpts from an article entitled Japan-north Korea Trade Faces Many Hurdles, by Kentaro Koshiba, published in the Japan Times on 7 February:

"North Korea is moving ahead with its long-range economic development program (1971-76) which is designed to more than double that country's industrial production in the six-year period. The private trade agreement signed last month between Japanese and Korean officials in Pyongyang provides, or seems to provide, a nice backdrop for that program. . . .

"The five-year agreement, the first long-term arrangement to be concluded between the two countries since trade was resumed in 1962, will bring their two-way trade to about $500 million in 1976 — provided, of course, that things develop as smoothly as north Korean leaders hope.

"But in reality the picture is not as rosy as it may appear. The Japanese Government is unlikely to approve the use of Export-Import Bank funds, easy-term credits needed for the export of large industrial machinery. Visits to Japanese factories by north Korean engineers, a step essential to the conclusion of any plant export contract, also seem remote as the Government is not willing to approve such trips.

"Behind these obstacles is, of course, the persistent opposition of the ROK. Since the trade agreement was signed, Seoul is reported to have been pressuring Tokyo not to ease economic relations with north Korea. Obviously, the ROK regards an economically strong north Korea as a threat to its existence.

"Unless these problems are ironed out, the north Koreans are not expected to get what they want from Japan. . . . If north Korea cannot buy these and other plants from Japan, it will turn to West European countries. This would mean a setback to Japanese firms trying to do more business with north Korea. But the best they can do at the moment is to get around the Government's "go slow" policy and make small contracts in anticipation of bigger deals in the future."
ASSIGNMENT OF ROK VIET-NAM VETERANS TO THE KOREAN DMZ

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

With the return of the fourth group of the ROK Second Marine Brigade (Blue Dragons) from Viet-Nam on 7 February, the Ministry of National Defence announced on the same day that the Brigade would be assigned to the Western Sector of the Korean Demilitarized Zone.

It is not known how many of the men of this Brigade will have remaining military service tenure (of three years) to be involved in this assignment, and for how long. However, some of the troops may have lengthy military service ahead.

Two matters, among others, seem pertinent: First, whether the psychology of these combat-seasoned soldiers may contribute to the mutual escalation of tensions at the DMZ. Second, whether the ROK has elected this risk because its apprehensions regarding an invasion from the north is more real than ordinarily accepted in certain quarters.

The matter of the return of all remaining ROK troops from Viet-Nam appears to have reached a decision-making stage between the ROK and the United States.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Ahmet H. Oztudun
Principal Secretary

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