November 04, 1987
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'A Strategy on Pakistan'

Citation:

Summary:
Adelman advised Armacost to “increase pressure on Pakistan to try to get them to stop enrichment above five percent and to stop illegal procurement activities in the United States.”

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: A Strategy on Pakistan (U)

We have some time before aid to Pakistan can be provided since, under the most likely Congressional scenario, the President will be unable to waive the Symington Amendment restriction before January 15. I believe it is essential that we use this time to increase the pressure on Pakistan to try to get them to stop enriching above five percent and to stop illegal procurement activities in the United States. We can do this without cutting off our future options. (S)

Specifically, I believe we should:
  o hold off on any certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device until aid is ready to resume, i.e. January 15; and
  o invoke the Solarz Amendment now and hold off the decision on waiving its restrictions until January 15 as well. (S)

Frankly, the arguments being used as justification for putting off a finding under Solarz are not at all convincing. Pretrial publicity is something courts manage to deal with routinely, without prejudicing fair trial rights. Pervez' possible acquittal should not be troublesome since the finding relates as much if not more to the activities of Inam-ul-Haq than to Pervez' activities. (S)

I see no reason not to invoke Solarz now and the facts certainly support such a finding. Continued delay, like an early certification, will only serve to take pressure off Pakistan at a time when we want to put it on. It could also undercut some Congressional support for the Pakistan assistance program. (S)
Should the President exercise the Symington waiver authority in conjunction with an unfavorable enrichment report, whatever criticism such a waiver may generate will not be significantly greater if the President concurrently decides to waive Solarz and to certify non-possession. Dribbling these actions out between now and a Symington waiver not only would expose the President to two additional opportunities for criticism but also would incrementally remove any pressure on Pakistan to curtail its nuclear program. (S)

I am sending a similar memorandum to Frank Carlucci. (U)

Kenneth L. Adelman

CC: Dal Cerl NEA