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Digital Archive International History Declassified

March 06, 1963

RECORD OF CONVERSATION FROM CHAIRMAN MAO'S RECEPTION OF THE DELEGATION OF THE BRAZILIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (THE NEW PARTY)

This document was made possible with support from the Henry Luce Foundation

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    Chairman Mao addresses the communist compulsion to revolution and past cases of revolutionary activities like the Cuban experience.
    "Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao's Reception of the Delegation of the Brazilian Communist Party (The New Party)," March 06, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 111-00608-03. Translated by Sergey Radchenko. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117972
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Central Committee International Liaison Department Document

Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao's Reception of the Delegation of the Brazilian Communist Party (The New Party)

Time: March 6, 1963. 6:10pm to 8pm.

Place: Zhongnanhai, Yinian Hall

Chairman: Welcome to you. You are a Marxist-Leninist party, determined to pursue revolution. There are some parties now that are Communist in name but are determined not to pursue revolution. A Marxist-Leninist must pursue revolution. What sort of Communist party is it if it does not [pursue] revolution? If one does not [pursue] revolution, from the people’s perspective, there is no great difference with the political parties of the capitalist class. For such parties, there is no need to exist at all. For example, European socialist parties, UK labor party – they are no different from the political parties of the capitalist class. At present some Communist parties are coming close to social democracy, especially the faction of the Indian Communist Party led by Dange – he doesn’t have the slightest difference from the big national parties of the big bourgeoisie and the landlords. This new party of yours, you feel that the new party is smaller than the old party, and also feel that the forces of imperialism and their running dogs are great, you have many difficulties. Your country has bourgeois liberalism, a Communist party can be either legal or semi-legal. Are you currently semi-legal or illegal?

Amazonas: We are semi-legal.

