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Digital Archive International History Declassified

April 03, 1945


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    Ambassador Lebedev reports the contents of a telegram from Veslav (Władysław Gomułka) about the situation in the Polish Underground.
    "Report from Soviet Ambassador to Poland V. Z. Lebedev to V. M. Molotov," April 03, 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, fond 07, op 10, p 22, d 308, ll. 4-5. Document No. 57 in Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1. Translated for CWIHP by Svetlana Savranskaya.
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V. Z. Lebedev's Report to V. M. Molotov Regarding V. Gomulka's Telegram About the Situation in the Polish Underground[1]


April 3, 1945


To comrade V. M. Molotov

I am sending you two telegrams from Secretary of the CC PWP comrade Veslav addressed to you.


"I consider it necessary to inform you of the following: The decisions of the underground organization of the PPC, Ludove, and the "Democratic Association”[2] prepared for the negotiations with the leadership in emigration[3] are the following:

1. Not to recognize Berut as President, and to propose Voitsehowsky, Vitos and Zhelikowski as candidates.

2. To allow the ''Lublin govemment”[4] to participate in the new government only as representatives of the PWP.

3. To demand from the Western allies to introduce troops in Poland to "ensure free elections."

4. The "AK" uniting separate units, including the Anders' army and the army formed in the USSR, should be the spine of the new Polish Army.

5. To demand a full amnesty.

6. The "camp of the Polish Democracy" oriented "against the fascist and totalitarian aspirations of the PWP" should become the ruling group.

7. To agree to the Eastern borders[5], but to emphasize that it was done under pressure.



"We received confidential information that Yankowsky and others, with whom comrade Serov[6] negotiated, disappeared; after which there were conferences of the underground organizations of the Ludove, People's Democrats and the so-called, ''Democratic association," during which it was decided that if in the next several days the disappearance of Yankowsky is not investigated, they would undertake an extensive campaign in the country and abroad. The "AK" accuses the delegates of frivolous thinking and believes that this fact should be used in order to dismiss "all tendencies to compromise”[7] and, therefore, to create a basis for a new conspiracy. In this connection, we are waiting for your instructions for appropriate preparations in the party.



[1] Copies sent to I. Stalin, V. Molotov, L. Beria. G. Malenkov, P. Bulganin, A. Vyshinsky, V. Dekanozov, the IV European Department, and to the files

[2] He refers to the political parties that still remained underground, which had connections to the Polish 6migr6 government. They recognized the decisions on the Polish issue taken by the heads of the great powers at the Yalta Conference in the beginning of February 1945, and so they could become real candidates for membership in the reorganized coalition government led by the Communists. In such a case, the Communists' dominant political positions could be undermined. As available documents and the further developments show, in February-March 1945, the Soviet side, concerned about this kind of resolution of the Polish issue, made contacts with the figures of the underground. On March 1-21 preliminary conversations between Colonel Pimenov and a number of prominent underground politicians took place; they discussed the issue of negotiations between representatives of the underground structures with the Soviet side. The political and military leaders of the underground, assembled for those negotiations, were arrested on March 28-29, and brought to Lubyanka on March 30. (For details see "NKVD and the Polish Underground, 1944-1945" (Based on I. V. Stalin's "Special Folders), Moscow, 1994, Documents ## 27,28,31,33-35,37,38,41-43; and also GARF, Fond 9478, Finding aid 1, File 333.}

[3] During the preliminary negotiations mentioned above they spoke about a trip to London for a delegation of the leaders of the underground on March 29. As Commander of Army Kraiova General Okulitsky reported to London to the Supreme Commander of the Polish Armed Forces, "the Soviets promised to give an opportunity for a delegate of the government and two representatives each from political parties to talk to you." (See: Duraczynski E. General lwanow mprasz,a. 16 przywodcy potiziemnego panstwa polskiego przed sadem moskiewskim. Warszawa, 1989. S. 96,98, 102-103).

[4] He refers to the Interim Government led by E. Osubka-Morawski

[5] He refers to the Soviet-Polish border, which was based on the "Kerzon Line" demarcated by the ethnic principle.

[6] On March 5, 1945, I. A. Serov was appointed Adviser of the NKVD USSR at the Ministry of Public Security of Poland, after the consent of B. Berut and Osubka~Morawski had been obtained on March 1, 1945 (See "NKVD and the Polish Underground, 19~1945" (Based on L V. Stalin's "Special Folders), Moscow, 1994, pp. 98~99.)

[7] In the spring of 1945, in the Polish political underground, there emerged a tendency for compromise with the existing government under the influence of the decisions in Yalta. The willingness to cooperate with the regime was especially prominent in the leadership of the underground peasants' party.