July 16, 1987
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf, Director to the Director, 'Solarz Amendment Applicability to the Pakistani Procurement Case'

Citation:

Summary:
ACDA official Norman Wulf saw a good case, with the information supporting positive answers to basic questions: would the maraging steel to be used for nuclear weapons manufacture, was the Pakistani national working on behalf of his government, would the steel “contribute significantly” to a capability to manufacture a nuclear explosive, and was there an “attempted illegal export”?

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

UNIFIED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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July 16, 1987

TO: The Director
FROM: NWC - Norman A. Wulf, Acting
SUBJECT: Solarz Amendment Applicability to the Pakistani Procurement Case

Four key questions must be answered before determining the applicability of the Solarz amendment to the maraging steel case:

1. Was the material to be used "in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device?" Technical analysis provided by experts at Oak Ridge indicates that there is no plausible end-use for 25 tons of grade 350 maraging steel other than in the manufacture of centrifuges. Pakistan is using centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium, for which Pakistan has no use except in nuclear explosives. While the maraging steel would not have been used directly in a device, it would have been used in the production of HEU, for which no purpose exists other than in the manufacture of a nuclear device.

2. Was the Pakistani national acting "on behalf of or in the interests of" the Government of Pakistan? As the intended end-use for the maraging steel is centrifuge enrichment equipment and the Government of Pakistan operates the only uranium enrichment facility in Pakistan, there is no reason to doubt that the export was attempted on behalf of the Pakistani Government. Moreover, the suspect has admitted to working for a retired Brigadier General known to be a procurement agent for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

3. Would the maraging steel contribute significantly to Pakistan's ability "to manufacture a nuclear explosive device?" The maraging steel sought would have significantly contributed to Pakistan's existing centrifuge enrichment program. If used to make centrifuges, those centrifuges could produce enough HEU for 8 to 12 bombs per year. This is in contrast to their present HEU production capacity which is sufficient to produce one bomb per year.
4. Was there an illegal export or an attempted illegal export? According to the affidavit filed by Customs investigators, the suspect is charged with filing a false export license application, bribing an undercover Customs investigator, and conspiring to export nuclear-related materials to Pakistan in violation of US export control regulations.