Chairman: On the one hand, this is advantageous. You can resort to semi-legal activities, openly publish periodicals, not be banned. The cadres and party members can openly carry out mass work, develop the party’s organization – all of this is advantageous. What’s not advantageous is this: this sort of situation is not seen as very good for a revolutionary’s toughening, there is no white terror. Our party was always illegal. We had two instances of cooperation with the Guomindang. The first time was from 1924 to 1927, three years. We used the conditions of cooperation to develop party and mass movement, and carried out some military work. In preparing and carrying out the Northern Expedition, we obtained [nawo] some troops. Party membership reached 50,000. But at the time the Party did not have the consciousness, was not prepared for a serious attack by the capitalist class, was not prepared to oppose white terror. The emphasis was placed at the time on the aspect of organizing a mass movement, including the peasant movement, but this organized several million peasants under our leadership. Though the peasantry [sic, possibly “the party?”] had some weapons, it was not prepared for white terror. In 1927 white terror began, we fell into a hasty position. We have told of this experience to many parties, for instance the Indonesian Party, the Japanese Party, letting them use if for reference. In general, there is day when one can meet with this sort of situation. We proposed that they prepare themselves mentally and organizationally, and also, if possible, prepare themselves militarily. But who really taught us to pick up arms? It is not that we taught ourselves. It was imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kai-shek. They taught us by resorting to white terror. We had no other way, only to grasp weapons. Out of 50,000 party members, not many were left. Some were killed, others turned allegiance. The third part turned negative and left the party. The fourth part are those who remained – it’s the few of us. Out of 50,000 party members, only a few thousand remained, less than 10,000, less than one fifth. Similar with your party, which also has a few thousand. We few were not killed, and did not turn allegiance, but were not willing to give up, wanted to continue the struggle. Where did we struggle? It was impossible to do in the city. In the city it was only possible to preserve some strength to conduct underground work, we were forced to go to the countryside. I personally did not go to university. Who among them (pointing to Deng Xiaoping and other comrades) went to university? None did. I did not go to university, comrade Liu Shaoqi did not go to university. Comrade Zhou Enlai did not go to university. Comrade Deng Xiaoping did not go to university. Our Central Committee has very few people who went to university. My social profession is elementary school teacher. I also did some newspaper work. The party’s work is to grasp the labor movement, to grasp the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. During the first period of cooperation between the Guomindang and the CCP, before Guomindang captured power, we used the Guomindang’s signboard as a cover to develop the labor movement. I also studied class relations in the countryside, organized village movement schools [sic, find the right term], such as the Guangzhou peasant movement lecture and study circle. But can one say that I really understood the peasants. No. Who chased out Marxist-Leninist intellectuals from the cities and up the mountains to become guerillas? It was Chiang Kai-shek’s white terror. There was no other way. There was only one road – to go into the mountains to become guerillas. Once we started fighting, we fought for 22 years, all the way until 1949, when at last Chiang Kai-shek was chased out of the mainland. It was only when we spent ten years in guerilla warfare that we were really able to understand peasants. The main method was to hold conversations with peasants in the base guerilla areas, to understand their situation. The main shortcoming of the intellectuals (which city workers also have) is that they really don’t understand the countryside, their flavor is the intellectuals’ flavor, out of tune with the peasants. I think that Juliao is like that, as a result peasant don’t trust them. They just look at them and know the flavor is wrong, different from theirs, they won’t speak their mind to you. When you speak to him, pull out a notebook to make notes, he is afraid you are writing things down to rectify him. It’s like Russia’s Narodniks: they advanced the motto of going among the people, but the peasants did not trust them, in fact they were a party of the capitalist class. These experiences – perhaps comrades have already told you – but I feel like I have a duty to tell you once again. For now you don’t have white terror. This is because your country still does not have a real revolutionary situation and a real revolutionary movement. The capitalist class does not yet feel there is necessity to unleash white terror against you, and even more does not feel that there is such a necessity in opposing the old party. The old party has already become a tool of the capitalist class. But when you really start up a wide mass movement, touch their rule, touch their ownership, at that time imperialism, the big landlords, comprador capitalist class will bring down their hand. Cuba’s experience is like that. Cuba’s old party, that is – the People’s Socialist Party – was not feared by the ruling class. What they feared was the July 26 Movement, because this movement touched imperialist and reactionary ownership, attacked the barracks. The attack was defeated, the ruling class began seizing people and killing people. Some people could not remain in the country and fled abroad, there was no other way but the way of guerilla struggle, this was the guerilla war led by Castro, but it did not have easy sailing. It is said that when they started they only had seven guns, 82 people, and they sailed in one boat. After they struggled for a certain period, only 8 people were left, including Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, [Che] Guevara and other comrades. They carried out the struggle in the countryside, summed up the lessons of their losses. 82 people turned to 8, less than ten in one. After they summed up their experience, they continued what they were doing, and scored initial victory. But at the time the People’s Socialist Party was opposed to them, was unwilling to take up the armed struggle. Only the July 26 Movement continued to do it, the revolutionaries within the People’s Socialist Party continued to do it. [Che] Guevara, Raul are all party members of the People’s Socialist Party, they continued to do it. Only when victory was about to be achieved did the People’s Socialist Party change its policy, and turned from opposition to support. Why is it that the main leadership positions fell into the hands of the July 26 Movement? This is because in the past the People’s Socialist Party committed the mistake of opportunism. In the ranks of the People’s Socialist Party there was a faction that was entirely revisionist, led by Escalante, their goal was to topple Castro, to replace him with someone else, to turn the banner of the revolution from red to grey so as to accord with the needs of imperialism. This faction lost out. As I see it, this struggle still continues inside the Cuban party, there still remain remnants of Escalante. Who taught the revolutionary party to go into the mountains and to fight a guerilla war? Mainly American imperialism and Batista, they forced them to have no other way out. In your country, one also has to pay attention to the environment. Your country had two instances of armed peasant struggle. One time was under the leadership of Prestes. At the time he was not yet a party member. I asked him why he lost. He said that at the time he did not have a basic land program, not to mention a thorough land program. The other time was the peasant armed struggle led by Juliao, it was also defeated. They first sent some intellectuals from the cities into the countryside, they were out of tune with the peasants, the peasants were not happy with them. The rulers just struck them a little, and they fell over. You have a rich experience that you can use. There is China’s experience, Cuba’s experience, and the Soviet experience. At the time the Russian Narodniki were a party of the capitalist class, there was also a constitutional democratic party, which was also a party of the capitalist class, a reformist party, similar to China’s Kang Youwei, can’t compare with Sun Yatsen, it never captured political power. On the one hand, it was against the tsar. On the other hand, it opposed the Russian Socialist [Democratic] Labor Party [double check the name in English]. Even more, it opposed the Bolsheviks who were a part of the Socialist Democratic [Labor] Party. The power of the Mensheviks within the Socialist Democratic Labor Party was very considerable. They were not prepared to go into the countryside to start revolution, they were not prepared for a real revolution. All of these capitalist parties taken together – the constitutional party, the democratic party, the Narodniks, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Mensheviks – together opposed the Bolsheviks’ party. And inside the Bolsheviks there was a faction led by Zinoviev that also opposed revolution and armed struggle. The faction that really supported armed struggle was Lenin’s faction. It had Lenin, Stalin, Molotov and others. Every bourgeois and petite bourgeois party exposed its real face to the society. In the period between the February and the October revolutions, the many political factions that entered upon the political stage all lost their credibility in the eyes of the people. The tsar lost his credibility and already fell from stage. The Socialist Revolutionaries, Kerenskii took power and also lost credibility. The people did not believe the Constitutional Democrats, they abandoned the people. One large remaining party were the Mensheviks. They had the majority in the Soviet, and the Bolsheviks had the minority. But the Bolsheviks and Lenin decided to rise up. On the eve of the October revolution they advanced the motto All Power to the Soviets, which had been previously abandoned. The reason that this motto was previously abandoned was that the Mensheviks had the majority in the Soviet, and All Power to the Soviets meant All Power to the Bolsheviks. But on the eve of the October revolution, the Bolsheviks in the Soviet turned from a minority to a majority, so Lenin proposed that the motto All Power to the Soviets, which had been previously abandoned, should be advanced again. However, at the time the majority was only 51%. Of course, it increased greatly after the October revolution. All the parties that opposed struggle, like the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Narodniks, the Mensheviks, and others – all of them turned into counterrevolutionary white parties. This point is worth researching. Every capitalist and reactionary enemies of the society, like the emperor, Chiang Kai-shek, Kerenski, the power-holders, every capitalist and petit bourgeois un-revolutionary or anti-revolutionary faction, they generally want to bring their role into play, generally want to perform their own game. Before these factions largely lose credibility before the masses, revolution cannot succeed. The Cuban revolution demonstrated this point. Batista and people who cooperated with him all were proven to have credibility, the majority of the society believed that the only way out was revolution. The revolution achieved victory because it was supported by the majority of the people. In your country, 65% of the people are in the countryside. This is a good condition, a little worse than the conditions of Russia on the eve of the October revolution. China’s conditions were better still than yours. 80% of the population was in the countryside, the real urban population did not reach 20%. China’s feudal exploiters were worse than yours in Brazil. Your materials say that land rent plus other exploitation reaches one third to one half [of one’s income]?

