



July 23, 1987

**US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum
from Kenneth Adelman for the Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs, 'The Pakistani Procurement Cases'**

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Summary:

With Pakistan already violating the “red line” on uranium enrichment, Adelman believed that without a display of resolve “presidential credibility” would be further damaged; that required cutting off aid under the Solarz amendment.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

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July 23, 1987

DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: The Pakistani Procurement Cases

As you know, I am concerned that the President's credibility and our overall nonproliferation policy will be further damaged if we do not respond forcefully to the current Pakistani procurement cases. Damage has already been inflicted as a result of our failure to correct Pakistan's violation of the enrichment red line. If we now "lawyer our way around" the Solarz Amendment, Zia will conclude once again that he need do nothing about his bomb program. This would put us in the worst possible position in terms of our Afghan and nonproliferation interests. (S)

I believe there is only one way to demonstrate our resolve: terminate assistance pursuant to the Solarz Amendment and then demand from Pakistan, as a precondition for a waiver, 1) a halt in procurement activities, and 2) a halt in enrichment beyond five percent. (We must be able to verify this latter condition.) (S)

Achievement of these conditions will not only allow the President to waive the Solarz Amendment but will provide the basis for Congress to enact the Symington waiver. Assistance to Pakistan will automatically terminate on September 30 unless Congress enacts legislation extending the Symington waiver. Indications are increasing that Congress will not enact such legislation without crippling conditions unless the President demonstrates that he takes the Solarz Amendment seriously, and Pakistan places meaningful constraints on its nuclear program. Thus, a Presidential termination of aid pursuant to the Solarz Amendment is the best way to ensure Congressional support for continuation of aid pursuant to a Symington waiver. (S)

Also, we have already laid out these conditions, most recently in your meeting with Ambassador Marker. The issue now is whether we back up our words with actions, or undertake yet another ineffectual demarche to add to the forty-plus that have already occurred. (S)

Kenneth L. Adelman

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