Amazonas: Yes.

Chairman: Is it just that – one still needs to study this. In China feudal exploitation took 50% to 80% [of income], it was hard to live. Why, although we committed many mistakes in the past, lost the base are in the south, were forced into a 12,500 km Long March, but we were not destroyed, maintained a part of our strength, continued revolution and ultimately achieved victory? There are two reasons: the first is that exploitation in the countryside, imperialist exploitation was very bad. This is an objective reason. It was always present. The other is a subjective reason: had we not overcome the dominant position that was in the party prior to 1934, that is to say the dogmatism that brought losses to the revolution, our revolution would have long collapsed. After the Zunyi Conference, we changed the mistaken line, that line was leftist in form but in reality rightist, terribly afraid of the enemy. At long last, the few of us became a majority from a minority, and the party was not split. But a part still split off. Zhang Guotao commanded more troops than us. They were 80,000, we were 30,000. Moreover, he established a Central Committee. At the time there were two central committees. But at last we overcame Zhang Guotao’s line. The Red Army originally had 300,000 people, after the Long March of ten thousand li only 30,000 remained, one out of ten. Party membership was also originally about 300,000, after the Long March only several tens of thousands remained. But at the time we were not weaker but stronger. Because we obtained lessons of experience, and our line was relatively correct. We summed up the experience of defeat from committing rightist opportunism in 1927, and also summed up the experience of having three times in the few years before 1934 had the leftist line lead the revolution to detour so that we had no choice but undertake the Long March. Afterwards were the eight years of the war against Japan, four years of the war of liberation, 12 years in all, when there were also many zigzags and difficulties. We renewed cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek. At the time there were two ways of thinking inside the party, one faction was revisionist, which we call rightist opportunism and capitulationism. It was represented by Wang Ming, who is now in Moscow. Even now he still opposes us, supports revisionism, but he is still a member of our central committee. We both united with and struggled against Chiang Kai-shek. We united with the aspect of his resistance against Japan but struggle against the aspect of his opposition to Communist Party and to the people, which included armed struggle. In the eight years of war against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek launched three anti-Communist high tides, sending troops to attack us. One the one hand, the Japanese attacked us. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek. We were under attack from two sides but we mainly struggled against Japan. As for Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist tide, if we did not counterattack, we would have collapsed. We resolutely counterattacked in the three anti-Communist high tides but after we counterattacked, whether we achieved victory or whether, because of mistakes, met with defeat (as in the Wannan Incident ), the struggle would reach a certain extent when it had to be controlled, and this is when the slogan of Reason, Interest, Control emerged [check the right translation]. Reason refers to ample reason [to fight], interest refers to an opportune moment, control is stopping before reaching a certain extent. This way, during the entire period of war of resistance against Japan, we maintained a united front with the Guomindang, all the way until Japan’s capitulation, and even after Japan’s capitulation we maintained it for a year and a half. After this, in July 1946 Chiang Kai-shek attacked us in a major way. At the time he had more than 4 million troops, we only had over 1 million troops and guerilla forces. The base are had a population of more than a 100 million. But the prestige of American imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek among the Chinese people became less and less, soon there was no prestige left. This way the war was fought for three and a half years, there were retreats and offensives. Then, for a year or more (1946 to the summer of 1947) we retreated in big strides, at the same time eliminating large numbers of the enemy troops. In the summer of 1947 we counterattacked, from retreat turned to offensive. In 1949 we chased Chiang Kai-shek out from the mainland. In general, revolution is tortuous, it’s not a straight road. Defeat-victory-again defeat-again victory – this way until the final victory. We hope you study the Cuban experience. They also lost and won, and against lost, and again won, also retreated, advanced, again retreated, again advanced, doing it again and again, only achieving victory in the end. But the time that passed was quite short. It took only five years from attacking the Moncada barracks to victory. At the time America and the reactionary clique did not have the experience. Now the situation is somewhat different, they have the experience of being defeated in Cuba. Rulers of every country in Latin America also have the experience of the defeat in Cuba, and experience of success in Guatemala and Ecuador. I met the former President of Guatemala [Jacobo] Arbenz, he is now in Cuba (when you go to Cuba you can also meet him, say hello from me when you see him). He is a good comrade. But because my conversation with him was not long after the defeat, sentiments were on the down side. I said: success and failure are common in military operations. The defeat of the Guatemala revolution is temporary, the people of Guatemala and comrade Arbenz will win in the end. I very much agree with Castro’s February 16 speech. He said that objectively Latin America has a revolutionary situation, but it lacks in subjective conditions. What he means is: many countries’ communist parties are opportunist, including Prestes’ party, the Mexican party, the Argentinian party, the Chile party, the Uruguay party, the Ecuador party, the Peru party (comrade Wu Xiuquan said: there is also the Columbian party). Your situation in Brazil is not bad. Not only is there the revolutionary Cuba, but there is also Venezuela, the Venezuelan party is good. Columbia has a leftist faction, Ecuador, Peru and Argentina don’t have one. Now the hope rests on the shoulders of revolutionary factions. You are the revolutionary faction of Brazil. Your party’s development is very quick, demonstrating that the people want revolution. It is said that in the old party there are a lot of those who approve of you. There are some comrades in the old party whom I spoke with. Last November, the Gesuoyi [translit] couple spoke to me. They told me that they agree with the new party’s points and disagree with the old party, but they are still members of the old party. Gesuoyi the husband was previously a central committee member, served as the secretary of the Rio de Janeiro party committee. Later that was revoked. You have to have confidence. Now you are a minority but the hope is on your shoulders. Your party will definitely develop, will definitely achieve victory, but there can be many zigzags during the struggle, there are victories and there are defeats. Sum up the experience, and in the end one can achieve victory. It is not definite that from the people joining your party now, everyone will reach the victory day. When the revolution meets with difficulties, there will be people who will not dare half-way, others will come over to the enemy’s side, another part of the party members will sacrifice their lives, this is definite. Cuba sacrificed 20,000 people but less than those who died in the old society from hunger, disease and oppression. People who died this way were more. Your material mentioned the death rate, it is said that many people do not reach 19 before dying, and average life expectancy is 39 years old. In China life expectancy used to be 30 years old. Your materials also mentioned malnutrition, the shortage of iron and calcium. This all testifies to what Lenin said: the suffering from the revolution is less than the slow suffering of the old society. China used to have a multitude of people. After the victory of the revolution, the population increased very quickly, to the extent that we think it is a little too fast. I hope to find a map pf Brazil, 1,000,000 to 1.

Amazonas: We can look for it.

Comrade Wu Xiuquan: (to the Chairman) We can look for it ourselves.

Comrade Li Qixin took out a large map, and everyone looked. Amazonas, pointing to the map, said: Brazil borders on eight countries. Chairman pointed to River Amazon, and asked: is this the world’s largest river? Amazonas said: it’s not the longest but it has the largest volume of water. Lin Ken said: in some places, you can’t see one bank from the other.

Chairman: My talk will stop here. I spoke for too long. Do you have anything you are dissatisfied with? Do you have any questions?

Amazonas: We don’t have any questions.

Chairman: I can’t guarantee that all that I said is appropriate, perhaps there are some things that are not appropriate, I can merely provide reference. One thing is that you must create experience, absolutely cannot mechanically copy a foreign country’s experience. Modern revisionism is on the one hand revisionism, on the other hand it is also dogmatism because it copies foreign country’s experience.

Amazonas: I want to tell Chairman Mao the following. For many years I was a central committee secretary in Prestes’s party. Because of party work relations, I travelled to many countries. During my contacts in many countries, it was only China that has a different relationship with fraternal parties than other parties. Even in the Soviet Union, the relationship with important parties is very different from that with unimportant parties. I have never met the highest leaders of the Soviet Communist Party.

Chairman: How long were you in the Soviet Union?

Amazonas: I studied in the Soviet Union for two years, and otherwise went there once for work, two times altogether. When Molotov was relieved from his post, I was in the Soviet Union. What I wanted to say is that I saw a new type of a relationship with a fraternal party in China. While having contacts with the leading comrades of the Chinese party, I saw modesty, a spirit of friendly affection towards fraternal parties, and rich experience. These experiences will help Brazil and the entire international Communist movement. Portuguese has a saying: a friend in need is a friend indeed. Now when we are difficult situation, just at this time, we found the Chinese Party’s helping hand extended to us. And we have never before found such kind of help. We believe that the short period that we are spending in China will greatly aid our party’s revolutionary work. I feel that a number of questions need to be newly discussed in our party. Especially the rural question, comrade Mao Zedong very much emphasized that we must recognize that we still do not understand the peasants, our work in the countryside is still just scratching the surface. I once again express our deep gratitude on behalf of the party and on my own behalf to Chairman Mao for the political and material help provided to us by the Chinese Party, and for giving us every possible care during our visit. We will never forget the point raised with us by Chairman Mao Zedong, in the future there will be defeats and victories, but the Brazilian people will certainly achieve the final victory. In general, we cannot find appropriate words to express our satisfaction and gratitude. We will express this gratitude in our struggle. Only our struggle can be the way of expressing our gratitude.

Chairman: Your party is developing very fast. Therefore, Brazil has a revolutionary party. China’s help is your right and our obligation. All help is mutual. Your struggle is great support to us, we have common enemies.

Lin Ken: Just now comrade Amazonas said that our party is very small and has difficulties. Before we came, the leadership discussed and decided to bring comrade Mao Zedong and his wife a small souvenir so as to express our admiration, love and esteem for comrade Mao Zedong. (Gives Chairman a fiber handbag).

Chairman: Thank you. My wife’s health is bad. Now she is in the South for treatment, not in Beijing. I will pass it to her.

Amazonas: (shaking hand with Chairman): It is a great honor for us to see Chairman today.

CHINESE (TRANSCRIPTION) HTML

63.03.06毛泽东主席接见巴西共产党(新党)代表团谈话记录巴西111-00608-03

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中央联络部文件

毛主席接见巴西共产党(新党)代表团的谈话记录

时间:196336日下午610分到8

地点:中南海颐年堂

主席:欢迎你们。你们是马列主义的党,是决心搞革命的。现在有好些党,号称共产党,但决心不搞革命。马列主义者就是要搞革命。不革命算是什么共产党?不革命的,人民看来,同资本产阶级政党没有多大区别。这样的当没有存在的必要。例如欧洲的社会党,英国的工党,他们和资产阶级的政党没有什么区别。现在有些共产党正在接近社会民主党,特别是印度共产党以丹吉为首的领导集团,同大资产阶级与大地

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主的政党国大党毫无区别。你们这个党是新党,你们感到新党比老党小,也感到帝国主义和他们的走狗势力很大,你们有很多困难。你们国家有资产阶级自由,共产党可以合法或半合法,你们当时半合法的还是非法的?

阿马索纳斯:(下简称阿):我们是半合法的。

主席:一方面这是有利的,你们可以利用半合法来活动,公开出报刊,不受禁止,干部和党员可以公开进行群众工作,发展党的组织,这都是有利的。不利的是:这种情况对革命者的锻炼并不见得好,没有白色恐怖。我们党就从来未合法过。有过两次同国民党合作。第一次一九二四至二七年这三年,我们利用了合作的条件发展了党和群众运动,还进行了一部分军队工作。在准备和进行北伐时期,掌握了一些军队。党员人数达到五万。但是当时党并不觉悟,没有准备资产阶级会来严重的打击,没有准备对付白色恐怖。那是注意点放在组织群众运动方面,包括农民运动,但是组织了几千万农民在我们领导之下。农会有了一部分武装,但是完全没有准备白色恐怖。到了一九二七年,白色恐怖以来,我们就陷于仓促的状态。这个经验我们告诉了许多党,如印尼党,日本党,请他们考虑,总有一天会遇到这种情况,建议他们在思想上和组织上进行准备,而且如果可能的话,在军事上也进行准备。但是真正教育了我们必须拿起枪杆的是谁?不是我们自己,是帝国主义和他的走狗蒋介石。他们用途上和白色恐怖来教育了我们。我们没有别的路走,只好拿起枪赶来。五万党员,剩下不多了。一部分被杀掉了,第二部分投降叛

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变了,第三部分消极不干了,脱党了,余下的第四部分,就是我们这些人。五万党员剩下几千,总之不到一万,不到五分之一。和你们当差不多,也是几千人。我们这些人,没有被杀掉,也没有叛变投降,又不愿消极,要继续斗争。在哪里斗争呢?在城市里是不行的,在城市中只能保存一部分力量进行地下工作,我们逼的只好到农村去。我本人从未上过大学,你们(指邓小平等同志)谁上过大学的?都没有。我未上过大学,刘少奇同志为上过大学,周恩来同志未上过大学,邓小平同志未上过大学,我们中央委员会上过大学的人很少。我的社会职业是小学教员,也搞点新闻工作。党的工作是搞工运,搞一些反帝反封建的斗争。这是在第一次国共合作的时期,在国民党取得政权以前,我们以国民党的招牌为掩护,发展工农运动。我也研究了农村阶级关系,办过一个农村运动学校,即广州的农民运动讲习所。可是我能算是真正了解农村的人吗?不能。是谁把城市里的相信马列主义的知识分子赶到山上打游击的?是蒋介石的白色恐怖。没有办法,只有一条出路,上山打游击,一打就打了二十二年,直到一九四九年才把蒋介石赶出大陆去。在游击战争中过了十年的时间,才真正了解农民。主要办法是在游击根据地召集农民谈话,了解他们的情况。知识分子一个最大的弱点(城市工人也有)就是不大了解农村,卫道士知识分子味道,与农民格格不入,我看儒利奥也是如此,因此农民不信任他们,一看他们就觉得味道不对,同他们不一样,不对你讲心里话。你同他谈话时,掏出本子来记录,他怕你记下来

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了整他。

象俄国的民粹派,他们提出到人民中去的口号,但农民并不信任他们,他们实际上是个资产阶级政党。这些经验,也许已经有同志向你们谈过,但我感到有义务再向你们讲一讲。你们现在还没有白色恐怖,这是因为你们国家还没有真正的革命形势和真正的革命运动。资产阶级还不感觉到有必要采取白色恐怖来对付你们,更不感觉有此必要来对付老党,老党已成为资产阶级的有用工具。但是等到你们真正搞起广大的群众运动,触动他们的统治,触动他们的所有制,那时帝国主义,大地主,买办资产阶级就要下手了。古巴的经验就是如此。古巴的老党,即人民社会党, 统治阶级并不怕它。他们怕的是七二六运动,因为这个运动触动了帝国主义和反动派的所有制,进攻了一个军营。进攻失败了,统治阶级开始抓人杀人。有些人在国内站不住了,逃到国外,没有别的路可走,只好打游击,这就是卡斯特罗领导的游击战争,但这不是一帆风顺的。他们据说开始时只有七只步枪,八十二人,坐了一条船。斗争了一段时期后,只余下八个人,包括了菲德尔卡斯特罗,劳尔卡斯特罗,格瓦拉等同志。他们在农村中进行斗争,总结了失败的经验教训。八十二个人变成了八个,不到十分之一。总结了经验之后,还是继续干,取得了初步胜利。但是此时人民社会党反对,不愿搞武装斗争,七二六运动则继续要干,人民社会党中的革命分子也继续要干,格瓦拉,劳尔等都是人民社会党党员,他们继续要干。一直到快胜利时,人民社会党才改变了政策,从反对转为支持。现在为什么主要的领导职

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位落到七二六运动手中?这是因为人民社会党过去犯了机会主义的错误。 人民社会党中出了一派完全修正主义的,以埃斯卡兰特为首,他们的目的是推翻卡斯特罗,取而代之,把革命的旗帜由红色转为灰色,以适合帝国主义的需要。这派人失败了。我看这个斗争在古巴党内还继续着,还存在着埃斯卡兰特的残余。是谁教育了革命党上山打游击?主要是美帝和巴蒂斯塔,逼得他们没有别的出路。在你们国家,也要注意环境。你们国家有过两次农民武装斗争,有一次是普列斯特斯领导的,当时他还不是党员,我问过他为什么失败,他说当时根本没有土地纲领,更谈不上彻底的土地纲领。另一次就是儒利奥领导的农民武装斗争,也失败了,他们先派一些知识分子从城市到农村,与农民格格不入,农民不高兴他们,统治者稍微一打击,他们就垮台了。你们有丰富的经验可以利用,有中国的经验,古巴的经验,苏联的经验。当时俄国的民粹派是资产阶级的政党,还有个立宪民主党也是资产阶级政党,改良主义的,同中国的康有为差不多,比不上孙中山,它从来没有取得过政权,它一方面反沙皇,一方面反对俄国社会民工党,更加反对社会民主党中的布尔什维克。 社会民主工党内的孟什维克势力很大,他们不准备到农村去发动农民,也不准备真正革命。所有这些资产阶级政党和在一起,有立宪民主党,民粹党,社会革命党,孟什维克,都一起反对布尔什维克党。而布尔什维克内部以季诺维耶夫为首的一派也反对进行革命和武装斗争。真正坚持武装斗争的是列宁的一派,有列宁,斯大林,莫洛托夫等。

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个资产阶级小资产阶级的政党,都在社会上暴露了自己的真面目。二月革命到十月革命这段期间,许多登上了政治舞台的政派都在人民中丧失了信用。沙皇失掉了信用,已经垮台了。社会革命党人,克伦斯基掌握过政权,也丧失了信用。人民不信任立宪民主党人,他们抛弃了人民。余下的一个大党就是孟什维克,他们在苏维埃里本占多数,布尔什维克占少数,但布尔什维克和列宁下决心起义,在十月革命前夕提出了一切政权归苏维埃的这个曾在一个时期放弃了的口号。过去一个时期放弃这个口号是因为在苏维埃中孟什维克占多数,一切政权归苏维埃就等于一切政权归孟什维克。但是在十月革命前夕,不失为可在苏维埃中有少数变为多数,所以列宁就提出应该把过去放弃的一切政权归苏维埃的口号重新提出。不过当时的多数也只是百分之五十一,当然,在十月革命后大大增加了。所有反对斗争的其他政党,象社会革命党,立宪民主党,民粹派,孟什维克等,都变成了反革命白党。这一条值得研究。社会上各种资产阶级的,反动的敌人,象皇帝,蒋介石,克伦斯基,当权的人,各种资产阶级小资产阶级的不革命以致反革命的派别,他们总是要发挥他们的作用,总是要演他们的戏的。在这些派别还未大体上在群众中丧失信用以前,革命是不能成功的,古巴革命也证明了这一点。巴蒂斯塔和一切同他合作的人都被证明失去了信用,社会上大多数人都认为唯一的出路是革命,革命之取得胜利,是因为得到大多数人的拥护。你们的国家有65%的人口在农村,这是个好条件,比十

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月革命前俄国条件差一些。中国条件比你们更好一些,80%以上的人口在农村,真正的城市人口不到20%。中国的封建剥削比你们巴西还厉害。你们材料上说,地租加上其他形式的剥削,占三分之一到一半?

阿:是的。

主席:是不是只是这些,还要进一步研究。中国的封建剥削是从50%80%,日子很不好过。为什么我们过去虽然犯了许多错误,把南方的根据地通通失掉,被迫举行一万二千五百公里的长征,但是没有被消灭掉,保存了一部分力量,继续搞革命,最后取得胜利?有两个方面的原因:一个是农村剥削,帝国主义剥削很厉害,这是个客观原因, 是经常存在的。 另一个是主观原因,就是:要是不克服一九三四年以前那种在党内占统治地位,把革命带到失败的教条主义的话,我们的革命早就垮台了。经过遵义会议,我们改变了错误的路线,这条路线形式上是左的,实际上是右的,害怕敌人害怕得要命。终于我们这些人,从少数变成了多数,党没有发生分裂。但一部分还是分裂出去了。张国寿率领的那部分军队,比我们的还多,他们八万人,我们三万人,他另外成立了一个中央委员会,当时就有了两个中央委员会。但我们终于还是克服了张国寿路线。红军原来有三十万人,经过了万里长征,剩下不到三万人,只十分之一,党员最初也有三十万左右,经过长征,只剩几万。但是这时我们不是更弱而是更强了。因为我们取得了经验教训,我们的路线比较正确了。我们总结了一九二七年犯右倾机会主义遭受失败的经

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验,也总结了一九三四前几年间三次左倾路线把革命引向挫折不得不举行万里长征的经验。后来抗日战争八年,解放战争四年,这中间十二年,也有许多的曲折困难。与蒋介石重新合作。当时党内思想上分裂为两派,一派是修正主义的,我们称之为右倾机会主义和投降主义,以王明为代表,他现在还在莫斯科,他直到现在还反对我们,支持修正主义,但他还是我们中央委员。我们对蒋介石是又团结又斗争,对他抗日的一面,我们谈团结;对他反共反人民的一面,我们进行斗争,包括武装斗争在内。抗日八年中,蒋介石发动了三次反共高潮,派军队进攻我们。一面是日本进攻我们,一面是蒋介石。我们处在两方面打击之下,但我们主要的斗争方面是日本。对蒋介石的反共高潮,我们如果不还击,就会垮台。对三次反共高潮,我们坚决还击,但还击取得胜利或因我们犯错误遭到失败(如皖南事变)之后,斗争到一定地步应有节制,这就出现了有理有利有节的口号。有理就是有充分的理由,有利是在有利的时机,有节就是在一定的程度适可而止。这样,我们在整个抗日战争时期,保持了同国民党的统一战线,知道日本投降,而且保持到日本投降一年半之后。然后,一九四六年七月,蒋介石大举进攻我们。当时他有四百多万军队,我们有一百多万军队和游击队。根据地有一亿多人口。但是,美帝国主义和蒋介石在人民中威信越来越小,知道没有威信。这场战争打了三年半,有退有进。最近一年多(四六年到四七年夏)我们大踏步后

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退,同时消灭了敌人很多军队,到四七年夏天就反攻,从后退转为前进,到四九年就把蒋介石赶出大陆。总之,革命是往返曲折的,不是一直走的。失败-胜利-又失败-又胜利-直到最后胜利。后退-前进-再后退-再前进-直到最后胜利。我们希望你们研究一下古巴的经验。他们也是失败,胜利,再失败,再胜利,也是退却-前进-再退却,再前进,经过多次反复,才最后取得胜利,但经过时间比较短,从攻打蒙卡达军营到胜利才五年时间。那时美国和古巴反动派没有经验。现在情况有点不同,他们有了再古巴失败的经验。拉丁美洲各国统治者也有了在古巴失败的经验。拉丁美洲各国统治者也有了在古巴失败的经验,也有在危地马拉和厄瓜多尔成功的经验。危地马拉前总统阿本斯我见过他,他现在在古巴。(你们到古巴时可以见他,见到他时代我问候他)他是个很好的同志,但我同他谈话时他因为刚失败不久,情绪有点不振。我说,胜负是兵家常事。危地马拉革命的失败是暂时的,危地马拉人民和阿本斯同志毕竟是要胜利的。我很同意卡斯特罗二月十六日的演说,他说拉丁美洲客观上有了革命的形势,就是缺少主观的条件,这意思是:大多数国家的共产党是机会主义的,这里有:普列斯特斯的党,墨西哥党,阿根廷党,智利党,乌拉圭党,厄瓜多尔党,秘鲁党(伍修权同志说:还有哥伦比亚)。你们巴西的环境不坏,不仅有革命的古巴,而且有委内瑞拉,委内瑞拉的党是好的。哥伦比亚有左派,厄瓜多尔,秘鲁,阿根廷,都有革命的。现在希望就寄托在革命派的身上。你们是巴西的革命派。你们党的发展很快,证明

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了人民是要革命的。就是在老党中,赞成你们的据说相当多。老当中有些同志与我谈过。去年十一月戈索伊夫妇同我谈过,他们向我说,他们同意新党的观点,不同意老党,但他们仍是老党党员。戈索伊的丈夫曾是中央委员,做过里约热内卢的党委书记,后来被撤销了。你们应该有信心。你们现在是少数,但希望就寄托在你们身上。你们党肯定是要发展的,肯定会取得胜利,但斗争中会出现许多曲折,有胜利有失败。总结了经验,最后会取得胜利。现在加入你们党的,不一定全都能到胜利的那一天。在革命困难的时候,会有人中途不干的,会有人叛变投敌,另一部分党员会牺牲生命,这是一定的。古巴革命牺牲了两万人,但比旧社会死于饥饿,疾病,压迫的要少,那样死的人要多。你们材料中谈到了死亡率,据说许多人不到十九岁就死去,平均寿命三十九岁。中国过去平均寿命是三十岁。你们材料还谈到营养不良,缺乏铁质,缺乏钙。这一切都证明了列宁所说的:革命引起的痛苦,比旧社会慢性的痛苦小。中国过去就是成百万成千万的人。革命胜利后,人口增加很快,以致我们嫌它快了点。我希望找到一张巴西地图,百万分之一的。

阿:我们可以找。

伍修权同志:(对主席)我们自己可以找。

(李启新同志拿出巴西地图大家观看。阿马索纳斯指着地图说:巴西与八个国家交界。主席指亚马逊河问:是不是世界上最大的河?阿马索纳斯说:长度不是最大的,但水量最充沛。林肯说:在有些地方,这边岸看不

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到那边岸。

主席:我的话就谈到这里吧。讲得太多了。看看你们有什么不满意的没有?有什么问题没有?

阿:没有什么问题了。

主席:我不能担保我说的都妥当,也许有不妥当的地方,仅能供你们参考。有一条,你们需要创造经验,决不能机械地抄外国的经验。现代修正主义一方面是修正主义,一方面也是教条主义,因为它照抄外国经验。

阿:我要告诉毛泽东主席的是:我多年曾经担任普列斯特斯党的中央书记,由于党工作的关系,到过许多国家。在同许多国家的接触中,只有在中国看到了跟别的党不一样的对兄弟党的关系。即使在苏联,重要的党和不重要的党的关系就很不一样。我从来没有跟苏共的最高领导人见过面。

主席:你在苏联多久?

阿:在苏联学习过两年,另外因公去过苏联一次,共两次。莫洛托夫被解职时,我正在苏联。我要说的是,我再中国看到了新型的兄弟党的关系。我跟中国党领导同志接触当中,看到了谦虚,对兄弟党的友爱的精神,和丰富的经验,这些经验将会帮助巴西的和全世界的共产主义运动。葡萄牙语有句成语:患难见朋友。我们现在正处在困难的时期,正在这时候,得到了中国党伸出的援助的手,而这种援助是我们以往从来没有得到过的。我们相信,在中国停留的这段时间,将大大有助于我们党的革命工作。我感到有若干问题,在我

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们党内有重新讨论的必要。尤其关于农村的问题,毛泽东同志很强调,我们必须承认,我们还不了解农民,我们的农村工作还是浮于表面。我再一次以党的名义和个人的名义向毛泽东主席表示我们对中国党给予的政治帮助和物质援助以及我们访问期间给予的无微不至的关怀的深切谢意。我们永远不会忘记毛泽东同志向我们提醒的一点,将来会有失败,有胜利,但巴西人民一定能取得最后胜利。总之,我们找不到适当的语言来表达我们的满意和感谢。我们要把这种感谢表现在我们的斗争当中,只有我们的斗争才是表示我们感谢的最好的方式。

主席:你们党发展很快。巴西因此有了一个革命的党。中国的援助,是你们应得的权利,也是我们应尽的义务。一切援助都是互助。你们的斗争,对我们是很大的支持,我们有共同的敌人。

林肯:刚才阿马索纳斯同志谈到我们党目前很小,有困难。我们来前,领导上讨论了决定应给毛泽东同志的夫人带来一件很小的纪念品,以表示我们对毛泽东同志的仰慕和爱戴。(巴一个纤维编成的手提包交给主席。)

主席:谢谢。我的爱人身体有病,现在南方修养,不在北京。我转交给她。

阿(与主席握手):今天能看见主席,是我们最大的荣幸。